Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two Sioux Falls police officers attempted to stop a stolen vehicle driven by a suspect who had absconded from parole and was believed to be armed. During a subsequent foot chase, the suspect allegedly shot at the officers, injuring one, and later exchanged gunfire with other law enforcement before being apprehended. After his arrest, the Minnehaha County State’s Attorney filed criminal charges, and the unredacted names of the two officers appeared in public court documents. The officers, invoking their rights as crime victims under Article VI, § 29 of the South Dakota Constitution (Marsy’s Law), requested that their names and any identifying information be redacted from public filings, citing concerns about potential harassment or targeting.Initially, the officers sought relief through a writ of mandamus, which was denied by a judge outside the circuit, who found that Marsy’s Law and South Dakota statutes provided an adequate remedy within the ongoing criminal proceedings. The officers then intervened directly in the criminal case, moving to have their names redacted. The Second Judicial Circuit Court denied their motion, reasoning that Marsy’s Law did not expressly provide a right to anonymity and that, even if the officers were assumed to be “victims,” their names alone did not constitute protected information under Marsy’s Law.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed and remanded. The Court held that law enforcement officers can qualify as “victims” under Marsy’s Law when a crime is committed against them. It further held that a victim’s name or initials are “information or records that could be used to locate or harass the victim or the victim’s family” and may be subject to redaction upon request. However, the Court clarified that Marsy’s Law does not grant a categorical right to redaction; rather, courts must balance victims’ rights with defendants’ and the public’s constitutional rights on a case-by-case basis. View "State v. Albaidhani" on Justia Law

A California company repurposed decommissioned military bunkers in South Dakota as survival shelters, offering them for sale or long-term lease. In 2020, an individual entered into a 99-year lease with the company for one of these bunkers, paying $35,000 upfront. The lease agreement incorporated a set of community rules, which the company reserved the right to modify with 30 days’ written notice. In 2021, the company amended the rules to expressly prohibit the brandishing of firearms except in designated areas. In 2023, the lessee was alleged to have brandished a firearm during an altercation, prompting the company to issue notices to vacate and, ultimately, to file a forcible entry and detainer action when the lessee secured the bunker but refused to return possession.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Fall River County granted summary judgment in favor of the lessee. The court reasoned that the lease was illusory because the company could unilaterally modify the rules at any time, leaving the lessee with no recourse. The court concluded that this rendered the entire lease void and unenforceable, thereby preventing the company from evicting the lessee under the lease.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the circuit court’s summary judgment order. The Supreme Court held that the lease agreement was supported by valid consideration and was not illusory merely because the company retained the right to modify community rules, as such modifications were constrained by requirements of reasonableness and good faith. The Court ruled that the ability to modify rules, when exercised subject to notice and implied duties of good faith and fair dealing, does not make the underlying contract unenforceable. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Vivos Xpoint v. Sindorf" on Justia Law

A South Dakota resident hired a South Dakota attorney after his wife's fatal car accident in North Dakota. The attorney brought in a North Dakota lawyer and they both signed agreements with the client, providing for a one-third contingent fee split between the two firms. The agreements allowed the attorneys to withdraw and assert a lien for their full contingent fee if the client refused a settlement offer they deemed reasonable. After the at-fault party’s insurer quickly offered policy limits totaling $500,000, the attorneys and client unsuccessfully pursued other sources of recovery. The attorneys advised settling, but the client declined, leading the attorneys to withdraw and file an attorney’s lien for their fee. Eighteen months later, the client accepted the settlement, prompting the attorneys to seek enforcement of their lien. The client counterclaimed, alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and deceit, and sought rescission under North Dakota law.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Codington County, granted summary judgment for the attorneys, enforcing their fee and dismissing the client’s counterclaims. The court found South Dakota law applied, not North Dakota law, and concluded that the fee agreements were enforceable and reasonable. The client appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota held that South Dakota law governs the dispute and affirmed dismissal of the client’s counterclaims. However, it reversed the enforcement of the full contingent fee, finding that the contractual provision allowing withdrawal and a full fee upon the client’s refusal to settle unduly infringed on the client’s rights. The court held that, after withdrawal for good cause, the attorneys are entitled to recover reasonable fees based on quantum meruit, not the contingent fee, and remanded for determination of that amount. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Culhane v. Thovson" on Justia Law

Leslie and Karen Turgeon own property in Spearfish, South Dakota, which can only be accessed by the Thoen Stone Road. The City of Spearfish owns the Thoen Stone Monument and the surrounding parkland, and has maintained a locked gate at the northern entrance of the Road for over forty years, providing keys to certain property owners, including the Turgeons. The Turgeons occasionally experienced issues with the key, hindering their access. They filed a declaratory action seeking a determination that the Road is a public right-of-way, asking the court to order the City to remove the gate and any other obstructions, and to enjoin the City from restricting access for themselves and the public.The Circuit Court for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Lawrence County, reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court determined that earlier documents (the 1953 Easement, 1971 Agreement, and 1972 Warranty Deed) did not manifest an intent to dedicate the Road for public use. The court found that the 2012 Plat expressly dedicated the Road as a public right-of-way but concluded that the City had not accepted this dedication, either expressly or impliedly, in part because the locked gate was inconsistent with public use. On this basis, the court granted summary judgment to the City and denied all relief to the Turgeons.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision that the Road was not dedicated for public use until the 2012 Plat, and that there was no express acceptance of dedication by the City. However, it reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment regarding implied acceptance, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the City impliedly accepted the dedication of the Road as a public right-of-way. The case was remanded for trial on this issue. View "Turgeon v. City Of Spearfish" on Justia Law

Susan and Richard Spry managed their uncle Richard Hermanek’s finances under a power of attorney after he suffered from significant cognitive decline. Acting in this capacity, the Sprys opened a joint bank account with Mutual of Omaha in Nebraska, titling it in the names of Hermanek, Susan, and Richard, and transferred large sums from Hermanek’s South Dakota accounts, proceeds from his home, and other funds. After Hermanek’s death, Susan transferred the remaining balance to the Sprys’ personal account in Texas. Concerned relatives who would have inherited from Hermanek initiated a civil suit and notified authorities, leading to a criminal investigation.A Bon Homme County grand jury indicted the Sprys on multiple counts, including grand theft and conspiracy to commit grand theft related to the handling of Hermanek’s property. After a jury trial in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, both were convicted on these charges, among others. At trial, the court instructed the jury on contractual rather than testamentary capacity regarding the joint account and limited testimony about Hermanek’s statements during the account’s creation. The court also instructed the jury that the presumption of survivorship rights in a joint account could be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence of contrary intent, rather than requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota held that the circuit court did not err in choosing the contractual capacity instruction but erred by excluding testimony about Hermanek’s contemporaneous statements and by using the clear and convincing evidence standard instead of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for rebutting the presumption of survivorship rights. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions for grand theft and conspiracy to commit grand theft and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Spry" on Justia Law

The case concerns an inmate who, while incarcerated at a South Dakota prison, damaged prison property and engaged in a physical altercation with a correctional officer. The incident began when officers searched the inmate’s cell and confiscated his television for lacking required security stickers. In response, the inmate followed an officer to the day hall, broke a computer monitor with an electric kettle, and damaged a wall-mounted television. When officers intervened, the inmate was sprayed with pepper spray and then struck a correctional officer multiple times. The incident was captured by prison surveillance cameras, though the video contained a four-second gap due to technical issues.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Bon Homme County, presided over the trial. The inmate was charged with two counts of simple assault against a correctional officer and one count of intentional property damage. He was convicted by a jury of one count of simple assault and one count of intentional damage to property, but acquitted on the second assault count. The court denied his requests for a self-defense jury instruction, as well as his motions to dismiss based on double jeopardy and due process claims. The court also allowed the use of surveillance footage with the four-second skip, finding no evidence of misconduct or suppression by the State.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota, the inmate raised issues regarding the propriety of the assault charge, the admission of the surveillance video, the refusal to give a self-defense instruction, the State’s alleged failure to preserve evidence, and double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the charging decision was not reviewable absent due process concerns, the video was properly admitted, there was insufficient evidence to warrant a self-defense instruction, no constitutional violation arose from the missing footage, and submitting alternative assault counts did not violate double jeopardy. View "State v. Warfield" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted after a jury trial of aggravated eluding, reckless driving, driving under suspension, and failing to stop at a stop sign, all arising from an incident in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Law enforcement responded to a call about a family dispute, with the caller reporting that the defendant was driving a red Toyota Camry. Officers observed the vehicle and identified the defendant as the driver, who then fled at high speed through residential neighborhoods. The defendant later testified that he was not involved, did not own or drive the Camry, and denied fleeing from police.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, presided over the trial. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to exclude statements related to the BOLO alert and the caller’s association of him with the Camry, arguing hearsay and character evidence grounds. The court denied these motions, reasoning that the BOLO and information about the vehicle were relevant to the officers’ actions and not unduly prejudicial. During trial, officers testified about the BOLO and caller’s statements, and defense counsel made a continuing objection referencing Crawford v. Washington. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts, and the defendant was sentenced with all terms suspended.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The defendant argued that admitting the caller’s statement violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and constituted inadmissible hearsay. The court held that the defendant had not properly preserved the Confrontation Clause issue for appeal, as he failed to provide sufficient facts or request a determination about whether the caller’s statement was testimonial. Regarding hearsay, the court found that, even if error occurred, it was not prejudicial because the officers’ identification testimony and dash camera videos provided strong, independent evidence of the defendant’s identity. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "State v. Clifford" on Justia Law

An individual, after experiencing ongoing conflicts with employees of a residential bunker community, confronted one employee about reckless driving near his home. Later that day, another community employee, upset by the earlier confrontation, decided to confront the resident directly. The employee sent text messages expressing his intent to physically confront and “educate” the resident. After being warned by a mutual acquaintance of the employee’s intentions, the resident armed himself. When the employee arrived, he shouted threats and claimed to have killed someone with his bare hands. As the employee advanced toward the resident, the resident shot him once in the chest, resulting in non-fatal injuries. The resident then provided medical aid until emergency responders arrived.A grand jury was convened to consider the resident’s conduct. It declined to indict him for the shooting but did charge him with simple assault for his earlier physical contact with the first employee. The injured employee then filed a civil lawsuit for assault and battery. The resident moved to dismiss, asserting self-defense immunity under South Dakota statutes and requesting a stay of discovery. The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit held an evidentiary hearing limited to the immunity issue. The court excluded a grand jury transcript from evidence, denied the plaintiff’s motion for a continuance, and found the resident’s testimony credible.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the continuance and whether it erred in finding civil immunity. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion regarding the continuance, and that the resident was justified in using deadly force in self-defense under SDCL 22-18-4.1, making him immune from civil liability under SDCL 22-18-4.8. The decision of the circuit court was affirmed. View "Anderson v. Streeter" on Justia Law

The defendant was involved in a series of criminal incidents beginning in late December 2023, including an alleged domestic assault, multiple vehicle thefts, assaulting a law enforcement officer with a vehicle, fleeing police, violating no-contact orders, drug possession, and failing to appear in court. These incidents led to six separate felony cases in Lawrence and Meade Counties. In each case, the defendant entered into plea agreements, resulting in guilty pleas to several counts in exchange for the dismissal of other charges and enhancements. The sentences imposed by the circuit court were largely concurrent, except for a consecutive sentence in the Meade County case.Following his convictions and sentencing, the defendant appealed, asserting that his guilty plea in the primary Lawrence County case was not knowing and voluntary. He claimed that both his counsel and the presentence investigation report (PSI) led him to believe he would be eligible for parole after serving a portion of his sentence, when in fact, state law rendered him ineligible for parole on the aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer charge. He further argued that, if his plea was invalid, the sentences in his other Lawrence County cases should also be vacated under the sentencing package doctrine.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the totality of the circumstances and found that the plea was knowing and voluntary. The court held that neither the circuit court nor counsel was required to inform the defendant of collateral consequences such as parole eligibility, and inaccuracies or misunderstandings about parole did not render the plea involuntary. Because the defendant did not prevail on his primary claim, his argument regarding the sentencing package doctrine was moot. The Supreme Court affirmed all of the circuit court’s judgments. View "State v. Ware" on Justia Law

An individual was convicted by a jury in Charles Mix County, South Dakota, for failing to appear at a pretrial conference in a pending felony case. In a separate incident, he pleaded guilty to simple assault following an altercation with another inmate at the county jail. He appealed both convictions, raising jurisdictional arguments based on his status as an enrolled member of the Yankton Sioux Tribe. He contended that both the courthouse and the jail are located in Indian country, thus depriving the state court of jurisdiction. He also challenged the denial of his motion to dismiss under the 180-day rule, the admission of certain evidence, and the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal in the failure to appear case.The First Judicial Circuit Court denied his motions to dismiss, finding that neither the courthouse nor the jail was located in Indian country as defined by federal law. The court attributed most of the pretrial delay to the defendant’s own actions, such as refusing to participate in proceedings and to communicate with counsel, and determined the 180-day period for trial had not expired. The court also admitted evidence over his objections, including a bond form and testimony by his prior attorney, and allowed a jury to decide the failure to appear charge.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed both appeals together. It held that the land in question does not qualify as Indian country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)-(c), reaffirming precedent that previously allotted lands that have passed into non-Indian ownership are not Indian country. The court declined to overrule its earlier decision in Bruguier v. Class. It further held that the 180-day rule was not violated, the challenged evidence was properly admitted, and sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed both convictions. View "State v. Winckler" on Justia Law