Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Todd Weiland filed a personal injury lawsuit against Patrick Bumann for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident while Bumann was on duty as a South Dakota Highway Patrol trooper. The circuit court denied Weiland’s motion for partial summary judgment on negligence, contributory negligence, causation, and failure to mitigate damages, leading to a jury trial. The court also denied Bumann’s request to apply a recklessness standard instead of ordinary negligence. At trial, the court excluded the Minnehaha County Sheriff’s Department accident report, certain SDHP investigation materials, and representations by Bumann’s insurance adjuster. The jury found Bumann negligent but also found Weiland contributorily negligent, awarding Weiland $18,661.50 in damages.Weiland appealed, challenging the circuit court’s rulings. The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court found Weiland’s challenge to the denial of summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law on negligence moot since the jury found Bumann negligent. The court upheld the denial of summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law on contributory negligence and failure to mitigate damages, finding sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.The court also upheld the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings, finding no prejudice from the exclusion of the accident report and SDHP investigation materials, as the jury heard similar testimony. The exclusion of the insurance adjuster’s testimony was also upheld due to lack of an offer of proof. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying the jury instruction on liability insurance and precluding a per diem argument for non-economic damages, as the evidence did not support such an argument.The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, making it unnecessary to address issues raised by Bumann’s notice of review. View "Weiland V. Bumann" on Justia Law

Puffy’s, LLC was first on a waiting list to receive a state registration certificate from the South Dakota Department of Health (Department) to operate a medical cannabis dispensary in Rapid City. After the Department failed to issue the certificate, Puffy’s filed a mandamus action in circuit court to compel the Department to issue the certificate. The circuit court granted the writ of mandamus, and the Department appealed, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction and abused its discretion in granting the writ.The circuit court found that it had jurisdiction because Puffy’s had no administrative remedy to exhaust, as the Department had not taken final action that could be appealed. The court also ruled that the matter was not moot because the Department had not issued the certificate. On the merits, the court concluded that the Department had a clear duty to issue the certificate to Puffy’s under ARSD 44:90:03:16, which mandates that a voided certificate must be awarded to the next applicant on the waiting list. The court found that Puffy’s had no other remedy and was entitled to the writ.The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision. It held that the circuit court had jurisdiction because there was no administrative remedy available for Puffy’s to exhaust. The court also agreed that the matter was not moot. On the merits, the Supreme Court found that the Department had a clear duty to issue the certificate to Puffy’s under the plain language of ARSD 44:90:03:16, which does not require additional application or fees from waitlisted applicants. The court concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the writ of mandamus without an evidentiary hearing, as the case turned on legal interpretation rather than factual disputes. View "Puffy’s LLC v. State of South Dakota" on Justia Law

Black Hills Adventure Lodging (BHAL) manages rental cabins in the Black Hills and hired Stephanie Hammer to clean these cabins. After her relationship with BHAL ended, Hammer applied for reemployment assistance benefits, which BHAL contested, claiming she was an independent contractor. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined Hammer was an employee and ordered BHAL to pay into the unemployment compensation fund based on her wages and those of others similarly situated. The circuit court affirmed this decision, and BHAL appealed.The ALJ found that Hammer was free to accept or decline cleaning jobs, was not trained or supervised by BHAL, and provided her own cleaning supplies and transportation. Despite these findings, the ALJ concluded that Hammer was not free from BHAL's control and was not customarily engaged in an independently established trade. The circuit court affirmed the ALJ's decision.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and determined that BHAL did not exercise control over Hammer's work, as she had the freedom to accept or decline jobs, set her own hours, and provide her own supplies. However, the court found that Hammer was not customarily engaged in an independently established trade, as she did not provide cleaning services to others, did not advertise her services, and was wholly dependent on BHAL for work.The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision that Hammer was an employee of BHAL and that BHAL must contribute to the unemployment compensation fund for her wages. However, the court reversed the decision that BHAL was liable for wages paid to "others similarly situated" to Hammer, as each individual's employment status must be determined based on their unique relationship with BHAL. The case was remanded for the circuit court to vacate that portion of the Department's decision. View "Black Hills Adventure Lodging, LLC v. South Dakota Department of Labor and Regulation" on Justia Law

Rod Dorale built his house with a setback of seven feet three inches from the neighboring property line, violating the McCook County ordinance requiring a nine-foot setback. Greg and Patricia DeCramer, who own the adjacent property, appealed the McCook County Board of Adjustment's decision to grant Dorale a variance for the reduced setback. The DeCramers argued that the Board exceeded its authority by violating the governing statute and county ordinance.The circuit court denied the DeCramers' petition for a writ of certiorari, concluding that the Board had complied with the requirements for granting a variance under SDCL 11-2-53(2). The court noted that the Board determined the variance would not be offensive to the public and that undue hardship existed because Dorale would have to move the house. The court emphasized the limited nature of its review, stating it could not question the Board's decision or examine the facts leading to the variance request.The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the Board acted illegally and in excess of its authority by granting a variance that did not comply with SDCL 11-2-53(2) or the county ordinance. The Court noted that the Board did not find any special conditions or extraordinary circumstances that justified the variance. The Board's finding that there was "nothing extraordinary in this residential district" precluded it from granting the variance under the terms of the ordinance. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case for the entry of an order vacating the variance granted by the Board. View "Decramer v. Dorale" on Justia Law

On January 13, 2020, Denise Likness ran a red light and collided with Breyanna Geerdes' car at an intersection in Watertown, South Dakota. Likness admitted fault for the accident. Geerdes claimed the accident caused her physical injuries, including neck pain, headaches, and back pain, as well as anxiety and anger outbursts. She received treatment from a chiropractor and a clinic, and attended physical therapy sessions. Sixteen months after the accident, she reported pain again and was diagnosed with upper cervical instability and neck curvature. Evidence showed Geerdes had similar symptoms before the accident.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit in Codington County, South Dakota, presided over the case. During the trial, Likness admitted fault but contested the extent of Geerdes' injuries and their connection to the accident. The jury found that Likness' negligence was not the legal cause of Geerdes' injuries. Geerdes filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the causation issue should not have been submitted to the jury. The circuit court did not rule on the motion, resulting in its automatic denial under SDCL 15-6-59(b).The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that Likness' counsel's statements during the trial did not constitute judicial admissions of causation. The court concluded that the statements were made in the context of arguing the extent of damages and were not intended to relieve Geerdes of her burden to prove causation. The court affirmed the circuit court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. View "Geerdes v. Likness" on Justia Law

Robert Mack, a beneficiary of his parents' estates, contested the distribution of assets from his mother’s will and his father’s testamentary trust. After his parents passed away, his brothers Hugh and Eric, acting as co-personal representatives and co-trustees, filed a petition for distribution to Robert. The circuit court approved the distribution after Robert’s attorney did not object at the hearing. Robert later obtained new counsel and filed a motion for relief from the order of distribution, claiming his previous attorney did not inform him of the hearing or the proposed distribution.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit in Codington County, South Dakota, denied Robert’s motion for relief under SDCL 15-6-60(b). The court found Robert’s claim that he had no communication with his attorney since late 2022 not credible, based on his previous conduct in court proceedings. The court also concluded that the order of distribution was fair and equitable, despite Robert’s request for an evidentiary hearing to contest the valuation of the estate assets.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and found that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Robert’s motion for relief. The Supreme Court noted that Robert’s affidavit, which stated he had no knowledge of the hearing or the proposed distribution, was unrefuted. Additionally, the court highlighted the pending disciplinary proceedings against Robert’s former attorney, which raised concerns about the attorney’s ability to practice law. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case with directions to grant the motion for relief from the order of distribution and to set an evidentiary hearing on the petition for distribution. View "In the Matter of the Estate Of Mack" on Justia Law

The Garretts owned 5,200 acres of farmland in Sully County and faced financial difficulties, leading them to sell the property to the Stocks. The Stocks agreed to lease the land back to the Garretts for five years, with an option for the Garretts to repurchase it. The Garretts failed to make timely lease payments, prompting the Stocks to initiate an eviction action. The Stocks alleged that the Garretts had not only failed to pay rent but also committed waste on the property.The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Sully County held a two-day trial, where the jury found in favor of the Stocks, granting them immediate possession of the farmland. The Garretts appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying their motion to dismiss, their motion for judgment as a matter of law, and their motion for a new trial. They also contended that the court erred in denying their proposed jury instructions.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decisions. The court held that the Stocks had complied with the three-day notice to quit requirement and that the mandatory mediation provisions did not apply as the relationship was that of lessor and lessee, not creditor and borrower. The court also found that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Garretts' proposed jury instructions, as the instructions given adequately covered the applicable law. Finally, the court concluded that the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, and the circuit court did not err in denying the Garretts' motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. The Supreme Court also awarded the Stocks $5,000 in appellate attorney fees. View "Stock v. Garrett" on Justia Law

VOR, Inc. and the Grand Valley Hutterite Brethren (Colony) initiated an eviction action against Paul O’Farrell and Skyline Cattle Co. (Skyline) under South Dakota’s forcible entry and detainer (FED) statutes. Paul moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the eviction should have been a compulsory counterclaim in his pending undue influence suit against his brother Kelly, the Colony, and the Raymond and Victoria O’Farrell Living Trust. The circuit court denied Paul’s motion to dismiss, and after a court trial, granted the eviction, ordering Paul to vacate the property within ten days and allowing the Colony to keep any of Paul’s personal property abandoned after the ten days expired. Paul appealed.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit denied Paul’s motion to dismiss, his request for a jury trial, and his request for a continuance. The court proceeded with a court trial and granted the eviction in favor of the Landlords. The court also ordered that any personal property left by Paul after ten days would be considered abandoned and could be kept by the Colony. Additionally, the court awarded attorney’s fees to the Landlords.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision in part and reversed it in part. The court held that the FED statutes did not allow for pre-answer motions to extend the time for filing an answer and that the eviction action was not a compulsory counterclaim in Paul’s undue influence lawsuit. The court also held that Paul’s demand for a jury trial was untimely and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for a continuance or in excluding evidence of undue influence. However, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court erred in ordering the forfeiture of Paul’s personal property and remanded the case to revise the judgment accordingly. The court awarded VOR and the Colony combined appellate attorney fees of $9,000. View "Vor, Inc. v. Estate of O'Farrell" on Justia Law

Lonnie Two Eagle, Sr. was injured when Chad Sully, who was driving and suffered a seizure, collided with him while he was operating a lawn mower. Two Eagle sued Dr. Matthew Smith and the entities Avel eCare, LLC and Moonlighting Solutions, LLC, which contracted with Dr. Smith to provide medical services to Rosebud Indian Health Services Hospital. Two Eagle alleged medical malpractice and ordinary negligence, claiming Dr. Smith was negligent in treating Sully and authorizing him to drive despite his seizure history.The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Todd County, South Dakota, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Dr. Smith owed no duty of care to Two Eagle. The court found that there was no relationship between Dr. Smith and Two Eagle that would give rise to a duty, and that imposing such a duty would contravene public policy.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Dr. Smith did not owe a duty to Two Eagle under either a medical malpractice or ordinary negligence theory. The court reasoned that there was no special relationship between Dr. Smith and Sully that would create a duty to Two Eagle, and that the risk of harm to Two Eagle was not foreseeable. Additionally, the court emphasized public policy considerations, noting that imposing a duty on physicians to protect third parties could negatively impact the physician-patient relationship and lead to overly restrictive recommendations by physicians. View "Two Eagle V. Avel Ecare" on Justia Law

Duane and Melody Remington purchased a campground and later discovered various defects on the property. They sued the seller, Keith Grimm, and the real estate agent, Bryan Iverson, alleging multiple claims including failure to disclose defects, fraudulent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. The Remingtons claimed that Iverson and Grimm did not provide a required property disclosure statement and misrepresented the financial condition of the campground.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Pennington County, South Dakota, granted summary judgment in favor of Iverson, determining that a property disclosure statement was not required because the sale was a commercial transaction. The court did not specifically address the common law claims of nondisclosure against Iverson. The Remingtons appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that a property disclosure statement was required for the living quarters of the campground, which constituted residential real property. The court affirmed the lower court's decision that a disclosure statement was not required for the non-residential aspects of the campground. The case was remanded to determine whether Iverson breached his fiduciary duty by failing to inform the Remingtons that Grimm was required to provide a property disclosure statement for the living quarters.The court also affirmed the summary judgment on the claims of Iverson’s direct liability, concluding that the Remingtons failed to establish that Iverson had actual knowledge of the alleged defects. The court dismissed Iverson’s notice of review regarding attorney fees and costs due to lack of jurisdiction. View "Remington v. Iverson" on Justia Law