Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A married couple, both active-duty military members, separated after nearly two decades of marriage and executed a notarized separation agreement in 2020 while stationed in Okinawa. The agreement provided that the wife would receive $1,500 per month in maintenance until divorce, 20% of the husband’s military retirement pay upon his retirement, and be named as beneficiary of his Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP). The wife later initiated a divorce in South Dakota, and the parties submitted a stipulation and settlement agreement incorporating key provisions from their separation. The divorce decree was filed in February 2021. Over time, the husband failed to make some required maintenance payments and, after retiring, did not pay the wife her portion of his retirement nor complete the SBP paperwork. The wife sought contempt and modifications, while the husband argued compliance was impossible due to deficiencies in the decree.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Charles Mix County, declined to hold the husband in contempt, finding the divorce decree’s orders too vague for enforcement. The court denied modification of the property division, found no fraud or coercion, and refused to vacate the decree. It reduced the wife’s retirement share from 20% to 16.1% using a coverture formula, ordered payment of $5,000 in arrears plus 8% interest, and instructed the husband to effectuate the SBP. Both parties appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that reducing the wife’s retirement share below the agreed 20% was error, as was applying an 8% rather than the statutory 10% interest rate to arrears. The court remanded for correction of those issues, but affirmed the denial of contempt, refusal to vacate the decree, and the exclusion of additional payments for stimulus or tax refunds. The court also found no due process violations or abuse of discretion in declining to take sworn testimony. View "Shevling v. Major" on Justia Law

An eight-year-old girl, A.R., disclosed to her mother that she had been sexually abused by her thirty-year-old half-brother, Tell Cadotte, over a two-year period. After reporting the abuse to the police, A.R. underwent a forensic interview, during which she described the abuse and produced drawings depicting the incidents. Law enforcement obtained a search warrant for Cadotte’s home, where they seized several electronic devices. Forensic examination of these devices revealed over 300 images and videos of child pornography, including multiple pictures that apparently depicted A.R. being abused. Cadotte was charged with multiple counts of first-degree rape and one count of sexual contact with a minor.After a federal conviction for possession of child pornography, Cadotte proceeded to trial in the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Pennington County, South Dakota. During trial, defense counsel objected to the admission of certain sanitized photographs, arguing the State had committed a discovery violation by not providing all the images intended for use. The defense also objected to testimony from a detective recounting the victim’s mother’s identification of A.R. in the photographs, claiming it was inadmissible hearsay. The court admitted the evidence, and the jury convicted Cadotte on nine counts of first-degree rape and one count of sexual contact with a minor. The court acquitted him on one rape count for insufficient evidence and sentenced him to seventy years, concurrent with a ten-year term for sexual contact, but consecutive to his federal sentence.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota held that there was no discovery violation because the State had complied with its statutory obligations, and the defense had access to the evidence in question. The court also held that even if the detective’s testimony was hearsay, its admission was not prejudicial since it was cumulative of other admissible testimony. The convictions were affirmed. View "State v. Cadotte" on Justia Law

A jury found the defendant guilty of third-degree rape in September 2020. The circuit court entered a judgment of conviction in January 2021, sentencing him to ten years in the penitentiary with seven years suspended. The defendant did not appeal his conviction or sentence. He was released from the penitentiary on parole in March 2022. In January 2023, while still on parole, the defendant moved for a sentence reduction, requesting a suspended imposition of sentence. The circuit court granted this motion, placing him on probation.The State objected, first moving for reconsideration on the grounds that the circuit court lacked authority to grant a suspended imposition of sentence after a judgment of conviction and that this would improperly remove the defendant from executive supervision. The circuit court denied the State’s motion and entered an order granting the suspended imposition of sentence. The State appealed, but the Supreme Court of South Dakota dismissed the appeal for lack of statutory appellate jurisdiction. The State then filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, which the circuit court again denied. The State petitioned for a discretionary appeal, which the Supreme Court of South Dakota granted.The Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the circuit court erred in concluding that res judicata barred the State’s challenge, as the State had not previously had an opportunity for appellate review. The Supreme Court further held that neither SDCL 23A-27-19 nor SDCL 23A-31-1 authorized a circuit court to vacate a judgment of conviction in order to grant a suspended imposition of sentence after a sentence has been imposed. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order suspending the imposition of the defendant’s sentence. View "State v. Pickner" on Justia Law

Two neighboring property owners with lakefront lots in the Ramona Beach subdivision became involved in a dispute over the boundary between their properties. The plaintiffs, who purchased their lots in 2005, claimed that they had acquired ownership of a strip of land through adverse possession. This disputed area included portions of two garages that had been built by previous owners and which physically encroach onto the defendants’ lots. The defendants acquired their lots in 2015 and, after conducting a survey, discovered the encroachments. The dispute escalated after the defendants sought to build a new garage, prompting the plaintiffs to initiate a lawsuit to prevent construction and assert adverse possession over the contested land.The Fifth Judicial Circuit Court held a bench trial, heard live and deposition testimony, and reviewed documentary evidence. The court found that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden to prove adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence, specifically concluding that there was no substantial enclosure or usual cultivation or improvement of the disputed land as required by law. However, the court granted the plaintiffs prescriptive easements for the portions of the garages that encroached onto the defendants’ property, though it limited the easements to the actual areas occupied by the garages and immediate areas necessary for their maintenance. The court denied the plaintiffs’ further requests to expand the easements and to add an additional easement for lake access.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It affirmed the circuit court’s findings and legal conclusions, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish adverse possession, and that the prescriptive easements for the garages were properly granted and appropriately limited. The Supreme Court also found that the plaintiffs’ additional claim for a lake access easement was not properly preserved for appeal and was therefore waived. View "Luzier v. Hemmah" on Justia Law

The county commission in a South Dakota county adopted an ordinance amending its zoning regulations. The key change was to substitute the “board of adjustment” in place of the “county commission” and “planning and zoning board” as the authority to consider conditional use permit (CUP) applications and variances. Save Centennial Valley Association, a local group, submitted a petition to the county auditor seeking to refer the ordinance to a public vote, arguing that the amendments were legislative actions subject to referendum under state law. The auditor, after consulting with the commission, rejected the petition, determining the ordinance was administrative and not subject to referendum. The petitioners then requested a writ of mandamus from the circuit court to compel the auditor to refer the ordinance to a vote.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Lawrence County, considered the pleadings and granted judgment on the pleadings to the county, denying the request for mandamus. The court found that the ordinance did not constitute a legislative decision and was therefore not subject to the referendum process. The petitioners appealed this determination.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the matter de novo, considering whether the ordinance was legislative or administrative under SDCL 7-18A-15.1. The court held that the ordinance merely executed a plan already adopted by the governing body or by the Legislature and did not create a new rule or policy. The court also clarified that decisions on CUPs, whether made by the commission or the board of adjustment, are quasi-judicial and not subject to referendum. Therefore, the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that the ordinance was an administrative decision not subject to the referendum process, and the petitioners were not entitled to mandamus relief. View "Save Centennial Valley Association v. Mcgruder" on Justia Law

Two Sioux Falls police officers attempted to stop a stolen vehicle driven by a suspect who had absconded from parole and was believed to be armed. During a subsequent foot chase, the suspect allegedly shot at the officers, injuring one, and later exchanged gunfire with other law enforcement before being apprehended. After his arrest, the Minnehaha County State’s Attorney filed criminal charges, and the unredacted names of the two officers appeared in public court documents. The officers, invoking their rights as crime victims under Article VI, § 29 of the South Dakota Constitution (Marsy’s Law), requested that their names and any identifying information be redacted from public filings, citing concerns about potential harassment or targeting.Initially, the officers sought relief through a writ of mandamus, which was denied by a judge outside the circuit, who found that Marsy’s Law and South Dakota statutes provided an adequate remedy within the ongoing criminal proceedings. The officers then intervened directly in the criminal case, moving to have their names redacted. The Second Judicial Circuit Court denied their motion, reasoning that Marsy’s Law did not expressly provide a right to anonymity and that, even if the officers were assumed to be “victims,” their names alone did not constitute protected information under Marsy’s Law.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed and remanded. The Court held that law enforcement officers can qualify as “victims” under Marsy’s Law when a crime is committed against them. It further held that a victim’s name or initials are “information or records that could be used to locate or harass the victim or the victim’s family” and may be subject to redaction upon request. However, the Court clarified that Marsy’s Law does not grant a categorical right to redaction; rather, courts must balance victims’ rights with defendants’ and the public’s constitutional rights on a case-by-case basis. View "State v. Albaidhani" on Justia Law

A California company repurposed decommissioned military bunkers in South Dakota as survival shelters, offering them for sale or long-term lease. In 2020, an individual entered into a 99-year lease with the company for one of these bunkers, paying $35,000 upfront. The lease agreement incorporated a set of community rules, which the company reserved the right to modify with 30 days’ written notice. In 2021, the company amended the rules to expressly prohibit the brandishing of firearms except in designated areas. In 2023, the lessee was alleged to have brandished a firearm during an altercation, prompting the company to issue notices to vacate and, ultimately, to file a forcible entry and detainer action when the lessee secured the bunker but refused to return possession.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Fall River County granted summary judgment in favor of the lessee. The court reasoned that the lease was illusory because the company could unilaterally modify the rules at any time, leaving the lessee with no recourse. The court concluded that this rendered the entire lease void and unenforceable, thereby preventing the company from evicting the lessee under the lease.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the circuit court’s summary judgment order. The Supreme Court held that the lease agreement was supported by valid consideration and was not illusory merely because the company retained the right to modify community rules, as such modifications were constrained by requirements of reasonableness and good faith. The Court ruled that the ability to modify rules, when exercised subject to notice and implied duties of good faith and fair dealing, does not make the underlying contract unenforceable. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Vivos Xpoint v. Sindorf" on Justia Law

A South Dakota resident hired a South Dakota attorney after his wife's fatal car accident in North Dakota. The attorney brought in a North Dakota lawyer and they both signed agreements with the client, providing for a one-third contingent fee split between the two firms. The agreements allowed the attorneys to withdraw and assert a lien for their full contingent fee if the client refused a settlement offer they deemed reasonable. After the at-fault party’s insurer quickly offered policy limits totaling $500,000, the attorneys and client unsuccessfully pursued other sources of recovery. The attorneys advised settling, but the client declined, leading the attorneys to withdraw and file an attorney’s lien for their fee. Eighteen months later, the client accepted the settlement, prompting the attorneys to seek enforcement of their lien. The client counterclaimed, alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and deceit, and sought rescission under North Dakota law.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Codington County, granted summary judgment for the attorneys, enforcing their fee and dismissing the client’s counterclaims. The court found South Dakota law applied, not North Dakota law, and concluded that the fee agreements were enforceable and reasonable. The client appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota held that South Dakota law governs the dispute and affirmed dismissal of the client’s counterclaims. However, it reversed the enforcement of the full contingent fee, finding that the contractual provision allowing withdrawal and a full fee upon the client’s refusal to settle unduly infringed on the client’s rights. The court held that, after withdrawal for good cause, the attorneys are entitled to recover reasonable fees based on quantum meruit, not the contingent fee, and remanded for determination of that amount. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Culhane v. Thovson" on Justia Law

Leslie and Karen Turgeon own property in Spearfish, South Dakota, which can only be accessed by the Thoen Stone Road. The City of Spearfish owns the Thoen Stone Monument and the surrounding parkland, and has maintained a locked gate at the northern entrance of the Road for over forty years, providing keys to certain property owners, including the Turgeons. The Turgeons occasionally experienced issues with the key, hindering their access. They filed a declaratory action seeking a determination that the Road is a public right-of-way, asking the court to order the City to remove the gate and any other obstructions, and to enjoin the City from restricting access for themselves and the public.The Circuit Court for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Lawrence County, reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court determined that earlier documents (the 1953 Easement, 1971 Agreement, and 1972 Warranty Deed) did not manifest an intent to dedicate the Road for public use. The court found that the 2012 Plat expressly dedicated the Road as a public right-of-way but concluded that the City had not accepted this dedication, either expressly or impliedly, in part because the locked gate was inconsistent with public use. On this basis, the court granted summary judgment to the City and denied all relief to the Turgeons.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision that the Road was not dedicated for public use until the 2012 Plat, and that there was no express acceptance of dedication by the City. However, it reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment regarding implied acceptance, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the City impliedly accepted the dedication of the Road as a public right-of-way. The case was remanded for trial on this issue. View "Turgeon v. City Of Spearfish" on Justia Law

Susan and Richard Spry managed their uncle Richard Hermanek’s finances under a power of attorney after he suffered from significant cognitive decline. Acting in this capacity, the Sprys opened a joint bank account with Mutual of Omaha in Nebraska, titling it in the names of Hermanek, Susan, and Richard, and transferred large sums from Hermanek’s South Dakota accounts, proceeds from his home, and other funds. After Hermanek’s death, Susan transferred the remaining balance to the Sprys’ personal account in Texas. Concerned relatives who would have inherited from Hermanek initiated a civil suit and notified authorities, leading to a criminal investigation.A Bon Homme County grand jury indicted the Sprys on multiple counts, including grand theft and conspiracy to commit grand theft related to the handling of Hermanek’s property. After a jury trial in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, both were convicted on these charges, among others. At trial, the court instructed the jury on contractual rather than testamentary capacity regarding the joint account and limited testimony about Hermanek’s statements during the account’s creation. The court also instructed the jury that the presumption of survivorship rights in a joint account could be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence of contrary intent, rather than requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota held that the circuit court did not err in choosing the contractual capacity instruction but erred by excluding testimony about Hermanek’s contemporaneous statements and by using the clear and convincing evidence standard instead of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for rebutting the presumption of survivorship rights. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions for grand theft and conspiracy to commit grand theft and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Spry" on Justia Law