Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was the owner of a voting interest in Coldwell Banker Lewis-Kirkeby-Hall Real Estate, Inc. (CBLKH). Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a contract under which the parties agreed that Plaintiff would sell Defendant his shares of CBLKH voting stock. On the closing date of the contract, Defendant failed to attend the closing and did not pay the amount agreed upon for Plaintiff's shares. After negotiations between the parties failed, Plaintiff brought suit for breach of contract against Defendant. Defendant raised the defense that his consent to enter into the contract was obtained by fraud. After a trial, the trial court entered judgment against Defendant for $250,000. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court correctly concluded that the contract was clear and unambiguous as to Defendant's receipt of financial documents; but (2) the court erred in barring Defendant's fraudulent inducement evidence under the parole evidence rule. View "Poeppel v. Lester" on Justia Law

Homeowners obtained a default judgment against an LLC. Although the LLC's manager (Manager) was listed as an individual defendant, the default was only against the LLC. A partial satisfaction of the judgment was later entered. Afterwards, the trial court issued an order stating that any other claims against Manager were dismissed with prejudice. Later, LLC unsuccessfully challenged the amount of the partial satisfaction of judgment. Thereafter, Manager, individually and on behalf of the LLC, filed a notice of appeal appealing four separate orders made in the case. Homeowners moved to dismiss, arguing that the appeal was untimely, Manager was not an attorney and could not represent the LLC, and Manager was not an aggrieved party. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the appeal of three of the orders was untimely; (2) a non-licensed attorney is not permitted to appear pro se to represent an LLC; and (3) because all of the claims against Manager were dismissed, he was not an aggrieved party and could not appeal the remaining order, the partial satisfaction of judgment order. View "Smith v. Rustic Home Builders, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant James Brown owned interests in several businesses. In late 2004, he acquired and redesigned two convenience stores on opposite sides of Exit 2 on Interstate 29 in North Sioux City, South Dakota. Plaintiff-Appellee Stern Oil, a fuel distributor for Exxon Mobil Corporation, contacted Brown while he was remodeling the properties. Although Brown was negotiating with another fuel distributor, he ultimately elected to do business with Stern Oil. When Brown notified Stern Oil that he would no longer purchase its fuel, Stern Oil initiated this breach of contract action. Brown filed a counterclaim, alleging fraudulent inducement. Stern Oil argued that Brown contracted to purchase a minimum amount of fuel for a ten-year period. The circuit court granted Stern Oil's motion for summary judgment on both the breach of contract claim and on Brown's counterclaim, but the issue of damages proceeded to trial. After trial, the circuit court awarded Stern Oil eight years of lost profits. Brown appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment. Both Brown's fraudulent inducement counterclaim and Stern Oil's breach of contract claim involved disputed material facts. Therefore, the Court concluded the circuit court erred in granting Stern Oil summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Stern Oil Co. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Randy Kramer initiated a breach of contract action against Mike D. Murphy and the William F. Murphy Self-Declaration of Trust (Trust). Tri-State Ethanol, LLC owned an ethanol plant in Rosholt, South Dakota. Kramer was one of the members and managers of Tri-State Ethanol. Kramer was also a member of White Rock Pipeline, LLC, which owned a pipeline that supplied natural gas to Tri-State Ethanol. In order to comply with various federal regulations, Tri-State Ethanol determined it was necessary to purchase the membership interests of Kramer, Murphy, Woods, and the Trust. To accomplish this, Tri-State Ethanol entered into a loan agreement (Loan Agreement) with Murphy and the Trust. Tri-State Ethanol was unable to meet its financial obligations and eventually filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. During the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, Murphy and the Trust reached a settlement agreement regarding payment of the Loan Agreement and the Disbursement Agreement. Murphy and the Trust, through its trustee, represented to the bankruptcy court that they would use the settlement proceeds to pay Kramer the amounts owed under the Disbursement Agreement. The bankruptcy court approved the settlement agreement. After the settlement proceeds from Tri-State Ethanol’s bankruptcy estate were distributed, Murphy and the Trust refused to pay Kramer the full amount listed in the Disbursement Agreement. Kramer then filed a complaint against Murphy and the Trust for breach of the Disbursement Agreement. Murphy filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue. He claimed that the forum-selection clauses contained in the Loan Agreement, the Balloon Note, and the Promissory Note controlled for any suit brought on the Disbursement Agreement. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the case. It found that while the Disbursement Agreement itself had no forum-selection clause, the other three agreements contained forum-selection clauses providing that the Fourteenth Judicial District in Rock Island County, Illinois was the proper forum. The circuit court reasoned that the agreements must be considered as a whole. After examining each of documents collectively as one contract, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in finding that the parties intended the venue for any suit on the Disbursement Agreement to be the Fourteenth (14th) Judicial District in Rock Island County, Illinois. The circuit court’s dismissal of this case was affirmed. View "Kramer v. William F. Murphy Self-Declaration of Trust" on Justia Law

Dan Prue sold his majority interest in DT-Trak Consulting, a medical coding business, for a lump-sum payment and several annual payments. DT-Trak withheld an annual payment, asserting that Prue had violated the parties' stock purchase agreement. The matter proceeded to arbitration. A three-member arbitration panel made an award in Prue's favor. DT-Trak sought to vacated the award, alleging that the arbitrator it selected demonstrated evident partiality and that the panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law were insufficient. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under either the Federal Arbitration Act or South Dakota Arbitration Act, DT-Trak failed to show that the arbitration award should be vacated, as (1) there was no support that any member of the arbitration panel exhibited evident partiality; and (2) the findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the panel were sufficient under the requirements of the agreement. View "DT-Trak Consulting, Inc. v. Prue" on Justia Law

Minority shareholders (Plaintiffs) brought this action against minority shareholders (Defendants), individually and as officers or directors of Multi-Community Cooperative Dairy (MCC Dairy). Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleged six causes of action, including oppression and/or unfairly prejudicial conduct toward minority shareholders, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, and restraint of trade or commerce. The circuit court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the amended complaint. The court also granted Defendants' motion for sanctions on the ground that Plaintiffs and their counsel had abused the discovery process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court id not err as a matter of law in granting summary judgment, as there was no support that Defendants engaged in any wrongdoing; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ordering sanctions against Plaintiffs for abuse of discovery in refusing to attend depositions scheduled by Defendants. View "Veblen Dist. v. Multi-Cmty. Coop. Dairy" on Justia Law

Loren Pourier, the owner of a corporation that operated a gas station on reservation land, brought an action against the state Department of Revenue and Regulation to protest a state motor-fuel tax imposed on the corporation. The Supreme Court held that the fuel tax was illegal in Pourier I. Pourier then filed a motion for costs and attorneys' fees. The circuit court granted the motion. The Department appealed, contending that the position it took in Pourier I was "substantially justified" under S.D. Codified Laws 10-59-34. The Supreme Court reversed after undertaking a three-pronged analysis, holding that the circuit court erred in finding the position the Department took in the Pourier litigation was not substantially justified and thus ordering the Department to pay Pourier's costs and attorneys' fees. View "Pourier v. S.D. Dep't of Revenue & Regulation" on Justia Law

This dispute involved a struggle between two factions in a Hutterite colony. One faction purported to excommunicate members of the other, and eventually the other faction sought court dissolution of the corporation. Denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the circuit court (1) concluded the corporation was not functioning as a communal organization in accord with its articles and bylaws, and (2) ordered the appointment of a receiver to collect all the assets and divide the proceeds among the colony members. In determining which members were entitled to distributed assets, the court was obliged to determine which members were eligible. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the underlying religious controversies over church leadership so pervaded the dissolution of the religious corporation that the dissolution required an unconstitutional entanglement in a religious dispute and was beyond a secular court's jurisdiction. Remanded for entry of an order of dismissal. View "Wipf v. Hutterville Hutterian Brethren, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants Thomas and Robin Branhan borrowed money from Appellee Great Western Bank. As collateral for the loan, the Branhans gave Great Western a security interest in their shares of Glacial Lakes stock. The Branhans later defaulted on their loan. Great Western subsequently brought a foreclosure action against the Branhans. As part of a settlement agreement, the Branhans agreed to surrender and transfer to Great Western all their rights to Glacial Lakes stock they were unable to sell by a certain date. After Great Western issued a satisfaction of judgment, Glacial Lakes announced a capital call repayment. In response, the Branhans filed a motion to determine which party was entitled to the capital call repayments. The circuit court concluded that Great Western owned the stock and was therefore entitled to the repayments. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that Great Western was entitled to the capital call repayment because the benefit of capital call repayment transferred with the shares. View "Great Western Bank v. Branhan" on Justia Law

The underlying action in this case involved a dispute among a family-owned corporation's shareholders concerning the management and control of the business. The two factions asked circuit court judge John Delaney to determine the corporation's value. Before trial, Delaney entered an order that (1) imposed a gag order on the parties and (2) closed the trial and court records. Several media entities (the Media) petitioned for a writ of mandamus or prohibition, asserting that Delaney's gag order unlawfully interfered with Media's First Amendment and common law rights. The Supreme Court granted Media's request for a permanent writ of prohibition, holding (1) although the underlying trial was complete, Media's claims could be considered under an exception to the mootness doctrine because the issue presented was capable of repetition yet evading review; (2) the First Amendment affords the media and public a qualified right of access to civil trials in the state; (3) Delaney abused his discretion in closing the trial proceedings from the media and public because the procedure and reasoning he used was flawed; and (4) Delaney did not have statutory or legal authority to issue the gag order under the facts and circumstances of this case. View "Rapid City Journal v. Circuit Court (Delaney)" on Justia Law