Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
by
Two members of a seven-member trust succession committee petitioned the circuit court for court supervision of the trust. Marvin M. Schwan owned and operated Schwan’s Sales Enterprises (a.k.a. The Schwan Food Company) until his death in 1993. In 1992, Marvin had created the Marvin M. Schwan Charitable Foundation. The Trust Instrument named seven beneficiaries: Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, The Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, Wisconsin Lutheran College Conference, Inc., Evangelical Lutheran Synod, Bethany Lutheran College, Inc., International Lutheran Laymen’s League, and Wisconsin Lutheran Synod Kingdom Workers, Inc. After Marvin’s death, the Trustees redeemed all Marvin’s stock in the company and funded the Foundation with assets valuing nearly $1 billion. The parties did not dispute that certain investments made by the Trustees over several years caused approximately $600 million in losses to the Foundation. These losses reduced the value of the Foundation’s assets and reduced the Foundation’s distributions to the Beneficiaries. According to Committee members Paul and Mark Schwan, the Trustees did not inform the Committee until 2013 that the Foundation had experienced such significant losses from the investments. In June 2014, Mark and Paul petitioned the circuit court for instruction and supervision under SDCL 21-22-9. Paul and Mark asked the court to address whether the Committee had a duty under the Trust Instrument to request an accounting from the Trustees related to the Trustees’ investment losses, whether a majority vote of the Committee was required in order to request an accounting, whether the Committee members that were also Trustees had a conflict of interest, whether the Committee had a fiduciary duty to request an accounting, and whether Paul and Mark as individual Committee members could request an accounting. After a hearing, the circuit court dismissed the petition because it concluded that the two members did not meet the classifications of persons able to petition the circuit court for supervision. After its review of the trial court’s decision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court found the trial court did not conclude that the Trustees, Attorney General, or Beneficiaries established good cause to the contrary related to the merits of Paul and Mark’s petition. The court did not hold a hearing on the merits of Paul and Mark’s petition, noting that it would not address arguments raised by the Trustees or Paul and Mark because it concluded that Paul and Mark did not meet any classification entitled to seek court supervision. The Supreme Court remanded to the trial court to "fix a time and place for a hearing thereon, . . . and upon such hearing, enter an order assuming supervision unless good cause to the contrary is shown." View "Schwan v. Burgdorf" on Justia Law

by
Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence and having an open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle. Defendant appealed, arguing that the magistrate court and circuit court erred by failing to suppress evidence from the traffic stop that led to his convictions because the law enforcement officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the totality of the circumstances led to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and therefore, the lower courts did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "State v. Olson" on Justia Law

by
Developers obtained a conditional use permit to build a dairy on Owner’s property in Brookings County. The City of Hendricks and others (collectively, City) filed a petition for writ of certiorari in circuit court challenging the permit. The circuit court affirmed the grant of the permit. City appealed. Developers filed a notice of review to challenge City’s standing but did not serve their notice of review on Owner. City moved to dismiss Developers’ notice of review/cross-appeal, arguing that Owner was a party required to be served with the notice of review. The affirmed, holding (1) Owner was a party required to be served with Developers’ notice of review, and Developers’ failure to serve Owner required dismissal of their notice of review/cross-appeal; and (2) neither S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-5(a) nor Developers’ alleged alignment of interests with Owner excused Developers’ failure to serve Owner. View "Lake Hendricks Improvement Ass’n v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n" on Justia Law

by
Attorney Irene Schrunk represented Mary Ellen Nylen in a divorce and was involved subsequent legal matters regarding Mary Ellen and her new husband, Mark Nylen. When Mark served Mary Ellen with a summons and complaint for divorce, Schrunk advised Mary Ellen that Schrunk could not represent her because Schrunk had represented Mark in the past. On July 31, 2014, Mary Ellen’s adult children, Molly and Brendon, commenced this action against Mary Ellen seeking a declaration that Mary Ellen had gifted them personal property. Molly and Brendon sought to depose Schrunk regarding communications she had with Mary Ellen between November 1, 2013, and December 31, 2014. Mary Ellen moved to prohibit the discovery, citing the attorney-client privilege protected the communications. The circuit court determined that the initial communications were privileged but did not extend the privilege to communications and documents shared with Schrunk after January 1, 2014. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Mary Ellen failed to meet her burden of proving entitlement to the attorney-client privilege after January 1, 2014, and Mary Ellen waived the privilege with respect to certain documents when she shared with Schrunk privileged communications between Mary Ellen and her current attorneys. View "Nylen v. Nylen" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff suffered an injury from a fall while at Black Hills Dialysis LLC’s (BHD) facility in Shannon County. Plaintiff sued BHD for her injuries. A dispute subsequently arose about whether the circuit court should summon jurors from Shannon County or neighboring Fall River County where Shannon County has no physical state court facilities and all Shannon County legal proceedings are held at the Fall River County Courthouse. The circuit court ruled that it would summon Fall River County jurors, holding that a 2009 standing order issued by the presiding judge of the Seventh Circuit stating that all Shannon County matters would be tried in Fall River County supported its resolution of the issue. The Supreme Court vacated the presiding judge’s standing order and reversed the order of the circuit court, holding (1) the presiding judge exceeded his statutory and constitutional authority in issuing the standing order, which effectively changed venue in all Shannon County cases; (2) the circuit court’s ruling on venue in this case was improper and without legal basis; and (3) under the circumstances of this case, venue was proper in Shannon County, and Shannon County jurors should be summoned and empaneled. View "Good Lance v. Black Hills Dialysis, LLC" on Justia Law

by
Julie and Grant Rush were married in 1990 in Pennsylvania. In 2012, Grant left the marital home in Pennsylvania and moved into his mother’s home in South Dakota. That same year, Julie filed a “Uniform Support Petition” in Pennsylvania seeking child and spousal support. Five days later, Grant filed for a divorce in South Dakota. The circuit court dismissed the divorce action for lack of jurisdiction and on the grounds of the forum non conveniens doctrine, concluding that Grant was not a true South Dakota resident at the time he filed for divorce and that, under the forum non conveniens doctrine, Pennsylvania was the more appropriate and convenient forum for this divorce matter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because there was substantial evidence in the record that Grant established actual residency in South Dakota in 2012 for purposes other than obtaining a divorce, the circuit court erred when it concluded that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the parties in this proceeding; and (2) the circuit court erred in dismissing Grant’s divorce action based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens because Grant properly commenced the divorce action in South Dakota and no divorce action had ever been commenced in Pennsylvania. View "Rush v. Rush" on Justia Law

by
Todd and Joanne Egge placed obstructions on a platted but unimproved service road north of their property. Gary Busselman sued the Egges for damages and sought an injunction to prevent the Egges’ obstruction of the service road, contending that the service road was open to public travel because it had been dedicated and accepted by the City of Sioux Falls and Minnehaha County. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Busselman. The Egges appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in failing to require joinder of the relevant governmental entity responsible for acceptance of the purported dedication. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for joinder of the appropriate governmental entity, holding that, under Thieman v. Bohman, the appropriate governmental entity was an indispensable party to Busselman’s action. View "Busselman v. Egge" on Justia Law

by
After an abuse and neglect proceeding, the circuit court entered a dispositional order terminating the parental rights of Mother to her two biological children. Mother filed a notice of appeal, but the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Mother’s signature was not on the notice. Mother then filed a second notice of appeal, which the Supreme Court dismissed as untimely. After obtaining an “Amended Dispositional Order” from the circuit court, which contained revisions to the final order, Mother filed a third notice of appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as untimely, holding that the circuit court’s order did not restart the timeframe for appeal, making Mother’s third appeal untimely. View "In re Interest of L.R." on Justia Law

by
Clint Bowyer, a North Carolina resident, was a professional race car driver for NASCAR. Appellant was also a motorcycle enthusiast who often attended the motorcycle rallies in Sturgis, South Dakota. Kustom Cycles, Inc., a South Dakota corporation, agreed to customize a motorcycle for Bowyer. After Kustom Cycles delivered the motorcycle to Bowyer, it sent Bowyer a bill for the work in the amount of $30,788. Bowyer refused to pay the bill, insisting that the owner of the corporation proposed, and Bowyer performed, compensation in the form of promotions, endorsements, and special access to NASCAR events. Kustom Cycles filed a complaint against Bowyer for payment of the bill. Bowyer moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bowyer’s minimal contacts with South Dakota did not meet the “minimum contacts” required to satisfy the Due Process Clause, and Kustom Cycles did not meet its burden of establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over Bowyer. View "Kustom Cycles, Inc. v. Bowyer" on Justia Law