Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant pleaded guilty to two charges of second degree robbery. The circuit court sentenced Appellant to a term of seven years with two years suspended for the first conviction and a term of eight years with two years suspended for the second conviction. While incarcerated, Appellant signed a suspended sentence supervision agreement. After Appellant received four major rule violations, the Board of Pardons and Paroles concluded that Appellant had violated the conditions of the agreement and ordered that the suspended sentence for the first robbery conviction be revoked and imposed and that the suspended sentence for the second robbery conviction be revoked, imposed, and re-suspended. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board did not exceed its authority in imposing additional conditions that were “not inconsistent” with those placed by the sentencing court; and (2) Appellant failed to establish an equal protection violation because he was not treated differently than a similarly-situated class of inmates. View "Mann v. S.D. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on two counts of intentional damage to property and one count each of reckless burning, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of marijuana. The Supreme Court (1) reversed and remanded for a new trial on the intentional damage charges so that a jury may determine Rosales’s intent, holding that the circuit court erred in failing to dismiss the intentional damage charges where the jury did not determine whether Defendant acted with intent to destroy the vehicles; and (2) affirmed as to the remainder of the judgment, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to quash the search warrant and suppress the evidence. View "State v. Rosales" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree rape, aggravated incest, and sexual contact with a child under age thirteen. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it determined that Defendant’s interview with law enforcement was noncustodial; (2) the circuit court did not err when it ruled that Defendant’s interview statements were voluntary and admissible; (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing certain expert testimony; (4) Defendant was not twice put in jeopardy for the same criminal offense; (5) the circuit court properly denied Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; and (6) the Court could not affirmatively say a new trial was warranted because of the State’s failure to provide certain evidence to Defendant. Remanded with instructions for the State to disclose the evidence to Defendant and the circuit court and for the circuit court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether there was a Brady violation and, if there was a violation, whether a new trial was warranted. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to committing manslaughter in the first degree and was sentenced to an eighty-five-year term of imprisonment. Appellant did not directly appeal his sentence or the sentencing court’s acceptance of his guilty plea. Appellant later filed an amended application of writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because defense counsel decided to forgo a motion to suppress statements Appellant made to law enforcement officers and because defense counsel failed properly to advise Appellant on his right to appeal the sentencing court’s decision. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) defense counsel had sound legal reasons for the decision not to move to suppress the incriminating statements; and (2) Appellant was not prejudiced by missing the opportunity to appeal his sentence or the circuit court’s acceptance of his guilty plea. View "McDonough v. Weber" on Justia Law

The Morris Family LLC (Morris Family) owns certain property abutting U.S. Highway 212 in the City of Watertown. In a 1970 condemnation action against Morris Family’s predecessor in title, the State sought to acquire the necessary “right of way and rights of access” in accordance with its plan to turn Highway 212 into a four-lane, controlled-access highway. The parties to the condemnation action eventually settled. In 2010, Morris Family filed a complaint against the City and State, claiming unconstitutional taking or damaging of property for the loss of access from their property to Highway 212 and violation of due process stemming from the State’s and City’s denial of access. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that the State was granted complete control of access for the land in the 1970 judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the motion for summary judgment was properly before the circuit court and that the court did not err when it granted summary judgment on all claims and dismissed the case. View "Morris Family LLC v. S.D. Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped after a highway patrol trooper registered Defendant’s car traveling at 112 miles per hour. Defendant, who was under the influence of alcohol and marijuana, was traveling with three small children in the vehicle. After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of abuse of a minor in violation of S.D. Codified Laws 26-10-1 because he had “exposed” the children as stated by the statute. Defendant appealed, asserting that section 26-10-1 is unconstitutionally vague because the statute does not define the word “expose.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even though section 26-10-1 does not include a definition of the word “expose,” the statute is not unconstitutionally vague because it affords the public adequate notice as to the conduct proscribed and does not allow law enforcement unfettered discretion to enforce it. View "State v. Myers" on Justia Law

In 2013, Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). The State filed a part II information charging Defendant with third offense DUI based on a 2005 DUI conviction and a 2012 DUI conviction. Defendant challenged the validity of his 2005 DUI conviction for sentence-enhancement purposes, arguing that the conviction was constitutionally invalid because he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his guilty plea. The circuit court found that the plea was involuntary under the factual circumstances and struck the 2005 DUI conviction from the part II information. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the Court’s recent decision in State v. Chant, Defendant may not collaterally attack his 2005 conviction for sentence-enhancement purposes because he waived his right to counsel in the 2005 proceedings. View "State v. Wolf" on Justia Law

In August 2011, an indictment issued charging Defendant with one count of aggravated child abuse between March 24, 2011 and March 28, 2011. Defense counsel requested that the jury be instructed that they must determine guilt or innocence on each incident, the one on March 24 and the one on March 28. The court refused the requested jury instruction. The jury subsequently returned a verdict of guilty on the single count of aggravated child abuse. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied the right to a unanimous jury verdict because there was no way to determine whether all twelve jurors agreed upon the commission of the same act in order to commit him of the charged offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State presented two incidents of trauma, each of which could have formed the basis of aggravated child abuse, and the instructions only informed the jury that the verdict must be unanimous; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred by not providing the jury with a special unanimity instruction requiring it to agree on the act supporting the conviction or to find that Defendant had committed both acts of child abuse. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. White Face" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled drug or substance. The circuit court sentenced Appellant to five years in prison with two years suspended and fined him $10,000. The two suspended years of imprisonment were conditioned on Appellant paying the fine. On appeal, Appellant argued that the $10,000 fine for possession of a controlled drug or substance was grossly disproportionate to the offense in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive fines. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to make a prima facie showing that the $10,000 fine was grossly disproportionate to the offense. View "State v. Webb" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and two counts of aggravated assault and sentenced to ten years in prison on each count, to be served concurrently. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not commit structural error by allowing the State’s reasonable doubt standard to be presented to the jurors during voir dire; (2) the State’s questioning during voir dire amounted to plain error, but Defendant’s substantial rights were not impacted by the prosecutor’s improper comments; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. View "State v. Hayes" on Justia Law