Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Shanna Starkey was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. The stop was based on the officer's perception that Starkey was attempting to evade the police. Starkey was ultimately arrested for driving under the influence. The circuit court suppressed the evidence, concluding that the officer lacked the reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in failing to consider that conduct designed to evade contact with the police may establish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory detention; and (2), under the totality of the circumstances in this case, Starkey's evasive driving provided reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Remanded. View "State v. Starkey " on Justia Law

Former county deputy sheriff Buckly McColl entered into a plea agreement to plead guilty to one count of third-degree rape. In exchange, the State dismissed other charges and agreed not to release an analysis of McColl's use of the sheriff's department's computers. More than one year after McColl was sentenced, he moved to withdraw his plea, asserting that the State violated the plea agreement by "leaking" the computer analysis. The circuit court denied the motion. McColl moved for reconsideration and a hearing to present witnesses who would testify they heard information about the computer analysis. The circuit court also denied that motion. McColl appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in not allowing a hearing to present evidence that the State breached the plea agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because McColl failed to allege specific facts, which, if true, would entitle him to withdraw his plea, the circuit court was not required to hold a hearing to determine if the plea agreement had been breached. View "State v. McColl" on Justia Law

Appellant Richard Litschewski was convicted by a jury of three separate offenses. The circuit court ordered that the sentence for count two was to run consecutive to the sentence for count one, and the sentence for count three was to run consecutive to counts one and two. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to vacate or modify an illegal sentence, arguing that his sentence was illegal because the circuit court imposed consecutive sentences in an order that was inconsistent with the chronological order in which his crimes occurred. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the version of S.D. Codified Laws 22-6-6.1 that was in effect when Appellant was sentenced, the circuit court lacked the authority to order Appellant's sentence for count two, which occurred first in time, to run consecutive to count one. Remanded. View "State v. Litschewski" on Justia Law

Appellant Jason Larsen-Smith was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and sentenced to life without parole. Appellant appealed, arguing that the sentence amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant where (1) the sentence did not appear grossly disproportionate to the crime, (2) Appellant received a statutorily authorized sentence for his conviction, and (3) the circuit court properly acquired a thorough acquaintance with Appellant and imposed a sentence that took into consideration the safety of the public and Appellant's prospects for rehabilitation. View "State v. Larsen-Smith" on Justia Law

Rylan Walth was convicted of one count of possession with intent to distribute and one count of simple possession of a controlled drug. Prior to trial, Walth filed a motion to suppress a statement he made to a police officer on the grounds that his Miranda rights were violated. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, holding (1) the statements Walth made to a detective prior to his arrest were not made while he was in custody because a reasonable person would have understood he or she was at liberty to terminate the interview and leave; and (2) therefore, there was no Miranda violation. View "State v. Walth" on Justia Law

Christopher Fisher was convicted of manslaughter following the death of a fifteen-month-old child. Fisher appealed, contending that the trial court erred in (1) failing to suppress incriminating statements Fisher made during an interview with law enforcement, (2) admitting a portion of a videotaped interrogation where Fisher was depicted shaking a doll with the image of the doll redacted; and (3) finding that one of the state's expert witnesses was qualified to testify about abusive head trauma. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Fisher's confession during his interrogation was voluntary, and the trial court did not err in denying his motion to suppress; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting the redacted video of Fisher shaking the doll as the evidence was insufficient to mislead the jury or unfairly prejudice Fisher; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the expert witness to testify because the evidence in the record supported the trial court's conclusion that the witness had sufficient knowledge, training or education to offer her opinion on the child's cause of death. View "State v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Lacy March sought a protection order against Roger Thursby, which the circuit court granted. The testimony elicited at trial concerned stalking. Thursby appealed, alleging, among other things, that the findings of fact were insufficient to support the order as signed. The Supreme Court reversed due to insufficiency of the findings of fact, holding the circuit court failed to insure that the findings of fact and conclusions of law were clearly entered. Specifically, the Court found that although the circuit court indicated that it believed March's version of the events, the written finding did not correspond with the oral testimony of March, and the court did not indicate how the evidence met the statutory elements of stalking. View "March v. Thursby" on Justia Law

Lucas Waugh was charged with attempted rape of a woman and the rape of a minor. The incidents occurred one after the other within walking distance of each other. The circuit court joined the cases for trial, and a jury found Waugh guilty of both offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in joining the charges for trial because (i) the two incidents in this case were closely related in time, location, and manner of execution, and (ii) there was no undue prejudice because the evidence of each incident could have been admitted in the trial of the other; and (2) the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to have found Waugh guilty of both offenses. View "State v. Waugh" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Jones was convicted of raping a twenty-three-year-old woman who testified that she was too intoxicated to have consented. The defendant appealed, asserting that although S.D. Codified Laws 22-22-1(4) does not explicitly include a knowledge element, the circuit court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that the State must prove that the defendant knew that the woman's intoxicated condition made her unable to consent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Legislature intended that a rape conviction under section 22-22-1(4) requires proof that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim's intoxicated condition rendered her incapable of consenting. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Appellant Mil Hirning pleaded guilty to unauthorized possession of a controlled substance and admitted to being a habitual offender. Hirning made the plea after Hirning's trial counsel withdrew from representing him and Hirning proceeded pro se. On appeal, Hirning argued that his waiver of counsel was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The Supreme Court reversed Hirning's convictions and sentence, (1) finding that Hirning was not warned of the dangers of self-representation, and (2) holding that the record did not indicate circumstances from which the Court could find Hirning was aware of the danger and made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. Remanded. View "State v. Hirning" on Justia Law