Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2013, Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). The State filed a part II information charging Defendant with third offense DUI based on a 2005 DUI conviction and a 2012 DUI conviction. Defendant challenged the validity of his 2005 DUI conviction for sentence-enhancement purposes, arguing that the conviction was constitutionally invalid because he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his guilty plea. The circuit court found that the plea was involuntary under the factual circumstances and struck the 2005 DUI conviction from the part II information. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the Court’s recent decision in State v. Chant, Defendant may not collaterally attack his 2005 conviction for sentence-enhancement purposes because he waived his right to counsel in the 2005 proceedings. View "State v. Wolf" on Justia Law

In August 2011, an indictment issued charging Defendant with one count of aggravated child abuse between March 24, 2011 and March 28, 2011. Defense counsel requested that the jury be instructed that they must determine guilt or innocence on each incident, the one on March 24 and the one on March 28. The court refused the requested jury instruction. The jury subsequently returned a verdict of guilty on the single count of aggravated child abuse. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied the right to a unanimous jury verdict because there was no way to determine whether all twelve jurors agreed upon the commission of the same act in order to commit him of the charged offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State presented two incidents of trauma, each of which could have formed the basis of aggravated child abuse, and the instructions only informed the jury that the verdict must be unanimous; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred by not providing the jury with a special unanimity instruction requiring it to agree on the act supporting the conviction or to find that Defendant had committed both acts of child abuse. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. White Face" on Justia Law

In 1996, Defendant, who was sixteen years old at the time, pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a term of thirty-three years in prison for kidnapping. In 2012, Defendant filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional based on the United States Supreme Court decisions Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not receive life without parole or a de facto life sentence because he had the opportunity for release at age forty-nine, and therefore, Defendant was unable to establish that Roper, Graham, and Miller applied to him. View "State v. Springer" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled drug or substance. The circuit court sentenced Appellant to five years in prison with two years suspended and fined him $10,000. The two suspended years of imprisonment were conditioned on Appellant paying the fine. On appeal, Appellant argued that the $10,000 fine for possession of a controlled drug or substance was grossly disproportionate to the offense in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive fines. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to make a prima facie showing that the $10,000 fine was grossly disproportionate to the offense. View "State v. Webb" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and two counts of aggravated assault and sentenced to ten years in prison on each count, to be served concurrently. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not commit structural error by allowing the State’s reasonable doubt standard to be presented to the jurors during voir dire; (2) the State’s questioning during voir dire amounted to plain error, but Defendant’s substantial rights were not impacted by the prosecutor’s improper comments; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. View "State v. Hayes" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial. Thereafter, Petitioner filed an amended and second amended application for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his due process rights were violated and that he was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel. The habeas court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner’s guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (3) Petitioner was not denied effective assistance of counsel. View "LeGrand v. Weber" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree arson and first-degree felony murder for intentionally setting fire to an occupied structure, resulting in the death of an unidentified victim in the fire. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent life sentences without parole for each conviction. Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, claiming that the concurrent sentences violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Legislature intended to authorize cumulative punishment for violations of felony murder and the underlying felony of arson, and therefore, the circuit court was authorized by the Legislature to impose concurrent sentences for both crimes. View "State v. Garza" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with alternative counts of driving under the influence after being stopped for committing a traffic violation and having blood evidence seized from her without a warrant. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the blood test administration and results. The magistrate court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that the warrantless search conducted under the state’s implied consent statutes was unconstitutional and that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was inapplicable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the blood draw in this case violated the warrant requirement of the federal constitution and state constitution; and (2) because the evidence was not obtained during a search conducted in “reasonable reliance on binding precedent,” it was not subject to the exclusionary rule. View "State v. Fierro" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of driving or control of a vehicle while having 0.08 percent or more of alcohol in his blood. The offense was found to be a third offense DUI within a ten-year period, and Defendant was sentenced to two years in the state penitentiary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress blood evidence seized without a warrant, as the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied in this case; and (2) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to strike a previous DUI conviction from the part II information. View "State v. Edwards" on Justia Law

While Defendant was incarcerated, he killed a corrections officer. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to death for the murder. On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded Defendant’s death sentence, concluding that the circuit court may have committed prejudicial error by improperly considering, for sentencing purposes, statements made by Defendant in a psychological evaluation procured to determine his competency to stand trial. The Court remanded for the limited purpose of resentencing without the use or consideration of the psychological evaluation unless Defendant called its authority to testify. On remand, the circuit court entered an amended judgment of conviction sentencing Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s death sentence, holding (1) the Court’s remand directions in Berget I did not infringe upon any of Berget’s constitutional rights; (2) the limited remand did not implicate or otherwise violate Defendant’s rights to be present and to allocution; and (3) Defendant’s judicial bias argument failed. View "State v. Berget" on Justia Law