Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Under the terms of a plea agreement entered into with the State, Chris Jones agreed to plead guilty to three counts of second-degree rape and one count of kidnapping. After sentencing, Jones filed a motion to reconsider the sentence based upon an alleged violation of the plea agreement by the State. The trial court granted the motion and held a resentencing hearing. At the hearing, the trial court denied Jones's oral motion for a different sentencing judge. Jones appealed, arguing that he was entitled to resentencing before a different judge and that his sentence was cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Jones did not contemporaneously object to the state's violation of the plea agreement, he forfeited his claim; (2) Jones did not demonstrate that the violation of the plea agreement resulted in plain error; and (3) given Jones's conduct and the fact that the sentence was well within the statutory maximums for his crimes, the sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Robert Dahl was convicted for third-offense DUI. Dahl appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the stop of his vehicle because the stop lacked reasonable suspicion. The arresting officer initiated the investigatory stop to determine whether Dahl violated the statute requiring a vehicle executing a right turn to be driven as closely as practicable to the right-hand curb. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the arresting officer did not make a mistake of law by concluding that Dahl's vehicle did not stay as close as practicable to the right-hand curb when making the turn; and (2) even if Dahl did not violate any traffic laws, his wide turn and crossing over the dividing line were sufficient to form the basis for reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. View "State v. Dahl" on Justia Law

This dispute involved a struggle between two factions in a Hutterite colony. One faction purported to excommunicate members of the other, and eventually the other faction sought court dissolution of the corporation. Denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the circuit court (1) concluded the corporation was not functioning as a communal organization in accord with its articles and bylaws, and (2) ordered the appointment of a receiver to collect all the assets and divide the proceeds among the colony members. In determining which members were entitled to distributed assets, the court was obliged to determine which members were eligible. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the underlying religious controversies over church leadership so pervaded the dissolution of the religious corporation that the dissolution required an unconstitutional entanglement in a religious dispute and was beyond a secular court's jurisdiction. Remanded for entry of an order of dismissal. View "Wipf v. Hutterville Hutterian Brethren, Inc." on Justia Law

Shanna Starkey was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. The stop was based on the officer's perception that Starkey was attempting to evade the police. Starkey was ultimately arrested for driving under the influence. The circuit court suppressed the evidence, concluding that the officer lacked the reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in failing to consider that conduct designed to evade contact with the police may establish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory detention; and (2), under the totality of the circumstances in this case, Starkey's evasive driving provided reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Remanded. View "State v. Starkey " on Justia Law

Former county deputy sheriff Buckly McColl entered into a plea agreement to plead guilty to one count of third-degree rape. In exchange, the State dismissed other charges and agreed not to release an analysis of McColl's use of the sheriff's department's computers. More than one year after McColl was sentenced, he moved to withdraw his plea, asserting that the State violated the plea agreement by "leaking" the computer analysis. The circuit court denied the motion. McColl moved for reconsideration and a hearing to present witnesses who would testify they heard information about the computer analysis. The circuit court also denied that motion. McColl appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in not allowing a hearing to present evidence that the State breached the plea agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because McColl failed to allege specific facts, which, if true, would entitle him to withdraw his plea, the circuit court was not required to hold a hearing to determine if the plea agreement had been breached. View "State v. McColl" on Justia Law

Appellant Richard Litschewski was convicted by a jury of three separate offenses. The circuit court ordered that the sentence for count two was to run consecutive to the sentence for count one, and the sentence for count three was to run consecutive to counts one and two. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to vacate or modify an illegal sentence, arguing that his sentence was illegal because the circuit court imposed consecutive sentences in an order that was inconsistent with the chronological order in which his crimes occurred. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the version of S.D. Codified Laws 22-6-6.1 that was in effect when Appellant was sentenced, the circuit court lacked the authority to order Appellant's sentence for count two, which occurred first in time, to run consecutive to count one. Remanded. View "State v. Litschewski" on Justia Law

Appellant Jason Larsen-Smith was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and sentenced to life without parole. Appellant appealed, arguing that the sentence amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant where (1) the sentence did not appear grossly disproportionate to the crime, (2) Appellant received a statutorily authorized sentence for his conviction, and (3) the circuit court properly acquired a thorough acquaintance with Appellant and imposed a sentence that took into consideration the safety of the public and Appellant's prospects for rehabilitation. View "State v. Larsen-Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff ranchers sued the State because of ongoing damage to their property from incursions of prairie dogs from public lands. Relying on multiple statutes requiring the State to manage and control prairie dog populations, Plaintiffs requested injunctive relief, abatement, and damages. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and ordered a trial on damages. When the case was reassigned, the State moved the new judge to reexamine the first judge's ruling. On reconsideration, the court vacated the first summary judgment and granted summary judgment for the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the second circuit court judge did not err in granting summary judgment for the State where the acts mandated by the statutes cited by Plaintiffs were discretionary and the State was protected from suit by sovereign immunity. View "Adrian v. Vonk" on Justia Law

Rylan Walth was convicted of one count of possession with intent to distribute and one count of simple possession of a controlled drug. Prior to trial, Walth filed a motion to suppress a statement he made to a police officer on the grounds that his Miranda rights were violated. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, holding (1) the statements Walth made to a detective prior to his arrest were not made while he was in custody because a reasonable person would have understood he or she was at liberty to terminate the interview and leave; and (2) therefore, there was no Miranda violation. View "State v. Walth" on Justia Law

Christopher Fisher was convicted of manslaughter following the death of a fifteen-month-old child. Fisher appealed, contending that the trial court erred in (1) failing to suppress incriminating statements Fisher made during an interview with law enforcement, (2) admitting a portion of a videotaped interrogation where Fisher was depicted shaking a doll with the image of the doll redacted; and (3) finding that one of the state's expert witnesses was qualified to testify about abusive head trauma. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Fisher's confession during his interrogation was voluntary, and the trial court did not err in denying his motion to suppress; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting the redacted video of Fisher shaking the doll as the evidence was insufficient to mislead the jury or unfairly prejudice Fisher; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the expert witness to testify because the evidence in the record supported the trial court's conclusion that the witness had sufficient knowledge, training or education to offer her opinion on the child's cause of death. View "State v. Fisher" on Justia Law