Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
State v. Stark
Kenneth Stark, a registered sex offender, was convicted of loitering in a community safety zone in violation of S.D. Codified Laws 22-24B-24. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the state statutes prohibiting sex offenders from loitering in community safety zones are constitutional; (2) the trial court did not err by allowing the State to amend the information to include the correct location of Stark's prior felony conviction; (3) there was sufficient evidence to establish that Stark's primary purpose for remaining in the community safety zones was to observe or contact minors; and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence that an individual in a white mini-van registered to Stark was seen in a community safety zone the day before the charged conduct occurred. View "State v. Stark" on Justia Law
Onnen v. Sioux Falls Indep. Sch. Dist.
Matt Onnen was terminated from the position of registrar at Southeast Technical Institute (STI), an entity of the Sioux Falls School District, after STI officials found several degrees or diplomas had been approved and awarded by Onnen to students who had not earned them, and several students entitled to a degree or diploma had not received one. The Sioux Falls School Board affirmed the decision. Onnen appealed the District's and Board's decision to circuit court, which affirmed the District. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that the District's decision was not arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion; (2) because Onnen was not a teacher at STI, he was not entitled to sixty days' notice before termination, and therefore Onnen was not denied procedural due process when he was terminated; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Onnen's motion for a new trial.
View "Onnen v. Sioux Falls Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law
In re Interpretation of S.D. Const. art. V, 2 & 6
The South Dakota Governor requested an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court regarding eligibility requirements for individuals seeking appointment to the South Dakota Supreme Court. The Governor asked (1) what actions or intent are sufficient to satisfy the requirement of S.D. Const. art. V, 2 and 6 that justices of the Supreme Court be voting residents within the district from which they are appointed, and (2) at what point in time must these actions be undertaken or intentions be formed? The Supreme Court accepted the request and answered (1) a person selected by the Governor to fill a vacant seat on the Supreme Court becomes a justice by qualifying for office by taking an oath or affirmation, (2) prior to taking that oath, that person must fulfill the eligibility requirement to hold that office including establishing voting residency in the district from which he or she is appointed pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 12-1-4, and (3) by doing so, that person becomes a justice after taking the oath and complies with the constitutional directives of being a voting resident of the district from which he or she was selected. View "In re Interpretation of S.D. Const. art. V, 2 & 6" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, South Dakota Supreme Court
State v. Jensen
Defendant William Jensen was charged with fourth offense driving under the influence. He filed a motion to strike one of his three prior driving under the influence convictions, arguing that because the magistrate court relied on a statement of rights form to establish the voluntariness of his guilty plea during that prior hearing, that prior conviction was invalid for sentence enhancement purposes. The trial court denied Jensen's motion to strike, concluding that the statement of rights form was an adequate record of voluntariness. Jensen appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Jensen did not demonstrate prejudice, his challenge to his prior driving under the influence conviction was not proper for the Court's consideration; and (2) Jensen did not demonstrate that the magistrate court's failure to personally canvass him to establish the voluntariness of his plea violated his due process rights. View "State v. Jensen" on Justia Law
State v. Good Plume
Defendant Ivan Good Plume was found guilty of aggravated assault and of being a habitual offender and was sentenced to eighteen years in prison. On appeal, defendant asserted (1) that the sentencing judge, in referring to a pattern of drunken violence by Good Plume as "going native," evinced his personal bias against defendant and used race as a sentencing factor, thus violating defendant's federal and state due process rights; and (2) the judge abused his discretion in admitting into evidence a letter defendant wrote without considering the requirements of S.D. R. Evid. 404(b) before admitting it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) defendant did not meet his burden of making a specific and substantial showing that a racial or personal bias was used as an aggravating factor in his sentence, and (2) the letter was admitted not to prove defendant engaged in other wrongs, crimes, or acts but as res gestae evidence necessary to prove intent. View "State v. Good Plume" on Justia Law
South Dakota Department of Transportation v. Clark (SD)
The South Dakota Department of Transportation (DOT) obtained title to land once owned by Defendants Philip Clark, P&J Enterprises, LLC and Hansen Manufacturing Corporation by eminent domain. The jury determined the amount of compensation to award for the taking. The trial court subsequently awarded prejudgment interest and attorneyâs fees to Defendants. The DOT challenged the award of attorneyâs fees. The Supreme Court found that the plain language of the applicable state law allows for an award of prejudgment interest and attorneyâs fees in connection with eminent domain takings. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial courtâs decision.
Lawrence v. Weber
Petitioner James Lawrence appealed the circuit courtâs denial of his petition for habeas corpus, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and sentence for âtheft by deception.â In 1996, Petitioner approached the victim four times over the course of several months, offering to perform home repairs that he said would be reimbursed under a federal government program. By the end, Petitioner had received over $5,000 for his âwork.â Petitioner furnished invoices he claimed would be reimbursed and an âofficialâ called the victim to arrange to inspect the work Petitioner had done. When the inspector never showed, the victim called the local branch of the government agency to follow up, and learned that the alleged reimbursement had ended several years earlier. In 2003, a jury found Petitioner guilty of theft by deception and sentenced him to twenty-five yearsâ imprisonment at the state penitentiary. The appellate court affirmed his conviction. In 2006, Petitioner sought the writ of habeas corpus, alleging among other things, that his constitutional rights had been violated because he was convicted on insufficient evidence. The circuit court denied his motion, and Petitioner brought his appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court concluded that there was ample evidence from which the jury could draw its conclusion. The Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decisions to dismiss Petitionerâs appeals.