Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued Defendant for specific performance of Plaintiff’s option to purchase a ranch owned by Defendant. Defendant counterclaimed, alleging that Plaintiff owed him rent. After a trial, the circuit court (1) denied Plaintiff’s request for specific performance, concluding that Plaintiff had not performed all the conditions precedent on his part; and (2) concluded that the parties had an implied or express contract requiring Plaintiff to pay Defendant rent. The Supreme Court (1) held that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding Plaintiff was the party who was materially at fault for the failure of the conditions and in therefore denying specific performance, but because the record did not reflect that the court considered whether specific performance was appropriate under the exception set forth in S.D. Codified Laws 21-9-5, the case was remanded for reconsideration of specific performance under this exception; and (2) the circuit court erred in concluding that either an express or an implied contract required Plaintiff to pay rent. View "Humble v. Wyant" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a breach of contract action against H&S Builders, Inc. and retained Defendants to defend them in the lawsuit. Plaintiffs fired Defendants during the proceedings and hired a new attorney to assist them. The case was eventually settled. Plaintiffs then commenced this legal malpractice case against Defendants, claiming that Defendant failed properly to represent their interests in the action brought against H&S. The circuit court entered a default judgment as to liability in favor of Plaintiffs but concluded that Plaintiffs failed to prove they suffered any damages that were proximately caused by Defendants’ negligent representation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that Plaintiffs failed to prove damages sustained as a proximately result of Defendants’ conduct. View "Peterson v. Issenhuth" on Justia Law

The Finnemans owned 17,000 acres of farmland that they deeded to Rock Creek Farms (RCF). RCF funded a series of redemptions of the property, and the Arnoldys purchased existing judgments on the property. Rabo Agrifinance and Rabo AgServices (Rabo) subsequently initiated foreclosure proceedings against the Finnemans, RCF, and all parties who had an interest in the land. The trial court entered a judgment and decree of foreclosure in the Rabo foreclosure proceedings and adjudged RCF as having the final owner's right of redemption as to the entirety of the property. The Arnoldys sought to have the judgment and decree of foreclosure set aside by filing a motion for relief pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-60(b). On May 26, the trial court granted the motion and vacated the portion of the judgment recognizing RCF's final redemption rights. RCF and the Finnemans sought relief from the May 26 order by filing separate motions pursuant to Rule 60(b). The trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court judge correctly determined that a Rule 60(b) motion was not appropriate and denied relief in this case. View "Rabo Agrifinance, Inc. v. Rock Creek Farms" on Justia Law

Thomas Konrad accepted a loan from Bob Law upon the advice of attorney Douglas Kettering. Law and Kettering had been partners in at least one of Law's business ventures and had an attorney-client relationship. Thomas's parents (the Konrads) provided their land as collateral for Thomas's loan. Thomas later defaulted on the note. Seven months after Kettering passed away, Law brought suit to enforce the note and mortgage against Thomas and the Konrads. Law settled with Thomas and the Konrads. Law then sought to recover from the Kettering Estate the amounts outstanding on the note, claiming that Kettering's acts - including his conflict of interest with Law and his alleged fraudulent inducement of the Konrads into signing the note and mortgage - voided the note and mortgage, and therefore, the Estate was liable to Law for the interest due on the note. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the contract between Law and Thomas did not contravene public policy because it was drafted by an attorney who failed to disclose a conflicting attorney-client relationship; and (2) the theory that Kettering fraudulently induced the Konrads into signing the note and mortgage rested on mere speculation. View "Law Capital, Inc. v. Kettering" on Justia Law

JAS Enterprises, Inc. (JAS) entered into a purchase agreement with BBS Enterprises, Inc. (BBS), which sold vehicles, equipment, and inventory used in a sheet metal installation business. The agreement also contained a covenant not to compete. The agreement was signed by the Statons as personal guarantors of the agreement. When BBS failed to make timely monthly payments, JAS filed suit against BBS and the Statons, alleging breach of contract. BBS and the Statons counterclaimed, arguing that JAS and James Swaby, JAS's principal shareholder, violated the covenant not to compete. A jury concluded that BBS and the Statons breached their contract and that JAS and Swaby breached the covenant not to compete. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) erred when it denied Swaby's motion to dismiss him personally; (2) erred in admitting certain testimony; (3) erred in admitting parol evidence in interpreting the contract; and (4) erred by not requiring the jury to choose the date when the damage occurred to enable the trial court to properly calculate prejudgment interest. Remanded. View "JAS Enters., Inc. v. BBS Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant applied for homeowner's insurance with Insurer, and his application was approved. Several years later, after discovering a misrepresentation in Defendant's application, Insurer rescinded the homeowner's insurance policy issued to Defendant. Insurer then initiated this action against Defendant, alleging that it lawfully rescinded the insurance contract with Defendant. Insurer also sought recovery of all monies paid to Defendant under the insurance contract. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Insurer, determining, as a matter of law, that Defendant made a misrepresentation on his homeowner's insurance application and that the misrepresentation was material. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because no material question of fact existed regarding whether Defendant made a material misrepresentation on his application for homeowner's insurance, the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment for Insurer. View "De Smet Farm Mut. Ins. Co. of S.D. v. Busskohl" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit against Black Hills Federal Credit Union and CUNA Mutual Insurance Society for changing their credit disability insurance policy. The complaint alleged that Defendants wrongfully switched the credit disability insurance policies of 4,461 borrowers. Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, but the trial court denied the motion, finding that Plaintiffs did not meet the adequacy requirement or the predominance and superiority requirements of the class certification statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in its application of the class certification statutes to the facts in this case. Remanded for certification of the class. View "Thurman v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y" on Justia Law

Decedent's ex-wife, Ann, filed a claim against Decedent's estate for compensation for nursing and convalescent services she provided to Decedent before his death. Before Decedent died, he forgave a loan he made to Ann. The trustee of Decedent's trust denied Ann's claim, asserting that the loan forgiveness constituted payment for Ann's services. Ann subsequently filed a petition for allowance of claim, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment and seeking payment from Decedent's trust. The trial court ordered that the trust pay Ann $183,538 for services rendered, concluding that Ann was entitled to compensation. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the loan forgiveness was not compensation for the services Ann provided to Decedent and that Ann was entitled to compensation for the services she provided to Decedent; but (2) concluded that the trial court erred in calculating the amount of Ann's award. Remanded with instructions to recalculate the award. View "In re Nelson Living Trust" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between two construction companies, Plaintiff and Defendant. Defendant contracted with Plaintiff to build grain storage facilities at two locations. After beginning construction, Plaintiff stopped work for Defendant's alleged failure to make progress payments. Plaintiff then filed two lawsuits against Defendant seeking to foreclose liens on the property and asserting, ultimately, claims for breach of contract. Defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract, negligence, and other claims. The trial court dismissed the mechanic's liens claims, granted Defendant's motions for default judgment on the counterclaims, and granted Defendant's motions for summary judgment in both cases. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of the default judgments and summary judgments, holding that the trial court (1) abused its discretion in granting the motions for default judgment against Plaintiff on Defendant's counterclaims and in failing to grant Plaintiff's motions for enlargement of time; and (2) erred in granting the motions for summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff's claims of breach of contract. Remanded. View "Donald Bucklin Constr. v. McCormick Constr. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an in-home registered nurse, was injured in an automobile accident while driving her employer's vehicle to to a patient's home to perform her nursing duties. Plaintiff incurred $382,849 in medical expenses as a result of the accident. After Plaintiff's employer's workers compensation carrier (AIG) denied Plaintiff's workers compensation claim, Plaintiff filed a medical payments claim with Allstate, with whom Plaintiff had a personal automobile insurance policy that provided $100,000 in medical payments coverage. Allstate failed to provide medical payments benefits immediately to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and AIG later settled Plaintiff's worker's compensation claim for $150,000. Plaintiff then commenced this breach of contract and bad faith action against Allstate based on Allstate's failure to pay medical benefits. The circuit court granted judgment as a matter of law for $33,000 on the breach of contract claim and awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages and $1,500,000 in punitive damages on the bad faith claim. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court erred in excluding Allstate's evidence of AIG's acceptance of the worker's compensation claim, and that exclusion prejudiced Allstate's ability to defend the bad faith and punitive damages claims. View "Bertelsen v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law