Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Border States Paving Company, Inc. was the prime contractor on a South Dakota Department of Transportation road construction project. Weatherton Contracting Company, Inc. entered into a subcontract with Border States to supply crushed aggregate for the project. Stern Oil Company sold Weatherton fuel and petroleum products necessary for Weatherton to perform its subcontract, but Weatherton failed to pay Stern Oil for the products. Stern Oil Company brought suit against Border States and its surety, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, pleading causes of action against Border States for unjust enrichment and breach of an alleged third-party beneficiary payment agreement to pay the bill and against Liberty Mutual for payment on the bond. The circuit court granted summary judgment against Stern Oil on all claims. The Supreme court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment against Stern Oil on its claims. View "Stern Oil Co. v. Border States Paving, Inc." on Justia Law

After Plaintiff obtained a judgment against Logs Unlimited, Inc., the corporation transferred its assets to Thomas Schramel, Schramel's daughter, and another corporation. Schramel was the sole shareholder, director, and officer of both corporations. Proceeds from the transfer were used to pay some of Logs Unlimited's creditors, but Plaintiff was not among the creditors paid. Plaintiffs sued Logs Unlimited, claiming that it had fraudulently transferred its assets. The circuit court set aside the transfer, concluding that Logs Unlimited fraudulently transferred its assets to prevent satisfaction of Plaintiff's judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, upon consideration of the relevant factors, the transfer was fraudulent under S.D. Codified Laws 54-8A-4(a)(1).View "Nielsen v. Logs Unlimited, Inc." on Justia Law

Steven Thomas & Sons (T&S), LLC did excavation and soil compaction work for an addition to a school building in the Kimball School District. The School District was later informed that problems in the building caused by settling issues were due to negligently performed work by T&S. The School District brought suit against T&S and other defendants. T&S’s commercial general liability insurer, Employers Mutual Casualty Company (EMC) withdrew from contributing to T&S's defense, asserting that the policy excluded coverage for continuous or progressive property damage that occurred before the effective date of the policy, and the problems to the building were observed before the 2007 policy date. In 2005 and 2006, T&S was insured by AMCO Insurance Company. Ultimately, AMCO paid defense costs and indemnified T&S for its share of the arbitration award in favor of the School District. AMCO subsequently brought a declaratory judgment action against EMC seeking a ruling that EMC had a joint duty to defend T&S and a declaration that EMC’s policy exclusion was void as against public policy. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of EMC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that EMC’s exclusion did not violate public policy. View "AMCO Ins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Belmont, Inc., a meat and produce business, leased unfinished commercial real estate space from Tri-City Associates, LP, the owner and developer of a shopping center. The parties later filed claims against each other for breach of the lease. After a court trial, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Belmont on all claims, concluding that Tri-City materially breached the lease by failing to deliver the space in “broom clean” condition and failing to complete its allocated portion of the initiated construction, and that these failures excused Belmont from performance. Tri-City appealed, arguing, among other things, that it was excused by Belmont’s failure to give notice of the breach and an opportunity to cure under a notice-and-cure provision in the lease. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that conflicting authority and the circuit court’s failure to address the notice-and-cure provision prevented effective appellate review. Remanded to the circuit court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law on the effect of Belmont’s failure to give notice of breach and an opportunity to cure. View "Tri-City Assocs., LP v. Belmont, Inc." on Justia Law

Jonathan Quinn and his family were residential tenants of Barker & Little, Inc., when Quinn’s daughter was diagnosed with lead poisoning, Quinn sued Barker & Little for the injuries his daughter sustained from the high concentrations of lead in the leased premises. Barker & Little tendered the claim to Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers) and Truck Insurance Exchange (Truck). Farmers declined to defend Barker & Little under the applicable insurance policies. After a trial, the circuit court rendered judgment for Quinn. Quinn then asserted standing to bring all claims against Farmers and Truck that otherwise could have been brought by Barker & Little. Farmers and Truck moved for summary judgment on the basis of exclusions in the applicable policies. The circuit court granted the motion, concluding that Farmers had no duty to defend or indemnify Barker & Little in the underlying action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed that precluded summary judgment in this case. View "Quinn v. Farmers Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant for specific performance of Plaintiff’s option to purchase a ranch owned by Defendant. Defendant counterclaimed, alleging that Plaintiff owed him rent. After a trial, the circuit court (1) denied Plaintiff’s request for specific performance, concluding that Plaintiff had not performed all the conditions precedent on his part; and (2) concluded that the parties had an implied or express contract requiring Plaintiff to pay Defendant rent. The Supreme Court (1) held that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding Plaintiff was the party who was materially at fault for the failure of the conditions and in therefore denying specific performance, but because the record did not reflect that the court considered whether specific performance was appropriate under the exception set forth in S.D. Codified Laws 21-9-5, the case was remanded for reconsideration of specific performance under this exception; and (2) the circuit court erred in concluding that either an express or an implied contract required Plaintiff to pay rent. View "Humble v. Wyant" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a breach of contract action against H&S Builders, Inc. and retained Defendants to defend them in the lawsuit. Plaintiffs fired Defendants during the proceedings and hired a new attorney to assist them. The case was eventually settled. Plaintiffs then commenced this legal malpractice case against Defendants, claiming that Defendant failed properly to represent their interests in the action brought against H&S. The circuit court entered a default judgment as to liability in favor of Plaintiffs but concluded that Plaintiffs failed to prove they suffered any damages that were proximately caused by Defendants’ negligent representation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that Plaintiffs failed to prove damages sustained as a proximately result of Defendants’ conduct. View "Peterson v. Issenhuth" on Justia Law

The Finnemans owned 17,000 acres of farmland that they deeded to Rock Creek Farms (RCF). RCF funded a series of redemptions of the property, and the Arnoldys purchased existing judgments on the property. Rabo Agrifinance and Rabo AgServices (Rabo) subsequently initiated foreclosure proceedings against the Finnemans, RCF, and all parties who had an interest in the land. The trial court entered a judgment and decree of foreclosure in the Rabo foreclosure proceedings and adjudged RCF as having the final owner's right of redemption as to the entirety of the property. The Arnoldys sought to have the judgment and decree of foreclosure set aside by filing a motion for relief pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-60(b). On May 26, the trial court granted the motion and vacated the portion of the judgment recognizing RCF's final redemption rights. RCF and the Finnemans sought relief from the May 26 order by filing separate motions pursuant to Rule 60(b). The trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court judge correctly determined that a Rule 60(b) motion was not appropriate and denied relief in this case. View "Rabo Agrifinance, Inc. v. Rock Creek Farms" on Justia Law

Thomas Konrad accepted a loan from Bob Law upon the advice of attorney Douglas Kettering. Law and Kettering had been partners in at least one of Law's business ventures and had an attorney-client relationship. Thomas's parents (the Konrads) provided their land as collateral for Thomas's loan. Thomas later defaulted on the note. Seven months after Kettering passed away, Law brought suit to enforce the note and mortgage against Thomas and the Konrads. Law settled with Thomas and the Konrads. Law then sought to recover from the Kettering Estate the amounts outstanding on the note, claiming that Kettering's acts - including his conflict of interest with Law and his alleged fraudulent inducement of the Konrads into signing the note and mortgage - voided the note and mortgage, and therefore, the Estate was liable to Law for the interest due on the note. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the contract between Law and Thomas did not contravene public policy because it was drafted by an attorney who failed to disclose a conflicting attorney-client relationship; and (2) the theory that Kettering fraudulently induced the Konrads into signing the note and mortgage rested on mere speculation. View "Law Capital, Inc. v. Kettering" on Justia Law

JAS Enterprises, Inc. (JAS) entered into a purchase agreement with BBS Enterprises, Inc. (BBS), which sold vehicles, equipment, and inventory used in a sheet metal installation business. The agreement also contained a covenant not to compete. The agreement was signed by the Statons as personal guarantors of the agreement. When BBS failed to make timely monthly payments, JAS filed suit against BBS and the Statons, alleging breach of contract. BBS and the Statons counterclaimed, arguing that JAS and James Swaby, JAS's principal shareholder, violated the covenant not to compete. A jury concluded that BBS and the Statons breached their contract and that JAS and Swaby breached the covenant not to compete. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) erred when it denied Swaby's motion to dismiss him personally; (2) erred in admitting certain testimony; (3) erred in admitting parol evidence in interpreting the contract; and (4) erred by not requiring the jury to choose the date when the damage occurred to enable the trial court to properly calculate prejudgment interest. Remanded. View "JAS Enters., Inc. v. BBS Enters., Inc." on Justia Law