Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ila and Gary Fedderson owned a business called Whisky Flow Dining and Minor Alley. Whisky Flow was destroyed by fire, after which Ila and Gary submitted a sworn proof of loss statement to the business's insurer, Columbia Insurance Group. Gary, however, made misrepresentations and committed fraud in submitting the statement. Columbia declined to pay Ila benefits, relying on a condition that voided the policy for fraud or misrepresentation by any insured. Ila filed suit, claiming that she was an innocent insured who was entitled to her share of the claim that related to her fifty percent interest in the business. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Columbia. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly granted Columbia's motion for summary judgment, as Gary's misrepresentation and fraud voided the policy. View "Fedderson v. Columbia Ins. Group" on Justia Law

While driving a car owned by her divorced parents, Plaintiff was hit and injured by an uninsured drunk driver. Plaintiff's father's policy specifically covered Plaintiff's car and paid Plaintiff $100,000 in uninsured motorist benefits. This amount did not fully compensate Plaintiff for her injuries, however, and Plaintiff filed a claim under her mother's policy with Farmers Mutual Insurance Company of Nebraska (Insurer). The policy did not specifically cover Plaintiff's car but covered Plaintiff as an insured. Farmers denied Plaintiff's claim for uninsured motorist benefits under an "owned-but-not-insured" exclusion in its policy. Plaintiff subsequently filed an action seeking a declaration that the "owned-but-not-insured" exclusion was void and that she was entitled to uninsured motorist benefits from Farmers. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers, concluding that the exclusion was valid and enforceable in relation to uninsured motorist coverage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court incorrectly applied the law when it used the Supreme Court's statements in previous cases to conclude that the exclusion was valid and enforceable under S.D. Codified Laws 58-11-9; and (2) the "owned-but-not-insured" exclusion was void in this case. View "Wheeler v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. of Neb." on Justia Law

Jorgensen Farms sued Country Pride Cooperative alleging that Country Pride sold Jorgensen fertilizer contaminated with rye, damaging its 2007 wheat crop. Country Pride settled with Jorgensen but preserved its claims against third-party defendants Agriliance, Agrium, and Dakota Gasification Company (Dakota Gas). Country Pride brought claims against the third-party defendants alleging that, if Jorgensen proved the fertilizer it purchased from Country Pride was contaminated, the contamination must have occurred in the chain of fertilizer distribution. The trial court granted the third-party defendants' motions for summary judgment, reasoning that Country Pride failed to provide specific facts upon which a jury could find a party responsible without resorting to speculation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Agriliance was not liable as a matter of law under either a breach of contract or negligence theory; (2) Country Pride's claims against Agrium were barred by Country Pride's failure to give notice, the economic loss doctrine, and the statute of limitations; and (3) Dakota Gas did not have a duty to inspect the vehicles used by trucking company for delivery. View "Jorgensen Farms, Inc. v. Country Pride Coop., Inc." on Justia Law

Terry Leonhardt and his wife, Cindy, alleged that they entered into an oral lease with Terry's father, Delbert Leonhardt, which was to extend for the lives of Delbert and his wife, Ellen. They claimed the oral lease contained a right of first refusal that Terry could exercise after the death of both Delbert and Ellen. Delbert later entered into a written lease with his grandson, Matthew Oswald. The written lease encompassed some of the farmland Terry and Cindy alleged was part of their oral lease with Delbert. Terry and Cindy initiated a declaratory judgment action against Delbert, seeking a declaration that the oral lease and right of first refusal were valid. Matthew intervened in the lawsuit. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Delbert and Matthew on the ground that the lease was invalid under the statute of frauds. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court erred in failing to provide them with notice that it would consider granting summary judgment on a legal theory different from the legal theory advances by Delbert and Matthew in their summary judgment pleadings and brief, and Terry and Cindy were prejudiced by the error. View "Leonhardt v. Leonhardt" on Justia Law

Insurer denied coverage for two unassembled wind turbines that were destroyed in a fire on Ranch's property. Insurer claimed that a policy exclusion for "fences, windmills, windchargers, or their towers" permitted it to deny coverage for the loss. Ranch sued Insurer, asserting Insurer committed a breach of contract and acted in bad faith in denying coverage for the unassembled wind turbines. The circuit court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment, finding the policy exclusion applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly applied the law in determining Ranch's unassembled wind turbines were precluded from coverage under Insurer's policy exclusion, as the language of the exclusion was unambiguous and the plain and ordinary meanings of "windmill" and "windcharger" encompassed the unassembled wind turbines. View "Ass Kickin Ranch, LLC v. N. Star Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Wayne and Sandra Masloskie sued real estate agent G. Pat Baldwin and Century 21 American Real Estate Inc. on a number of causes of action including actual fraud. Baldwin and Century 21 moved for summary judgment, arguing that all causes of action were barred by statutes of limitation governing realtor malpractice. The circuit court granted summary judgment dismissing all claims. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their cause of action for fraud. Because that cause of action was subject to a longer statute of limitations, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded that portion of the judgment. View "Masloskie v. Century 21 American Real Estate, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant James Brown owned interests in several businesses. In late 2004, he acquired and redesigned two convenience stores on opposite sides of Exit 2 on Interstate 29 in North Sioux City, South Dakota. Plaintiff-Appellee Stern Oil, a fuel distributor for Exxon Mobil Corporation, contacted Brown while he was remodeling the properties. Although Brown was negotiating with another fuel distributor, he ultimately elected to do business with Stern Oil. When Brown notified Stern Oil that he would no longer purchase its fuel, Stern Oil initiated this breach of contract action. Brown filed a counterclaim, alleging fraudulent inducement. Stern Oil argued that Brown contracted to purchase a minimum amount of fuel for a ten-year period. The circuit court granted Stern Oil's motion for summary judgment on both the breach of contract claim and on Brown's counterclaim, but the issue of damages proceeded to trial. After trial, the circuit court awarded Stern Oil eight years of lost profits. Brown appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment. Both Brown's fraudulent inducement counterclaim and Stern Oil's breach of contract claim involved disputed material facts. Therefore, the Court concluded the circuit court erred in granting Stern Oil summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Stern Oil Co. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Randy Kramer initiated a breach of contract action against Mike D. Murphy and the William F. Murphy Self-Declaration of Trust (Trust). Tri-State Ethanol, LLC owned an ethanol plant in Rosholt, South Dakota. Kramer was one of the members and managers of Tri-State Ethanol. Kramer was also a member of White Rock Pipeline, LLC, which owned a pipeline that supplied natural gas to Tri-State Ethanol. In order to comply with various federal regulations, Tri-State Ethanol determined it was necessary to purchase the membership interests of Kramer, Murphy, Woods, and the Trust. To accomplish this, Tri-State Ethanol entered into a loan agreement (Loan Agreement) with Murphy and the Trust. Tri-State Ethanol was unable to meet its financial obligations and eventually filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. During the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, Murphy and the Trust reached a settlement agreement regarding payment of the Loan Agreement and the Disbursement Agreement. Murphy and the Trust, through its trustee, represented to the bankruptcy court that they would use the settlement proceeds to pay Kramer the amounts owed under the Disbursement Agreement. The bankruptcy court approved the settlement agreement. After the settlement proceeds from Tri-State Ethanol’s bankruptcy estate were distributed, Murphy and the Trust refused to pay Kramer the full amount listed in the Disbursement Agreement. Kramer then filed a complaint against Murphy and the Trust for breach of the Disbursement Agreement. Murphy filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue. He claimed that the forum-selection clauses contained in the Loan Agreement, the Balloon Note, and the Promissory Note controlled for any suit brought on the Disbursement Agreement. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the case. It found that while the Disbursement Agreement itself had no forum-selection clause, the other three agreements contained forum-selection clauses providing that the Fourteenth Judicial District in Rock Island County, Illinois was the proper forum. The circuit court reasoned that the agreements must be considered as a whole. After examining each of documents collectively as one contract, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in finding that the parties intended the venue for any suit on the Disbursement Agreement to be the Fourteenth (14th) Judicial District in Rock Island County, Illinois. The circuit court’s dismissal of this case was affirmed. View "Kramer v. William F. Murphy Self-Declaration of Trust" on Justia Law

The Surgical Institute of South Dakota, P.C. filed suit against Dr. Matthew Sorrell who was formerly employed by the practice. The practice alleged breach of contract against the physician for failing to give required notice of resignation and breach of an implied contract resulting in unjust enrichment. The implied contract claim was dismissed by summary judgment; a jury found the physician did not breach the contract. The practice timely appealed the dismissal of its implied contract claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that there was sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury's verdict, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the practice's motion for a new trial. Additionally, the Court found that the practice did not show a "clear abuse of discretion" in excluding certain evidence from trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Surgical Institute of South Dakota, PC v. Sorrell" on Justia Law

Dan Prue sold his majority interest in DT-Trak Consulting, a medical coding business, for a lump-sum payment and several annual payments. DT-Trak withheld an annual payment, asserting that Prue had violated the parties' stock purchase agreement. The matter proceeded to arbitration. A three-member arbitration panel made an award in Prue's favor. DT-Trak sought to vacated the award, alleging that the arbitrator it selected demonstrated evident partiality and that the panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law were insufficient. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under either the Federal Arbitration Act or South Dakota Arbitration Act, DT-Trak failed to show that the arbitration award should be vacated, as (1) there was no support that any member of the arbitration panel exhibited evident partiality; and (2) the findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the panel were sufficient under the requirements of the agreement. View "DT-Trak Consulting, Inc. v. Prue" on Justia Law