Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Thomas Konrad accepted a loan from Bob Law upon the advice of attorney Douglas Kettering. Law and Kettering had been partners in at least one of Law's business ventures and had an attorney-client relationship. Thomas's parents (the Konrads) provided their land as collateral for Thomas's loan. Thomas later defaulted on the note. Seven months after Kettering passed away, Law brought suit to enforce the note and mortgage against Thomas and the Konrads. Law settled with Thomas and the Konrads. Law then sought to recover from the Kettering Estate the amounts outstanding on the note, claiming that Kettering's acts - including his conflict of interest with Law and his alleged fraudulent inducement of the Konrads into signing the note and mortgage - voided the note and mortgage, and therefore, the Estate was liable to Law for the interest due on the note. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the contract between Law and Thomas did not contravene public policy because it was drafted by an attorney who failed to disclose a conflicting attorney-client relationship; and (2) the theory that Kettering fraudulently induced the Konrads into signing the note and mortgage rested on mere speculation. View "Law Capital, Inc. v. Kettering" on Justia Law

JAS Enterprises, Inc. (JAS) entered into a purchase agreement with BBS Enterprises, Inc. (BBS), which sold vehicles, equipment, and inventory used in a sheet metal installation business. The agreement also contained a covenant not to compete. The agreement was signed by the Statons as personal guarantors of the agreement. When BBS failed to make timely monthly payments, JAS filed suit against BBS and the Statons, alleging breach of contract. BBS and the Statons counterclaimed, arguing that JAS and James Swaby, JAS's principal shareholder, violated the covenant not to compete. A jury concluded that BBS and the Statons breached their contract and that JAS and Swaby breached the covenant not to compete. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) erred when it denied Swaby's motion to dismiss him personally; (2) erred in admitting certain testimony; (3) erred in admitting parol evidence in interpreting the contract; and (4) erred by not requiring the jury to choose the date when the damage occurred to enable the trial court to properly calculate prejudgment interest. Remanded. View "JAS Enters., Inc. v. BBS Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant applied for homeowner's insurance with Insurer, and his application was approved. Several years later, after discovering a misrepresentation in Defendant's application, Insurer rescinded the homeowner's insurance policy issued to Defendant. Insurer then initiated this action against Defendant, alleging that it lawfully rescinded the insurance contract with Defendant. Insurer also sought recovery of all monies paid to Defendant under the insurance contract. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Insurer, determining, as a matter of law, that Defendant made a misrepresentation on his homeowner's insurance application and that the misrepresentation was material. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because no material question of fact existed regarding whether Defendant made a material misrepresentation on his application for homeowner's insurance, the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment for Insurer. View "De Smet Farm Mut. Ins. Co. of S.D. v. Busskohl" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit against Black Hills Federal Credit Union and CUNA Mutual Insurance Society for changing their credit disability insurance policy. The complaint alleged that Defendants wrongfully switched the credit disability insurance policies of 4,461 borrowers. Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, but the trial court denied the motion, finding that Plaintiffs did not meet the adequacy requirement or the predominance and superiority requirements of the class certification statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in its application of the class certification statutes to the facts in this case. Remanded for certification of the class. View "Thurman v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y" on Justia Law

Decedent's ex-wife, Ann, filed a claim against Decedent's estate for compensation for nursing and convalescent services she provided to Decedent before his death. Before Decedent died, he forgave a loan he made to Ann. The trustee of Decedent's trust denied Ann's claim, asserting that the loan forgiveness constituted payment for Ann's services. Ann subsequently filed a petition for allowance of claim, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment and seeking payment from Decedent's trust. The trial court ordered that the trust pay Ann $183,538 for services rendered, concluding that Ann was entitled to compensation. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the loan forgiveness was not compensation for the services Ann provided to Decedent and that Ann was entitled to compensation for the services she provided to Decedent; but (2) concluded that the trial court erred in calculating the amount of Ann's award. Remanded with instructions to recalculate the award. View "In re Nelson Living Trust" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between two construction companies, Plaintiff and Defendant. Defendant contracted with Plaintiff to build grain storage facilities at two locations. After beginning construction, Plaintiff stopped work for Defendant's alleged failure to make progress payments. Plaintiff then filed two lawsuits against Defendant seeking to foreclose liens on the property and asserting, ultimately, claims for breach of contract. Defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract, negligence, and other claims. The trial court dismissed the mechanic's liens claims, granted Defendant's motions for default judgment on the counterclaims, and granted Defendant's motions for summary judgment in both cases. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of the default judgments and summary judgments, holding that the trial court (1) abused its discretion in granting the motions for default judgment against Plaintiff on Defendant's counterclaims and in failing to grant Plaintiff's motions for enlargement of time; and (2) erred in granting the motions for summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff's claims of breach of contract. Remanded. View "Donald Bucklin Constr. v. McCormick Constr. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an in-home registered nurse, was injured in an automobile accident while driving her employer's vehicle to to a patient's home to perform her nursing duties. Plaintiff incurred $382,849 in medical expenses as a result of the accident. After Plaintiff's employer's workers compensation carrier (AIG) denied Plaintiff's workers compensation claim, Plaintiff filed a medical payments claim with Allstate, with whom Plaintiff had a personal automobile insurance policy that provided $100,000 in medical payments coverage. Allstate failed to provide medical payments benefits immediately to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and AIG later settled Plaintiff's worker's compensation claim for $150,000. Plaintiff then commenced this breach of contract and bad faith action against Allstate based on Allstate's failure to pay medical benefits. The circuit court granted judgment as a matter of law for $33,000 on the breach of contract claim and awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages and $1,500,000 in punitive damages on the bad faith claim. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court erred in excluding Allstate's evidence of AIG's acceptance of the worker's compensation claim, and that exclusion prejudiced Allstate's ability to defend the bad faith and punitive damages claims. View "Bertelsen v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A corporation entered into an agreement with Wells Fargo for a business line of credit. The owners of the corporation signed the document as officers of the corporation. The corporation later defaulted on the line of credit. Velocity Investments, the alleged successor in interest to Wells Fargo, subsequently filed suit against the corporation and the owners as personal guarantors of the debt. The trial court granted summary judgment for Velocity after the owners, acting pro se, failed to respond to Velocity's statement of material facts and requests for admissions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court (1) abused its discretion in denying the owners' motion for leave to answer requests for admissions, as (i) allowing the owners to answer the requests for admissions would serve the presentation of the merits of this case, and (ii) Velocity failed to demonstrate that it would be prejudiced if the owners were allowed to answer; and (2) because the trial court granted summary judgment based solely upon the owners' failure to respond to the request for admissions, genuine issues of material fact still existed, and the motion for summary judgment should have been denied. View "Velocity Invs., LLC v. Dybvig Installations, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs entered into a contract with DJ Construction (DJ) to build a home on their property. Construction was halted two years later after Plaintiffs discovered significant water damage in the home. Plaintiffs sued DJ, seeking to recover for the damage to their home and DJ's failure to complete the house. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, DJ's insurer, denied DJ's requests for defense and indemnity against Plaintiffs' claims, determining coverage was not provided for under the terms of the policy. Plaintiffs subsequently entered into a stipulated judgment and settlement agreement with DJ in which DJ confessed judgment and assigned its rights and claims against Owners to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then filed suit against Owners based on Owners' failure to defend and indemnify DJ. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Owners, determining there was no coverage under the policy because multiple policy exclusions applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Owners on Plaintiffs' breach of contract and bad faith claims based upon its determination that multiple policy exclusions applied. View "Swenson v. Owners Ins. Co." on Justia Law

An intoxicated driver (Driver) struck and injured several children. Driver later pleaded guilty to two counts of vehicular battery. Driver's insurer (Insurer) brought a declaratory action seeking a ruling that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the driver in any negligence suit brought on the children's behalf. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Insurer, ruling that coverage had expired twelve hours prior to the accident. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that by failing to accept the offer from Insurer to renew her insurance policy, Driver's coverage expired the day before the accident under the express and unambiguous terms of the insurance contract. View "Alpha Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ihle" on Justia Law