Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs-Appellants Wayne and Sandra Masloskie sued real estate agent G. Pat Baldwin and Century 21 American Real Estate Inc. on a number of causes of action including actual fraud. Baldwin and Century 21 moved for summary judgment, arguing that all causes of action were barred by statutes of limitation governing realtor malpractice. The circuit court granted summary judgment dismissing all claims. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their cause of action for fraud. Because that cause of action was subject to a longer statute of limitations, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded that portion of the judgment. View "Masloskie v. Century 21 American Real Estate, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant James Brown owned interests in several businesses. In late 2004, he acquired and redesigned two convenience stores on opposite sides of Exit 2 on Interstate 29 in North Sioux City, South Dakota. Plaintiff-Appellee Stern Oil, a fuel distributor for Exxon Mobil Corporation, contacted Brown while he was remodeling the properties. Although Brown was negotiating with another fuel distributor, he ultimately elected to do business with Stern Oil. When Brown notified Stern Oil that he would no longer purchase its fuel, Stern Oil initiated this breach of contract action. Brown filed a counterclaim, alleging fraudulent inducement. Stern Oil argued that Brown contracted to purchase a minimum amount of fuel for a ten-year period. The circuit court granted Stern Oil's motion for summary judgment on both the breach of contract claim and on Brown's counterclaim, but the issue of damages proceeded to trial. After trial, the circuit court awarded Stern Oil eight years of lost profits. Brown appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment. Both Brown's fraudulent inducement counterclaim and Stern Oil's breach of contract claim involved disputed material facts. Therefore, the Court concluded the circuit court erred in granting Stern Oil summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Stern Oil Co. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Randy Kramer initiated a breach of contract action against Mike D. Murphy and the William F. Murphy Self-Declaration of Trust (Trust). Tri-State Ethanol, LLC owned an ethanol plant in Rosholt, South Dakota. Kramer was one of the members and managers of Tri-State Ethanol. Kramer was also a member of White Rock Pipeline, LLC, which owned a pipeline that supplied natural gas to Tri-State Ethanol. In order to comply with various federal regulations, Tri-State Ethanol determined it was necessary to purchase the membership interests of Kramer, Murphy, Woods, and the Trust. To accomplish this, Tri-State Ethanol entered into a loan agreement (Loan Agreement) with Murphy and the Trust. Tri-State Ethanol was unable to meet its financial obligations and eventually filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. During the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, Murphy and the Trust reached a settlement agreement regarding payment of the Loan Agreement and the Disbursement Agreement. Murphy and the Trust, through its trustee, represented to the bankruptcy court that they would use the settlement proceeds to pay Kramer the amounts owed under the Disbursement Agreement. The bankruptcy court approved the settlement agreement. After the settlement proceeds from Tri-State Ethanol’s bankruptcy estate were distributed, Murphy and the Trust refused to pay Kramer the full amount listed in the Disbursement Agreement. Kramer then filed a complaint against Murphy and the Trust for breach of the Disbursement Agreement. Murphy filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue. He claimed that the forum-selection clauses contained in the Loan Agreement, the Balloon Note, and the Promissory Note controlled for any suit brought on the Disbursement Agreement. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the case. It found that while the Disbursement Agreement itself had no forum-selection clause, the other three agreements contained forum-selection clauses providing that the Fourteenth Judicial District in Rock Island County, Illinois was the proper forum. The circuit court reasoned that the agreements must be considered as a whole. After examining each of documents collectively as one contract, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in finding that the parties intended the venue for any suit on the Disbursement Agreement to be the Fourteenth (14th) Judicial District in Rock Island County, Illinois. The circuit court’s dismissal of this case was affirmed. View "Kramer v. William F. Murphy Self-Declaration of Trust" on Justia Law

The Surgical Institute of South Dakota, P.C. filed suit against Dr. Matthew Sorrell who was formerly employed by the practice. The practice alleged breach of contract against the physician for failing to give required notice of resignation and breach of an implied contract resulting in unjust enrichment. The implied contract claim was dismissed by summary judgment; a jury found the physician did not breach the contract. The practice timely appealed the dismissal of its implied contract claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that there was sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury's verdict, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the practice's motion for a new trial. Additionally, the Court found that the practice did not show a "clear abuse of discretion" in excluding certain evidence from trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Surgical Institute of South Dakota, PC v. Sorrell" on Justia Law

Dan Prue sold his majority interest in DT-Trak Consulting, a medical coding business, for a lump-sum payment and several annual payments. DT-Trak withheld an annual payment, asserting that Prue had violated the parties' stock purchase agreement. The matter proceeded to arbitration. A three-member arbitration panel made an award in Prue's favor. DT-Trak sought to vacated the award, alleging that the arbitrator it selected demonstrated evident partiality and that the panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law were insufficient. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under either the Federal Arbitration Act or South Dakota Arbitration Act, DT-Trak failed to show that the arbitration award should be vacated, as (1) there was no support that any member of the arbitration panel exhibited evident partiality; and (2) the findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the panel were sufficient under the requirements of the agreement. View "DT-Trak Consulting, Inc. v. Prue" on Justia Law

In the early 1990s, Kevin Costner commissioned Peggy Detmers and Detmers Studios, Inc. (collectively, Detmers) to design several sculptures, intending to display them at the entrance of a luxury resort called The Dunbar that Costner had envisioned. Subsequently, Costner and The Dunber (collectively, Costner) and Detmers entered into a binding contract in which Costner would provide Detmers additional compensation. Paragraph three of the agreement provided that if The Dunbar was not built within ten years or the sculptures were not "agreeably displayed elsewhere," Costner would give Detmers fifty percent of the profits from the sale of the sculptures. The sculptures were later placed on Costner's project called Tatanka. Detmers later brought suit against Costners, seeking a declaratory judgment that she did not agree to the placement of the sculptures as required by paragraph three of the parties' contract. The trial court granted judgment in favor of Costner. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) determining that the sculptures were "agreeably displayed elsewhere," in the absence of a guarantee from Costner that The Dunbar would be built; and (2) concluding that Tatanka was "elsewhere" under the language of the contract. View "Detmers v. Costner" on Justia Law

Heidi Schumacher signed a renewed lease with Meadowland Apartments. Meadowland later filed an eviction action against Schumacher, alleging that she was in material non-compliance with the lease because Schumacher kept a disruptive dog in her apartment. The magistrate court found that Schumacher's conduct constituted sufficient grounds for termination of the lease. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the magistrate court (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying Schumacher's motion for a continuance, as Schumacher was given a reasonable opportunity to secure evidence on her behalf; (2) did not abuse its discretion in considering evidence of incidents that occurred prior to the term of Schumacher's most recent lease with Meadowland; and (3) did not err in finding that Meadowland provided reasonable accommodations for Schumacher's disability as required under the Fair Housing Amendments Act. View "Meadowland Apartments v. Schumacher" on Justia Law

The parties in this case signed an arbitration agreement providing that arbitration would occur in accordance with the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) Code of Procedure, but the NAF became unavailable to administer its Code and the arbitration. Defendants moved the circuit court to appoint a substitute arbitrator under Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The circuit court concluded that a substitute arbitrator could not be appointed under Section 5 because the NAF Code of Procedure was integral to the parties' agreement to arbitrate and the NAF was unavailable to administer its Code. The Supreme Court reversed after considering the language of the arbitration agreement, the language of the NAF Code, and the federal policy expressed in the FAA, holding that Section 5 applied, and that absent some other defense, Section 5 required the appointment of a substitute arbitrator. View "Wright v. GGNSC Holdings LLC " on Justia Law

Sellers hired Agent to list their ranch for sale. Buyers purchased the ranch after Agent represented that the well on the ranch would produce as much water as they would need for their farming and ranching operation. Later, Buyers sued Sellers and Agent for negligent misrepresentation, maintaining that they were misled about the condition of the well and its potential to meet their farming and ranching needs. Buyers sought $513,000 in damages, which was the estimated cost of installing a new well. The circuit court (1) granted Sellers' motion to prohibit evidence of the cost of a new well as a measure of damages, and (2) prohibited Buyers from testifying on the cost of the well as a means of proving the devaluation of their property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth the proper measure of damages in South Dakota for negligent misrepresentation; (2) plaintiffs asserting misrepresentation claims may recover reliance damages but not expectation damages, and therefore, Buyers' evidence of the estimated cost for a new well was properly excluded; and (3) the circuit court properly precluded Buyers from testifying on their land's value. View "Steineke v. Delzer" on Justia Law

Border States Paving was awarded the prime contract by the state DOT for a road project. Border States entered into a subcontract with Morris, Inc. for aggregates and work on the project. During work on the project, the DOT orally informed Morris that certain materials passed the soundness test. However, the materials actually failed. Ultimately, the paving was not completed by the seasonal deadline. When the project was completed the next year, the DOT paid Border States in full. Border States withheld several thousand dollars from Morris for costs associated with the project because it believed Morris defaulted in its contractual obligations under the subcontract. Morris brought suit against the DOT, alleging that the DOT breached its express and implied contractual obligations owed to Morris and that the DOT breached its implied contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing. The circuit court ruled in favor of Morris and awarded Morris damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence that the DOT's erroneous pass report proximately damaged Morris where there was no evidence in the record that this error alone caused the project to not get completed by the deadline. View "Morris, Inc. v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law