Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

When Rita Fix's son and daughter-in-law, Jeff and Marie, secured a loan from the First State Bank of Roscoe by obtaining a warranty deed for the property, the Bank assured Fix she could retain possession of the house. After Jeff and Marie conveyed the house and property to the Bank, the Bank sold the property and sought to remove Fix from the house. Fix sued the Bank for, inter alia, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Meanwhile, Fix, Jeff, and Marie were indicted on multiple criminal counts. The State attorney who brought the charges and who represented the Bank civilly offered to dismiss the criminal charges against Fix if she would deed the house back to the Bank. Fix then amended her complaint to include a claim of abuse of process against the Bank. The trial court granted summary judgment against Fix on her IIED claim. A jury then returned a verdict finding the Bank liable for abuse of process but awarded no damages to Fix. The Supreme Court reversed on the abuse of process claim, holding that the trial court provided the jury with the incorrect legal standard for the recovery of emotional damages. Remanded for a new trial. View "Fix v. First State Bank of Roscoe" on Justia Law

Two unions filed grievances against the Sioux Falls School District, alleging that that the District violated the parties' labor agreements when the District provided 2.5 percent wage increases for the 2008-2009 school year. The District and the Department of Labor denied both grievances as untimely. The circuit court judge concluded that the grievances were timely, and reversed and remanded the matter to the Department to determine the correct percentage wage increase. On remand, the Department concluded that the union members were entitled to a three percent wage increase. The circuit court affirmed. The District appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the union's grievances were timely; and (2) the union members were entitled to a three percent salary increase, and the District violated the terms of the agreements by implementing a percentage wage increase other than the percentage change in the per student allocation referenced in S.D. Codified Laws 13-13-10.1(4). View "AFSCME Local 1025 v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Clarkson and Company owned and leased land on which Continental Resources conducted oil and gas exploration activities. Continental agreed to pay Clarkson for use of and damage to Clarkson's property. Clarkson sued Continental, seeking declaratory relief to clarify the terms of the payment agreement Continental and Clarkson made. The trial court granted judgment to Clarkson for $164,102. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that (1) Clarkson's claim was not barred by laches; (2) the agreement called for annual escalation of road use payments; (3) roads on land that Clarkson leased in 1981 and subsequently purchased were subject to the road use payment provision of the agreement; and (4) Clarkson was not entitled to a road use payment for a portion of existing road that Continental used to construct a new road. View "Clarkson & Co. v. Continental Res., Inc." on Justia Law

In this land contract dispute, Landowners arranged for the sale of several thousand acres of their property. Landowners and Buyer executed three separate contracts, one that conveyed to Buyer a majority of the land, the second that gave Buyer the option to purchase the remaining acreage, and the third that leased the remaining acreage to Buyer. A dispute between the parties later arose concerning the purchase price of the remaining acreage under the option agreement. Buyer brought suit against Landowners, alleging breach of contract. At issue during trial was whether the option agreement was ambiguous and required the admission of parol evidence to ascertain the parties' intent. The trial court held that the option agreement was not fully integrated and relied on parol evidence to calculate the purchase price, awarding Buyer the acreage for $171 per acre. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that Buyer was entitled to specific performance but at a different price because (1) the trial court erred when it went outside the parties' agreement to set the price per acre at $171; and (2) according to the parties' agreement, the price per acre at the option price was $289 per acre. Remanded. View "Pankratz v. Hoff" on Justia Law

Cindy Tolle sued Peter Lev for damages for failing to transfer ownership of a cabin situated on land owned by the government in a national park. Tolle also sued Lev for tortious interference with a business relationship she claimed with an employer. The circuit granted granted summary judgment in favor of Lev on both claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the tortious interference claim, but (2) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Lev on the claim for damages for failure to transfer the cabin, as (i) the statute of frauds did not bar the claim because an email from Lev confirming his agreement to transfer ownership of the cabin to Tolle was a sufficient writing and because the cabin agreement was for the sale of personal property, not real estate, (ii) neither the doctrine of merger nor the integration clause defeated Tolle's claim to enforce the oral agreement, and (iii) the parol evidence rule did not bar Lev's email. View "Tolle v. Lev" on Justia Law

For almost twenty years, Lincoln Neugebauer rented his mother Pearl Neugebauer's farm under an oral lease. In 2008, Lincoln purchased the farm by contract for deed. Pearl later brought an action to rescind the contract on the ground of undue influence. The circuit court found that Lincoln had exerted undue influence, and the court rescinded the contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding (1) Pearl was susceptible to undue influence, (2) Lincoln had the opportunity to exert undue influence over Pearl, (3) Lincoln was disposed to exert undue influence, and (4) the resulting contract for deed clearly showed the effects of undue influence. View "Neugebauer v. Neugebauer" on Justia Law

In December 2007, Kjerstad Realty brought suit against Bootjack Ranch for breach of a realty contract. In October 2009, the case was remanded. After remand, the assigned judge retired and a temporary judge presided over the case for six months. In the interim, Kjerstad pursued discovery. Once a new judge was appointed, Kjerstad requested a trial date within the one-year statutory deadline, which the judge did not grant. In November 2010, Bootjack moved to dismiss for Kjerstad's failure to commence trial within one year from the date of remand pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 15-30-16. The trial court granted Bootjack's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed Kjerstad's suit against Bootjack because good cause existed to extend the deadline under section 15-30-16. View "Kjerstad Realty, Inc. v. Bootjack Ranch, Inc." on Justia Law

The South Dakota Public Assurance Alliance (SDPAA), a local government risk pool, negotiated with Aurora County to provide what was essentially insurance coverage. After coverage was finalized, a local dairy farm sued the County over a pre-existing zoning dispute. The County was found liable for damages. SDPAA then sought a declaration that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify, arguing, inter alia, that the County failed to disclose material facts relating to the claim. In a jury trial, the circuit court excluded as parol evidence the parties' pre-contract communications regarding coverage for zoning issues, including communications that could be interpreted as having disclosed the dairy farm zoning dispute. The jury found for SDPAA. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that because the excluded coverage communications were not offered to alter or contradict any written terms of the agreement, their admission would not have violated the parol evidence rule. View "S.D. Public Assurance Alliance v. Aurora County" on Justia Law

After self-insured Employer filed for bankruptcy, it continued to take payroll deductions from Employees for medical coverage but stopped paying the provider hospital for the covered charges. The hospital then directly billed Employees for services that should have been paid by Employer. Employees filed suit to stop the hospital's attempts to collect payment, seeking relief under the theories of declaratory judgment, injunction, breach of contract, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and bad faith breach of contract. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital on all of Employees' claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Employees had standing as third party beneficiaries to enforce the provisions of the hospital agreement and payer agreement; and (2) Employees were not obligated to pay for covered medical services under the agreements. Remanded. View "Jennings v. Rapid City Reg'l Hosp., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellees Floyd Demaray and James Hagemann were sued for repeated tortious activity in discharging of pollutants into lakes and streams of a nearby property. Appellees, who owned separate but identical insurance policies with De Smet Farm Mutual Insurance, notified De Smet of the lawsuit. De Smet declined defense of the suit, asserting it owed no duty to defend under the insurance contract. Appellees obtained their own defense counsel and defended the matter through trial, where a jury ruled in their favor. Appellees then sued De Smet, alleging that the company breached its duty to defend them in the previous lawsuit and seeking indemnification for all costs and fees incurred as a result. The trial court granted Appellees' motion for summary judgment, holding that De Smet owed Appellees a duty to defend because the alleged claim, if true, fell within policy coverage. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the policy language was unambiguous and the complaint asserted no claim that would arguably invoke coverage. Remanded with directions to grant summary judgment for De Smet. View "Demaray v. De Smet Farm Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law