Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Contracts
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A limited partnership, POB Associates, was formed for the purpose of owning and operating a physicians office building. The partnership had two general partners. The allocation of POB Associates' profits and losses was governed by Article I, Section 1.06(b) of the partnership agreement, and for approximately 25 years the general partners annually allocated 98% of the limited partnership's profits and losses to the limited partners in accordance with the number of units held by each. In 2008, the general partners adopted a new allocation formula based on a new interpretation of Section 1.06(b), under which 46% of POB Associates' profits and losses were allocated to the limited partners and the remaining 54% was allocated to the general partners. Several limited partners sued the general partners, alleging breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty and requesting a declaratory judgment regarding the allocation under the agreement. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the general partners. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment, finding the partnership agreement capable of more than one meaning under the disputed facts of the case. Remanded. View "Benson Living Trust v. Physicians Office Bldg. Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-Appellee Spiska Engineering, Inc. (Spiska) sued Defendant-Appellee SPM Thermo-Shield, Inc. (Thermo-Shield) for breach of contract. Following a number of proceedings and appeals relating to the arbitration of the dispute, an arbitration award was confirmed, and Spiska obtained a money judgment against Thermo-Shield. A receiver was appointed to satisfy the judgment by liquidating Thermo-Shield's assets. Appellant Joseph Raver was Thermo-Shield's president, CEO and sole shareholder. Mr. Raver was not a party to the arbitration proceedings. The receiver mailed Mr. Raver a motion and notice of its intent to sell Thermo-Shield's assets. Mr. Raver appeared at a hearing at the circuit court, and objected to the sale. The court denied Mr. Raver's objection, and approved the sale. Though injunctive relief was not an issue at the hearing, the receiver included language in his proposed findings and conclusions that permanently enjoined Mr. Raver from competing with Thermo-Shield. The court adopted the receiver's findings in its final order. Mr. Raver appealed the award of injunctive relief, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Raver to enjoin him. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin Mr. Raver from competing with Thermo-Shield. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

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Plaintiff-Appellee Steven Johnson wanted to purchase a tract of commercial real estate from Defendant-Appellant Harrell Sellers and his wife Sandra Green. The purchase agreement, dated May 2009, was prepared by Mr. Johnson's attorney and incorrectly indicated that Mr. Sellers was a single person. Mr. Sellers was married at the time, but in the process of obtaining a divorce from Ms. Green. Ms. Green moved out in October 2008, and divorce proceedings started in January 2009. Sometime after signing the purchase agreement, Mr. Sellers told his attorney about the mistake in the agreement. Mr. Sellers' counsel advised him that Ms. Green would need to give her permission to sell the property. In June 2009, Ms. Green would not authorize the sale. The parties tried to work out agreements as to the closing and problems with the title, but could not resolve their problems. Mr. Sellers tried to rescind the original purchase agreement, arguing that issues with his divorce made closing on the property impossible. Mr. Johnson sued for specific performance. The trial court ruled that Mr. Sellers waived his rights pertaining to certain terms of the original purchase agreement. The Supreme Court concluded that the impediments to closing were resolved within a reasonable time, and because of this, the court could award specific performance of the contract. The Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court.

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Plaintiffs Terry and Susan Brown purchased land adjacent to Defendant James Hanson. The neighbors signed a well-and-road easement agreement, which was recorded with the County Register of Deeds. Believing that the Browns had violated the terms of the agreement, Mr. Hanson filed a letter "rescinding" the agreement with the Register of Deeds. The Browns sued Mr. Hanson, and the trial court ruled that a rescission was not the appropriate remedy for a breach of the easement. Mr. Hanson appealed that decision, and the appellate and Supreme Courts affirmed it. The case was remanded back to the trial court for other issues, one of which was that the Browns alleged Mr. Hanson slandered their title by filing his "rescission" letter with the Register of Deeds. Furthermore, that letter created a cloud on the Browns' title, which the Browns claimed interfered with their contract to sell the property to a third party. The trial court entered a judgment in the Browns' favor. Mr. Hanson again appealed. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in finding Mr. Hanson slandered the Browns' title and tortiously interfered with their sales contract. The Court remanded the case for the redetermination of attorney's fees.