Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a fire damaged Oscar Batiz's residential rental property, Batiz filed a claim with his carrier, Fire Insurance Exchange. Exchange initially tendered to Batiz $33,182 representing the actual cash value of the damaged property, later raising that amount to $8,415 after both parties chose an impartial appraiser and an umpire determined the cost to repair the property was $43,921. Batiz did not cash the payment and brought a declaratory action against Exchange. Both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted Exchange's motion for summary judgment, dismissing Batiz's action without prejudice. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) the circuit court did not err in determining that a declaratory judgment against Exchange was unwarranted because the insurance policy unambiguously provided what rights and obligations the parties had; and (2) the circuit court was correct in ruling that Batiz's assertion that the vast difference between his appraiser's and the umpire's valuations presented a justiciable issue requiring the court to determine the amount of loss was premature as Batiz had not yet repaired or replaced the damaged property. Remanded. View "Batiz v. Fire Ins. Exchange" on Justia Law

Arrowhead Ridge initiated a forcible entry and detainer action when its tenant, Cold Stone Creamery, defaulted on its lease. The trial court granted Arrowhead partial summary judgment, and the issues of mitigation of damages, interest, and attorneys' fees proceeded to trial. The trial court concluded that (1) Arrowhead failed to mitigate its damages due solely to an exclusivity provision in a lease with another tenant, and (2) Arrowhead could not recover its attorneys' fees under either the terms of the lease or state law. The court then denied the parties' motions for a new trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the undisputed evidence established that Arrowhead made substantial efforts to lease the premises to another tenant, the trial court abused its discretion by denying Arrowhead's motion for a new trial; (2) the record established that Arrowhead mitigated its damages by the exercise of reasonable diligence as a matter of law; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Arrowhead's motion for a new trial on the basis that it could recover the attorneys' fees it incurred due to Cold Stone's default. Remanded. View "Arrowhead Ridge I, L.L.C. v. Cold Stone Creamery, Inc." on Justia Law

Richard Orr and Sheldon Cook had a partnership agreement to conduct a cow-calf operation. The parties sold the cows and calves in the spring of 2007. Cook received $230,935 from the sale. Orr sued Cook, disputing the reimbursement amount Cook owed him from the sale and for the cost of feeding and caring for the cows during the winter of 2007. The trial court awarded Orr $41,614. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court was not clearly erroneous in determining the value of the calves; (2) the trial court was not clearly erroneous in determining the amount of reimbursement Cook owed Orr for feed and veterinarian costs; and (3) the trial court did err in refusing to award Orr prejudgment interest because it was requested in a manner allowed by statute. View "Orr v. Cook" on Justia Law

A limited partnership, POB Associates, was formed for the purpose of owning and operating a physicians office building. The partnership had two general partners. The allocation of POB Associates' profits and losses was governed by Article I, Section 1.06(b) of the partnership agreement, and for approximately 25 years the general partners annually allocated 98% of the limited partnership's profits and losses to the limited partners in accordance with the number of units held by each. In 2008, the general partners adopted a new allocation formula based on a new interpretation of Section 1.06(b), under which 46% of POB Associates' profits and losses were allocated to the limited partners and the remaining 54% was allocated to the general partners. Several limited partners sued the general partners, alleging breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty and requesting a declaratory judgment regarding the allocation under the agreement. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the general partners. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment, finding the partnership agreement capable of more than one meaning under the disputed facts of the case. Remanded. View "Benson Living Trust v. Physicians Office Bldg. Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Spiska Engineering, Inc. (Spiska) sued Defendant-Appellee SPM Thermo-Shield, Inc. (Thermo-Shield) for breach of contract. Following a number of proceedings and appeals relating to the arbitration of the dispute, an arbitration award was confirmed, and Spiska obtained a money judgment against Thermo-Shield. A receiver was appointed to satisfy the judgment by liquidating Thermo-Shield's assets. Appellant Joseph Raver was Thermo-Shield's president, CEO and sole shareholder. Mr. Raver was not a party to the arbitration proceedings. The receiver mailed Mr. Raver a motion and notice of its intent to sell Thermo-Shield's assets. Mr. Raver appeared at a hearing at the circuit court, and objected to the sale. The court denied Mr. Raver's objection, and approved the sale. Though injunctive relief was not an issue at the hearing, the receiver included language in his proposed findings and conclusions that permanently enjoined Mr. Raver from competing with Thermo-Shield. The court adopted the receiver's findings in its final order. Mr. Raver appealed the award of injunctive relief, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Raver to enjoin him. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin Mr. Raver from competing with Thermo-Shield. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellee Steven Johnson wanted to purchase a tract of commercial real estate from Defendant-Appellant Harrell Sellers and his wife Sandra Green. The purchase agreement, dated May 2009, was prepared by Mr. Johnson's attorney and incorrectly indicated that Mr. Sellers was a single person. Mr. Sellers was married at the time, but in the process of obtaining a divorce from Ms. Green. Ms. Green moved out in October 2008, and divorce proceedings started in January 2009. Sometime after signing the purchase agreement, Mr. Sellers told his attorney about the mistake in the agreement. Mr. Sellers' counsel advised him that Ms. Green would need to give her permission to sell the property. In June 2009, Ms. Green would not authorize the sale. The parties tried to work out agreements as to the closing and problems with the title, but could not resolve their problems. Mr. Sellers tried to rescind the original purchase agreement, arguing that issues with his divorce made closing on the property impossible. Mr. Johnson sued for specific performance. The trial court ruled that Mr. Sellers waived his rights pertaining to certain terms of the original purchase agreement. The Supreme Court concluded that the impediments to closing were resolved within a reasonable time, and because of this, the court could award specific performance of the contract. The Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court.

Plaintiffs Terry and Susan Brown purchased land adjacent to Defendant James Hanson. The neighbors signed a well-and-road easement agreement, which was recorded with the County Register of Deeds. Believing that the Browns had violated the terms of the agreement, Mr. Hanson filed a letter "rescinding" the agreement with the Register of Deeds. The Browns sued Mr. Hanson, and the trial court ruled that a rescission was not the appropriate remedy for a breach of the easement. Mr. Hanson appealed that decision, and the appellate and Supreme Courts affirmed it. The case was remanded back to the trial court for other issues, one of which was that the Browns alleged Mr. Hanson slandered their title by filing his "rescission" letter with the Register of Deeds. Furthermore, that letter created a cloud on the Browns' title, which the Browns claimed interfered with their contract to sell the property to a third party. The trial court entered a judgment in the Browns' favor. Mr. Hanson again appealed. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in finding Mr. Hanson slandered the Browns' title and tortiously interfered with their sales contract. The Court remanded the case for the redetermination of attorney's fees.