Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Tri-City Associates, LP owned and operated the Northgate Shopping Center in Rapid City. It entered into a written lease agreement with Belmont, Inc. in April 2006 for unfinished commercial space. The unfinished commercial space required substantial initial construction work before the lease was to begin on August 1, 2006. The parties experienced considerable difficulties in completing the terms of the lease. Tri-City proposed to move the start date of the lease to January 15, 2007. Belmont did not respond to the requested modification. Ultimately, Tri- City did not deliver the premises to Belmont on August 1, 2006, in the condition required under the lease and did not complete its allocated initial construction work. After Belmont did not pay rent for the first few months of the lease, Tri-City served Belmont with a notice of default under the lease. A month later, Tri-City served Belmont with a notice to quit and vacate and, in April 2007, sued to evict Belmont. Belmont answered and asserted that Tri-City materially breached the lease, which Belmont asserted relieved it of its duty to pay rent. Then, in October 2007, Belmont counterclaimed for damages for Tri-City’s failure to perform under the terms of the lease. Tri-City responded to Belmont’s counterclaim that Belmont agreed to accept the premises “as is.” Tri-City also argued that Belmont failed to provide Tri-City with written notice of Tri-City’s alleged breach and did not give Tri-City an opportunity to cure as required by the notice-and-cure provision in the lease. In this second appeal, Tri-City argued that the circuit court erred when it entered a judgment in favor of Belmont, Inc. In "Tri-City I," the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for the circuit court to enter “findings of fact and conclusions of law on the effect of Belmont’s failure to give notice of breach and an opportunity to cure.” On remand, the circuit court entered supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, interpreting the notice-and-cure provision of the lease at issue to allow for substantial compliance and found that Belmont substantially complied. It also found that Tri-City had actual notice of its material breaches and an opportunity to cure. Alternatively, the court concluded that, by bringing suit against Belmont, Tri-City repudiated any intention to perform its obligation under the lease and made futile the requirement that Belmont strictly comply with the notice-and-cure provision. It then entered a judgment in favor of Belmont. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tri-City Associates, LP v. Belmont, Inc." on Justia Law

Black Hills Excavating Services, Inc. (BHE) and Retail Construction Services, Inc. (RCS) entered into three subcontract agreements pursuant to which BHE agreed to perform construction services for RCS. BHE later filed suit alleging that RCS breached the subcontracts. RCS counterclaimed against BHE for breach of contract and also filed a complaint against BHE’s president, Mitch Morris, alleging that he was personally liable for BHE’s actions. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of RCS and awarded damages but did not impose personal liability on Morris. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not clearly err in determining that BHE had breached the subcontracts and that RCS was not liable for breach of contract; and (2) Morris was not personally liable for the corporation’s acts. View "Black Hills Excavating Servs., Inc. v. Retail Constr. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

The Laskas entered into a contract involving real property with the Barr Partners. Believing the contract created an option, the Barr Partners attempted to buy the property listed in the contract. The Laskas contended that the contract was ambiguous and void for lack of a time of performance and lack of mutual assent. The circuit court found the contract to be unambiguous and concluded that it granted the Barr Partners a right of first refusal and limited their rights under the contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the contract was ambiguous. Remanded to the circuit court to consider extrinsic evidence and to determine the parties’ intent. View "Laska v. Barr" on Justia Law

Fifteen-year-old Haley Gores was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Steven Smith when Smith lost control of the vehicle. Haley was treated by Dr. Lisa Miller for injuries she received during the accident. Dawn Gores, Haley’s mother and conservator, signed a general release in exchange for a settlement with Smith and Smith’s insurer. The release did not specifically name the treating physician or clinic, but it released al other claims that might develop from the accident. Haley and Dawn subsequently filed a malpractice suit against Dr. Miller and Yankton Surgical Associates (YSA), Dr. Miller’s practice group. Dr. Miller and YSA filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the release discharged Plaintiffs’ claims against them. The circuit court granted summary judgment, concluding that, based on the language of the release, the malpractice claims were discharged as a matter of contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly determined that the release barred Plaintiffs’ claims as a matter of contract. View "Gores v. Miller" on Justia Law

Travis Naser died in a one-vehicle accident that occurred at a T intersection at a dead-end road. The east-west road (“268th Street”) was located in Aurora County. Lynn Foster-Naser, Travis’s wife, brought suit against Aurora County for wrongful death, alleging that the County negligently failed to maintain the double-arrow sign on 268th Street. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that Aurora Township had a statutory duty to maintain the double-arrow sign on 268th Street, and Aurora County did not assume a duty to repair or maintain the Township’s signage when it agreed to maintain the Township’s roads. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Foster-Naser failed to present sufficient probative evidence that the County’s contract agreement to provide road maintenance included an agreement to maintain and repair the Township’s roadway signage. View "Foster-Naser v. Aurora County" on Justia Law

USA Tire Management Systems Inc. entered into a contract with Great Western Bank to “take title to, remove, and transport” tires and casings from a foreclosed property that a bank was attempting to sell. After an audit, the South Dakota Department of Revenue issued an assessment on the gross receipts USA Tire received from Great Western under their contract. USA Tire contested the assessment. The circuit court affirmed the assessment. USA Tire appealed, arguing that it was entitled to a trucking services tax exemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that USA Tire did not meet its burden of proving that its services were exempt trucking services under S.D. Codified Laws 10-45-12.1. View "In re Sales Tax Liability of USA Tire Mgmt. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

John and Kimberly Nooney purchased tickets from StubHub, Inc. for a concert. The tickets were invalid, and the Nooneys were denied access to the concert. The Nooneys sued StubHub for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement. The circuit court granted StubHub’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but in doing so, the circuit court considered a document that was not attached to the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in considering the document without converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment because the document was referenced in the complaint; but (2) erred in dismissing the complaint on the merits, as the Nooneys’ complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Nooney v. StubHub, Inc." on Justia Law

David Zerfas swerved to avoid a deer carcass in his lane of travel and lost control of his vehicle. Zerfas died after his vehicle was hit by oncoming traffic. Zerfas’s wife, Stacey, sought uninsured motorist benefits with their automobile insurance company, AMCO Insurance Company, alleging that an unidentified driver left the deer carcass in the lane of travel, which caused Zerfas to lose control of his vehicle. AMCO denied Stacey’s claim on the grounds that Stacey would not legally be entitled to recover damages from the unidentified driver. Stacey subsequently brought a breach of contract action against AMCO. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of AMCO, concluding that the unidentified driver did not have a legal duty to Zerfas to remove the carcass or warn of its existence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no common law or statutory duty existed between the unidentified driver and Zerfas, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in granting AMCO summary judgment. View "Zerfas v. AMCO Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Adam Ray, a former employee of Granite Buick GMC, Inc., and Scott Hanna, a former employee of McKie Ford Lincoln, Inc., left their respect employment and started their own automobile dealership. Granite Buick and McKie Ford sought injunctions to enforce non-compete agreements Defendants signed during the course of their employment. After the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, the circuit court concluded that the non-compete agreements were valid but granted judgment in favor of Defendants on their affirmative defenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly determined (1) Ray’s covenant not to compete was fraudulently induced; and (2) McKie Ford waived its right to enforce Hanna’s covenant not to compete. View "Granite Buick GMC, Inc. v. Ray" on Justia Law

Duane Pankratz filed a complaint against Robert Cullum’s estate for breach of an oral promise to transfer corporate stock and for the recovery of corporate debt Robert Cullum allegedly personally guaranteed to pay. The Estate moved for summary judgment, asserting that there was no binding personal guaranty between Pankratz and Cullum and that the statute of limitations barred Pankratz’s claim for shares in Cullum’s corporation. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it ruled that Cullum’s personal guaranty must be in writing to be enforceable; and (2) the circuit court did not err when it granted summary judgment on Pankratz’s claim that Cullum breached the parties’ oral agreement to transfer corporate stock because Pankratz did not bring his claim within the relevant statute of limitations period. View "In re Estate of Cullum" on Justia Law