Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A man lived with his girlfriend in an apartment in Pierre, South Dakota, where they invited a teenage girl to spend time with them. On the evening in question, the group played cards and drank alcohol, but tensions arose, particularly between the man and the girl. After two friends left the apartment, the girlfriend became ill and went to the bathroom, followed by the girl to assist her. The man entered the bathroom, argued with the girl, and the girlfriend fled to seek help. Police responded to 911 calls shortly thereafter, encountered the man at the apartment, and noticed blood on him. Upon entry, police discovered the girl’s body in the bathroom, having suffered multiple stab wounds. The man was arrested, and forensic evidence linked him to the crime scene and the murder weapon.The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Hughes County, presided over the trial. During jury selection, the State used a peremptory strike to remove a Native American juror, prompting a Batson challenge from the defense. The circuit court accepted the State’s race-neutral justifications—prior negative interactions with law enforcement and criminal history—as valid reasons for the strike and allowed it to stand. At trial, the man testified, offering conflicting accounts of the events. The jury acquitted him of first-degree murder and aggravated assault but convicted him of second-degree murder, resulting in a life sentence.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the appeal. It held that the circuit court did not clearly err in allowing the State’s peremptory strike, finding the reasons provided to be race-neutral and not pretextual. It also concluded that the State’s closing argument comments did not constitute improper vouching or prosecutorial misconduct. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "State v. Shangreaux" on Justia Law

A jury found the defendant guilty of third-degree rape in September 2020. The circuit court entered a judgment of conviction in January 2021, sentencing him to ten years in the penitentiary with seven years suspended. The defendant did not appeal his conviction or sentence. He was released from the penitentiary on parole in March 2022. In January 2023, while still on parole, the defendant moved for a sentence reduction, requesting a suspended imposition of sentence. The circuit court granted this motion, placing him on probation.The State objected, first moving for reconsideration on the grounds that the circuit court lacked authority to grant a suspended imposition of sentence after a judgment of conviction and that this would improperly remove the defendant from executive supervision. The circuit court denied the State’s motion and entered an order granting the suspended imposition of sentence. The State appealed, but the Supreme Court of South Dakota dismissed the appeal for lack of statutory appellate jurisdiction. The State then filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, which the circuit court again denied. The State petitioned for a discretionary appeal, which the Supreme Court of South Dakota granted.The Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the circuit court erred in concluding that res judicata barred the State’s challenge, as the State had not previously had an opportunity for appellate review. The Supreme Court further held that neither SDCL 23A-27-19 nor SDCL 23A-31-1 authorized a circuit court to vacate a judgment of conviction in order to grant a suspended imposition of sentence after a sentence has been imposed. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order suspending the imposition of the defendant’s sentence. View "State v. Pickner" on Justia Law

An eight-year-old girl, A.R., disclosed to her mother that she had been sexually abused by her thirty-year-old half-brother, Tell Cadotte, over a two-year period. After reporting the abuse to the police, A.R. underwent a forensic interview, during which she described the abuse and produced drawings depicting the incidents. Law enforcement obtained a search warrant for Cadotte’s home, where they seized several electronic devices. Forensic examination of these devices revealed over 300 images and videos of child pornography, including multiple pictures that apparently depicted A.R. being abused. Cadotte was charged with multiple counts of first-degree rape and one count of sexual contact with a minor.After a federal conviction for possession of child pornography, Cadotte proceeded to trial in the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Pennington County, South Dakota. During trial, defense counsel objected to the admission of certain sanitized photographs, arguing the State had committed a discovery violation by not providing all the images intended for use. The defense also objected to testimony from a detective recounting the victim’s mother’s identification of A.R. in the photographs, claiming it was inadmissible hearsay. The court admitted the evidence, and the jury convicted Cadotte on nine counts of first-degree rape and one count of sexual contact with a minor. The court acquitted him on one rape count for insufficient evidence and sentenced him to seventy years, concurrent with a ten-year term for sexual contact, but consecutive to his federal sentence.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota held that there was no discovery violation because the State had complied with its statutory obligations, and the defense had access to the evidence in question. The court also held that even if the detective’s testimony was hearsay, its admission was not prejudicial since it was cumulative of other admissible testimony. The convictions were affirmed. View "State v. Cadotte" on Justia Law

Two Sioux Falls police officers attempted to stop a stolen vehicle driven by a suspect who had absconded from parole and was believed to be armed. During a subsequent foot chase, the suspect allegedly shot at the officers, injuring one, and later exchanged gunfire with other law enforcement before being apprehended. After his arrest, the Minnehaha County State’s Attorney filed criminal charges, and the unredacted names of the two officers appeared in public court documents. The officers, invoking their rights as crime victims under Article VI, § 29 of the South Dakota Constitution (Marsy’s Law), requested that their names and any identifying information be redacted from public filings, citing concerns about potential harassment or targeting.Initially, the officers sought relief through a writ of mandamus, which was denied by a judge outside the circuit, who found that Marsy’s Law and South Dakota statutes provided an adequate remedy within the ongoing criminal proceedings. The officers then intervened directly in the criminal case, moving to have their names redacted. The Second Judicial Circuit Court denied their motion, reasoning that Marsy’s Law did not expressly provide a right to anonymity and that, even if the officers were assumed to be “victims,” their names alone did not constitute protected information under Marsy’s Law.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed and remanded. The Court held that law enforcement officers can qualify as “victims” under Marsy’s Law when a crime is committed against them. It further held that a victim’s name or initials are “information or records that could be used to locate or harass the victim or the victim’s family” and may be subject to redaction upon request. However, the Court clarified that Marsy’s Law does not grant a categorical right to redaction; rather, courts must balance victims’ rights with defendants’ and the public’s constitutional rights on a case-by-case basis. View "State v. Albaidhani" on Justia Law

Susan and Richard Spry managed their uncle Richard Hermanek’s finances under a power of attorney after he suffered from significant cognitive decline. Acting in this capacity, the Sprys opened a joint bank account with Mutual of Omaha in Nebraska, titling it in the names of Hermanek, Susan, and Richard, and transferred large sums from Hermanek’s South Dakota accounts, proceeds from his home, and other funds. After Hermanek’s death, Susan transferred the remaining balance to the Sprys’ personal account in Texas. Concerned relatives who would have inherited from Hermanek initiated a civil suit and notified authorities, leading to a criminal investigation.A Bon Homme County grand jury indicted the Sprys on multiple counts, including grand theft and conspiracy to commit grand theft related to the handling of Hermanek’s property. After a jury trial in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, both were convicted on these charges, among others. At trial, the court instructed the jury on contractual rather than testamentary capacity regarding the joint account and limited testimony about Hermanek’s statements during the account’s creation. The court also instructed the jury that the presumption of survivorship rights in a joint account could be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence of contrary intent, rather than requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota held that the circuit court did not err in choosing the contractual capacity instruction but erred by excluding testimony about Hermanek’s contemporaneous statements and by using the clear and convincing evidence standard instead of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for rebutting the presumption of survivorship rights. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions for grand theft and conspiracy to commit grand theft and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Spry" on Justia Law

The case concerns an inmate who, while incarcerated at a South Dakota prison, damaged prison property and engaged in a physical altercation with a correctional officer. The incident began when officers searched the inmate’s cell and confiscated his television for lacking required security stickers. In response, the inmate followed an officer to the day hall, broke a computer monitor with an electric kettle, and damaged a wall-mounted television. When officers intervened, the inmate was sprayed with pepper spray and then struck a correctional officer multiple times. The incident was captured by prison surveillance cameras, though the video contained a four-second gap due to technical issues.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Bon Homme County, presided over the trial. The inmate was charged with two counts of simple assault against a correctional officer and one count of intentional property damage. He was convicted by a jury of one count of simple assault and one count of intentional damage to property, but acquitted on the second assault count. The court denied his requests for a self-defense jury instruction, as well as his motions to dismiss based on double jeopardy and due process claims. The court also allowed the use of surveillance footage with the four-second skip, finding no evidence of misconduct or suppression by the State.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota, the inmate raised issues regarding the propriety of the assault charge, the admission of the surveillance video, the refusal to give a self-defense instruction, the State’s alleged failure to preserve evidence, and double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the charging decision was not reviewable absent due process concerns, the video was properly admitted, there was insufficient evidence to warrant a self-defense instruction, no constitutional violation arose from the missing footage, and submitting alternative assault counts did not violate double jeopardy. View "State v. Warfield" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted after a jury trial of aggravated eluding, reckless driving, driving under suspension, and failing to stop at a stop sign, all arising from an incident in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Law enforcement responded to a call about a family dispute, with the caller reporting that the defendant was driving a red Toyota Camry. Officers observed the vehicle and identified the defendant as the driver, who then fled at high speed through residential neighborhoods. The defendant later testified that he was not involved, did not own or drive the Camry, and denied fleeing from police.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, presided over the trial. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to exclude statements related to the BOLO alert and the caller’s association of him with the Camry, arguing hearsay and character evidence grounds. The court denied these motions, reasoning that the BOLO and information about the vehicle were relevant to the officers’ actions and not unduly prejudicial. During trial, officers testified about the BOLO and caller’s statements, and defense counsel made a continuing objection referencing Crawford v. Washington. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts, and the defendant was sentenced with all terms suspended.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The defendant argued that admitting the caller’s statement violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and constituted inadmissible hearsay. The court held that the defendant had not properly preserved the Confrontation Clause issue for appeal, as he failed to provide sufficient facts or request a determination about whether the caller’s statement was testimonial. Regarding hearsay, the court found that, even if error occurred, it was not prejudicial because the officers’ identification testimony and dash camera videos provided strong, independent evidence of the defendant’s identity. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "State v. Clifford" on Justia Law

An individual was convicted by a jury in Charles Mix County, South Dakota, for failing to appear at a pretrial conference in a pending felony case. In a separate incident, he pleaded guilty to simple assault following an altercation with another inmate at the county jail. He appealed both convictions, raising jurisdictional arguments based on his status as an enrolled member of the Yankton Sioux Tribe. He contended that both the courthouse and the jail are located in Indian country, thus depriving the state court of jurisdiction. He also challenged the denial of his motion to dismiss under the 180-day rule, the admission of certain evidence, and the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal in the failure to appear case.The First Judicial Circuit Court denied his motions to dismiss, finding that neither the courthouse nor the jail was located in Indian country as defined by federal law. The court attributed most of the pretrial delay to the defendant’s own actions, such as refusing to participate in proceedings and to communicate with counsel, and determined the 180-day period for trial had not expired. The court also admitted evidence over his objections, including a bond form and testimony by his prior attorney, and allowed a jury to decide the failure to appear charge.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed both appeals together. It held that the land in question does not qualify as Indian country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)-(c), reaffirming precedent that previously allotted lands that have passed into non-Indian ownership are not Indian country. The court declined to overrule its earlier decision in Bruguier v. Class. It further held that the 180-day rule was not violated, the challenged evidence was properly admitted, and sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed both convictions. View "State v. Winckler" on Justia Law

The defendant was involved in a series of criminal incidents beginning in late December 2023, including an alleged domestic assault, multiple vehicle thefts, assaulting a law enforcement officer with a vehicle, fleeing police, violating no-contact orders, drug possession, and failing to appear in court. These incidents led to six separate felony cases in Lawrence and Meade Counties. In each case, the defendant entered into plea agreements, resulting in guilty pleas to several counts in exchange for the dismissal of other charges and enhancements. The sentences imposed by the circuit court were largely concurrent, except for a consecutive sentence in the Meade County case.Following his convictions and sentencing, the defendant appealed, asserting that his guilty plea in the primary Lawrence County case was not knowing and voluntary. He claimed that both his counsel and the presentence investigation report (PSI) led him to believe he would be eligible for parole after serving a portion of his sentence, when in fact, state law rendered him ineligible for parole on the aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer charge. He further argued that, if his plea was invalid, the sentences in his other Lawrence County cases should also be vacated under the sentencing package doctrine.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the totality of the circumstances and found that the plea was knowing and voluntary. The court held that neither the circuit court nor counsel was required to inform the defendant of collateral consequences such as parole eligibility, and inaccuracies or misunderstandings about parole did not render the plea involuntary. Because the defendant did not prevail on his primary claim, his argument regarding the sentencing package doctrine was moot. The Supreme Court affirmed all of the circuit court’s judgments. View "State v. Ware" on Justia Law

A minor, J.A.D., was charged as a juvenile delinquent in South Dakota after threatening to shoot a school counselor, other students, and himself, during a conversation with a school official. These statements, made at school, led staff to initiate a soft lockdown and notify law enforcement. J.A.D. left the school, was later located at his grandfather’s home, and was arrested. The State charged him with aggravated assault, simple assault, and making a terrorist threat; the aggravated and simple assault charges were presented as alternatives.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit found J.A.D. not delinquent on aggravated assault, concluding the State had not established use of a deadly weapon or imminence of harm. However, the court found him delinquent on the simple assault and terrorist threat charges, determining that his statements constituted a credible threat and placed the counselor in fear, and that he threatened a crime of violence with the intent to impair a public service. For disposition, the court committed J.A.D. to the Department of Corrections, finding that less restrictive alternatives were not viable due to his prior unsuccessful treatments and risk to public safety.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed whether the evidence supported findings of simple assault and making a terrorist threat, and whether commitment to the Department of Corrections was proper. The Supreme Court held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the simple assault adjudication because J.A.D.’s threat was not imminent, but affirmed the adjudication for making a terrorist threat, finding sufficient evidence of a specific intent to substantially impair a public service. The Supreme Court also affirmed the commitment to the Department of Corrections, holding that the circuit court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and that it did not abuse its discretion. View "Interest Of J.A.D." on Justia Law