Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction for driving under the influence and following too closely, rendered after a jury trial. Defendant argued that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss for the State’s failure to bring him to trial within 180 days under S.D. Codified Laws 23A-44-5.1. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss because (1) a constructive appearance before a judicial officer does not constitute a first appearance under the statute; and (2) under the facts of this case, the State did not violate the 180-day rule. View "State v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions, entered after a jury trial, of three counts of first-degree rape and one count of sexual contact with a child under sixteen years of age. The child was Defendant’s four-year-old daughter, who had autism. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not abuse its discretion by finding the child, who was six years old at the time of trial, competent to testify despite her young age and developmental delays; (2) did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to have the child declared unavailable as a witness for the purposes of cross-examination because of her lack of memory; (3) did not err by denying Defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement; and (4) did not abuse its discretion by giving Instruction 11 to the jury. View "State v. Spaniol" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions of simple assault and intentional damage to property, holding that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in admitting purported business records - Verizon’s log of Defendant’s tex messages sent and received during the time of the alleged conduct underlying the convictions - because the State did not lay the required foundation for the evidence, and there was a reasonable probability that admission of the cell-phone log contributed to the jury’s decision. Because the error was prejudicial, the Court remanded for a new trial on Defendant’s convictions for simple assault and intentional damage to property. View "State v. Stokes" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and kidnapping. Defendant received concurrent, mandatory life sentences for the convictions. Defendant was fourteen years old when he committed the offenses. After the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Miller v. Alabama, Defendant filed a motion in circuit court to correct an illegal sentence. The circuit court granted the motion. Following a resentencing hearing, the sentencing court resentenced Defendant to concurrent, 200-year sentences for first-degree murder and kidnapping. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to establish that his sentence is cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and (2) the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed concurrent, 200-year sentences. View "State v. Jensen" on Justia Law

In 2009, Defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse in Illinois. After he moved to South Dakota, Defendant was indicted on two charges of violating S.D. Codified Laws 22-24B-12, which requires registered sex offenders to inform law enforcement of their new addresses within three business days of moving. Defendant’s registration violations subjected him to an enhanced sentence as a repeat-registration violator, but the State did not seek enhancement under S.D. Codified Laws 22-24B-12.1. Instead, the State filed a part II information on both charges alleging that Defendant was a habitual offender under S.D. Codified Laws 22-7-7 because of Defendant’s 2009 felony conviction in Illinois. Defendant pleaded guilty to the failure-to-register charges in both indictments. After a court trial on the part II informations, the circuit court imposed class 5 felony sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 22-24-B-12.1 does not preempt the use of section 22-7-7; and (2) the circuit court did not err in refusing to dismiss the part II informations. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law

After a court trial, Defendant was found guilty of driving with a .08 percent blood alcohol content. Defendant also pleaded guilty to a part II information alleging that this was his second driving under the influence offense. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress statements that he made to law enforcement that he had been drinking and driving, asserting that the statements were made in violation of his Miranda rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter between Defendant and the law enforcement officer did not amount to a custodial interrogation, and therefore, the circuit court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress any incriminating statements made during the encounter. View "State v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to sexual contact with a child under the age of sixteen. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, asking that the Supreme Court remand for resentencing on the grounds that the mandatory minimum sentence under S.D. Codified Laws 22-22-1.2 allows the court to suspend part of the sentence to give him a probationary sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the minimum sentence in section 22-22-1.2 does not allow for a term of probation rather than incarceration because the term “minimum sentences” in section 22-22-1.2 refers to required prison terms. View "State v. Bingham" on Justia Law

Twin brothers Ryan Alan Krause and Brian Michael Krause pleaded guilty to separate complaints alleging grand theft and four counts of unlawfully using a computer. The circuit court sentenced each of the Krauses to four years imprisonment for grand theft and two years imprisonment for each count of unlawfully using a computer system, and ordered all sentences to run consecutively. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Krauses’ consecutive sentences for unlawfully using a computer system do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment; and (2) the circuit court did not err by imposing sentences of imprisonment instead of probation for the unlawful-use-of-computer-system convictions. View "State v. Krause" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence resulting from a traffic stop, including the results of a blood test, arguing that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conclude that Defendant had committed a crime in order to justify the traffic stop. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress because the arresting officer did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and any evidence resulting from the stop was the product of an illegal search. View "State v. Stanage" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and received a mandatory sentence of life in prison. Defendant was fourteen years old when he committed the offense. After the United States Supreme Court issued Miller v. Alabama, which barred mandatory life sentences against juvenile homicide offenders, Defendant filed a motion to have his sentence correct. After a hearing, the sentencing court resentenced Defendant to ninety-two years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a ninety-two-year sentence is not categorically unconstitutional for a fourteen-year-old child; (2) because Defendant had the opportunity for release at age sixty, his sentence was not the legal equivalent of a life sentence without parole; (3) the sentencing court properly considered the mitigating qualities of youth set forth in Miller; (4) Defendant’s sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense; and (5) the sentencing court did not commit prejudicial error when it permitted an oral victim-impact statement by an individual outside the statutory definition of a victim. View "State v. Charles" on Justia Law