Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Sueellan Kline and her boyfriend, Douglas Strong, a parolee, lived together in a motel room. Parole agent Connie Johnson went to the motel room to obtain a urine sample from Strong. When Strong’s urine field-tested positive to methamphetamine Johnson removed Strong from the room and detained him in the hallway. Johnson then reentered the room and asked Kline if there were drugs or drug paraphernalia in the room. In response, Kline removed a methamphetamine pipe from her purse and handed it to Johnson. The pipe was used to obtain a search warrant for Kline’s urine, which tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. Kline filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that it was obtained as the result of an illegal search. The circuit court denied the motion. Kline was subsequently convicted of ingestion of a controlled substance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Johnson lawfully reentered the residence and that Kline voluntarily consented to production of the methamphetamine pipe, and therefore, the evidence was not obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. View "State v. Kline" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possessing a controlled substance. The circuit court departed from a presumptive sentence of probation and sentenced Defendant to four years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circumstances enumerated by the circuit court did not justify a departure from the presumptive sentence of probation, as the court failed to identify aggravating factors sufficient to deviate from a presumptive sentence of probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s criminal history and complete disregard for supervised release indicated that the circuit court’s departure from the presumptive sentence of probation was warranted. View "State v. Underwood" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of four counts of rape in the first degree and two counts of sexual contact with a child under sixteen years of age. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in limiting cross-examination to exclude statements regarding self-harm; (2) the circuit court erred in denying a judgment of acquittal on the two sexual contact counts; (3) the State offered sufficient evidence to convict Defendant; and (4) the circuit court did not impose a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant. Remanded. View "State v. Bausch" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of seven drug-related offenses, six of which were felonies. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an aggregated sentence of forty-five years’ imprisonment and thirty days in the county jail. The court suspended all but six years and thirty days of the prison sentence and ordered that the jail sentence run concurrently. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion for acquittal because there was sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions; and (2) Defendant’s sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. View "State v. Uhing" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree manslaughter, commission of a felony with a firearm, and possession of a controlled weapon. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the State committed a violation of Brady v. Maryland when it denied Defendant access to certain records. The Supreme Court issued a limited remand to determine whether a Brady violation occurred in this case and to include the records in the record. On remand, the circuit court concluded that the State committed no Brady violation as it pertained to the challenged records. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it concluded that the State committed no Brady violation; and (2) the circuit court did not err in determining that Defendant was not entitled to a new trial related to the subject records. View "State v. Birdshead" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated incest and four counts of abusing his children. Defendant was sentenced to a total of forty-seven years imprisonment and ordered to pay the Department of Social Services $19,555 for counseling and treatment costs incurred in caring for the children. Defendant appealed from the reimbursement order, contending that the Department was not statutorily entitled to the reimbursement order because it was not a victim of Defendant’s crimes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even if the Department did not qualify as a victim under S.D. Codified Laws 23A-28-2(5), Defendant was still responsible for paying the entirety of his victims’ treatment costs under S.D. Codified Laws 23A-28-12. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the question of whether a defendant is “licensed or privileged to enter or remain” in an occupied structure hinges on whether the defendant is, under the totality of the circumstances, in possession or control of the premises at the time of entry. Defendant entered a home he previously shared with his ex-wife and brought with him items that could be used for restraint, a suicide note, and his last will and testament. The police arrested Defendant inside the home, and the State charged with second-degree burglary, among other offenses. Defendant ultimately pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary. Defendant moved to withdraw his plea, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that he had a “license or privilege to enter or remain” in the residence under S.D. Codified Laws 22-32-3; (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to set aside the judgment of conviction and allow withdrawal of Defendant’s guilty plea; and (3) did not err by accepting Defendant’s guilty plea where there was an adequate factual basis supporting Defendant’s guilty plea. View "State v. Pentecost" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with murder and kidnapping. Defendant was a juvenile at the time of the crime. The State moved to transfer Defendant’s case to adult court. After a hearing, the juvenile court granted the State’s motion to transfer. After a trial in adult court, the jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder (arson), first-degree felony murder, first-degree arson, felony murder (aggravated kidnapping), and second-degree aggravated kidnapping. Defendant was sentenced to eighty years imprisonment for the murder conviction and a concurrent fifty-year sentence for second-degree aggravated kidnapping. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the juvenile court did not err in transferring Defendant to adult court; (2) the circuit court did not fail to adequately instruct the jury on Defendant’s theory of defense; and (3) Defendant’s eighty-year-sentence was not an abuse of discretion, grossly disproportionate, or a de facto life sentence in violation of the spirit of Montgomery v. Louisiana. View "State v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for eight drug-related offenses. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of seven of the eight counts. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the trial court erred by amending the indictment the day before trial, and (2) the trial court committed plain error by not informing the parties of a jury question that arose during deliberations and then by answering that question without input from the parties. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not commit plain error by amending the indictment the day prior to trial; and (2) the trial court did not commit plain error by not notifying the parties of the jury’s question at the time it occurred. View "State v. Schrempp" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and charged with driving under the influence after police officers approached a parked vehicle and found Defendant in the driver’s seat and smelled the odor of alcohol. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, asserting that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to support the intrusion. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress, holding that the officer’s investigation was justified under the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it concluded that the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement applied and thus denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "State v. Kleven" on Justia Law