Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree rape, aggravated incest, and sexual contact with a child under age thirteen. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it determined that Defendant’s interview with law enforcement was noncustodial; (2) the circuit court did not err when it ruled that Defendant’s interview statements were voluntary and admissible; (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing certain expert testimony; (4) Defendant was not twice put in jeopardy for the same criminal offense; (5) the circuit court properly denied Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; and (6) the Court could not affirmatively say a new trial was warranted because of the State’s failure to provide certain evidence to Defendant. Remanded with instructions for the State to disclose the evidence to Defendant and the circuit court and for the circuit court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether there was a Brady violation and, if there was a violation, whether a new trial was warranted. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for the premeditated killing of Robert Thunderhawk. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court’s decision to admit into evidence a recording of a 911 call and in allowing two officers to testify about several out-of-court statements made by Defendant was not arbitrary or outside the range of permissible choices; and (2) there was sufficient evidence in the record for a jury to have concluded that Defendant acted with premeditation. View "State v. Martin" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to committing manslaughter in the first degree and was sentenced to an eighty-five-year term of imprisonment. Appellant did not directly appeal his sentence or the sentencing court’s acceptance of his guilty plea. Appellant later filed an amended application of writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because defense counsel decided to forgo a motion to suppress statements Appellant made to law enforcement officers and because defense counsel failed properly to advise Appellant on his right to appeal the sentencing court’s decision. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) defense counsel had sound legal reasons for the decision not to move to suppress the incriminating statements; and (2) Appellant was not prejudiced by missing the opportunity to appeal his sentence or the circuit court’s acceptance of his guilty plea. View "McDonough v. Weber" on Justia Law

While two police officers were searching Defendant’s vehicle, Defendant waited with another officer in a patrol car. Suddenly, without warning, Defendant began attacking the officer inside the car. Defendant was subsequently found guilty of aggravated assault, among other offenses. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence in the record to sustain the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support proof that Defendant attempted to cause serious bodily injury to the officer and that the assault occurred under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. View "State v. Miland" on Justia Law

In 2013, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). On appeal, Defendant argued that from 2012 to 2014, S.D. Codified Laws 34-20A-93 prohibited the enforcement of laws such as the DUI statute, S.D. Codified Laws 32-23-1, that included “drinking, drunknness, or being found in an intoxicated condition” as an element of the offense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in enacting of section 34-20A-93 in 1974, the Legislature did not intend to end the enforcement of the DUI statute, and in repealing S.D. Codified Laws 34-20A-95 in 2012, the Legislature did not intend to prohibit the enforcement of section 32-23-1. View "State v. Mundy-Geidd" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped after a highway patrol trooper registered Defendant’s car traveling at 112 miles per hour. Defendant, who was under the influence of alcohol and marijuana, was traveling with three small children in the vehicle. After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of abuse of a minor in violation of S.D. Codified Laws 26-10-1 because he had “exposed” the children as stated by the statute. Defendant appealed, asserting that section 26-10-1 is unconstitutionally vague because the statute does not define the word “expose.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even though section 26-10-1 does not include a definition of the word “expose,” the statute is not unconstitutionally vague because it affords the public adequate notice as to the conduct proscribed and does not allow law enforcement unfettered discretion to enforce it. View "State v. Myers" on Justia Law

In 2013, Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). The State filed a part II information charging Defendant with third offense DUI based on a 2005 DUI conviction and a 2012 DUI conviction. Defendant challenged the validity of his 2005 DUI conviction for sentence-enhancement purposes, arguing that the conviction was constitutionally invalid because he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his guilty plea. The circuit court found that the plea was involuntary under the factual circumstances and struck the 2005 DUI conviction from the part II information. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the Court’s recent decision in State v. Chant, Defendant may not collaterally attack his 2005 conviction for sentence-enhancement purposes because he waived his right to counsel in the 2005 proceedings. View "State v. Wolf" on Justia Law

After Paul Lockenour was arrested, police officers found drugs and drug paraphernalia in Lockenour’s recreational vehicle (RV). Lockenour pleaded guilty to distribution of a controlled substance. The State then brought a civil forfeiture action against Lockenour’s RV. The value of the RV was $54,000, and the approximate street value of the drugs found in Lockenour’s possession was between $1,600 and $2,000. Lockenour asserted as an affirmative defense that the forfeiture of the TV was disproportionate to his crime. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that the forfeiture was not grossly disproportionate or unconstitutionally excessive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the entire circumstances surrounding the offense that led to the forfeiture, the forfeiture of Lockenour’s TV was not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of Lockenour’s offense. View "State v. 2011 White Forest River XLR Toy Hauler" on Justia Law

In August 2011, an indictment issued charging Defendant with one count of aggravated child abuse between March 24, 2011 and March 28, 2011. Defense counsel requested that the jury be instructed that they must determine guilt or innocence on each incident, the one on March 24 and the one on March 28. The court refused the requested jury instruction. The jury subsequently returned a verdict of guilty on the single count of aggravated child abuse. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied the right to a unanimous jury verdict because there was no way to determine whether all twelve jurors agreed upon the commission of the same act in order to commit him of the charged offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State presented two incidents of trauma, each of which could have formed the basis of aggravated child abuse, and the instructions only informed the jury that the verdict must be unanimous; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred by not providing the jury with a special unanimity instruction requiring it to agree on the act supporting the conviction or to find that Defendant had committed both acts of child abuse. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. White Face" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Brandon Taliaferro of seven charges. The State formally dismissed two charges, and the circuit court granted judgments of acquittal on the remaining five charges. Thereafter, Taliaferro filed a petition for expungement of all seven charges pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 23A-3-27. The circuit court granted the petition of expungement as to the five acquitted charges but denied the petition as to the two dismissed charges on the grounds that the court did not have the prosecutor’s consent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it denied Taliaferro’s petition to expunge the two dismissed charges, as the plain language of section 23A-3-27 only allows for the expungement of dismissed charges when the entire criminal case has been dismissed on the record, not when only part of the case has been dismissed. View "In re Expungement of the Record Concerning Taliaferro" on Justia Law