Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

While two police officers were searching Defendant’s vehicle, Defendant waited with another officer in a patrol car. Suddenly, without warning, Defendant began attacking the officer inside the car. Defendant was subsequently found guilty of aggravated assault, among other offenses. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence in the record to sustain the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support proof that Defendant attempted to cause serious bodily injury to the officer and that the assault occurred under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. View "State v. Miland" on Justia Law

In 2013, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). On appeal, Defendant argued that from 2012 to 2014, S.D. Codified Laws 34-20A-93 prohibited the enforcement of laws such as the DUI statute, S.D. Codified Laws 32-23-1, that included “drinking, drunknness, or being found in an intoxicated condition” as an element of the offense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in enacting of section 34-20A-93 in 1974, the Legislature did not intend to end the enforcement of the DUI statute, and in repealing S.D. Codified Laws 34-20A-95 in 2012, the Legislature did not intend to prohibit the enforcement of section 32-23-1. View "State v. Mundy-Geidd" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped after a highway patrol trooper registered Defendant’s car traveling at 112 miles per hour. Defendant, who was under the influence of alcohol and marijuana, was traveling with three small children in the vehicle. After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of abuse of a minor in violation of S.D. Codified Laws 26-10-1 because he had “exposed” the children as stated by the statute. Defendant appealed, asserting that section 26-10-1 is unconstitutionally vague because the statute does not define the word “expose.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even though section 26-10-1 does not include a definition of the word “expose,” the statute is not unconstitutionally vague because it affords the public adequate notice as to the conduct proscribed and does not allow law enforcement unfettered discretion to enforce it. View "State v. Myers" on Justia Law

In 2013, Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). The State filed a part II information charging Defendant with third offense DUI based on a 2005 DUI conviction and a 2012 DUI conviction. Defendant challenged the validity of his 2005 DUI conviction for sentence-enhancement purposes, arguing that the conviction was constitutionally invalid because he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his guilty plea. The circuit court found that the plea was involuntary under the factual circumstances and struck the 2005 DUI conviction from the part II information. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the Court’s recent decision in State v. Chant, Defendant may not collaterally attack his 2005 conviction for sentence-enhancement purposes because he waived his right to counsel in the 2005 proceedings. View "State v. Wolf" on Justia Law

After Paul Lockenour was arrested, police officers found drugs and drug paraphernalia in Lockenour’s recreational vehicle (RV). Lockenour pleaded guilty to distribution of a controlled substance. The State then brought a civil forfeiture action against Lockenour’s RV. The value of the RV was $54,000, and the approximate street value of the drugs found in Lockenour’s possession was between $1,600 and $2,000. Lockenour asserted as an affirmative defense that the forfeiture of the TV was disproportionate to his crime. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that the forfeiture was not grossly disproportionate or unconstitutionally excessive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the entire circumstances surrounding the offense that led to the forfeiture, the forfeiture of Lockenour’s TV was not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of Lockenour’s offense. View "State v. 2011 White Forest River XLR Toy Hauler" on Justia Law

In August 2011, an indictment issued charging Defendant with one count of aggravated child abuse between March 24, 2011 and March 28, 2011. Defense counsel requested that the jury be instructed that they must determine guilt or innocence on each incident, the one on March 24 and the one on March 28. The court refused the requested jury instruction. The jury subsequently returned a verdict of guilty on the single count of aggravated child abuse. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied the right to a unanimous jury verdict because there was no way to determine whether all twelve jurors agreed upon the commission of the same act in order to commit him of the charged offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State presented two incidents of trauma, each of which could have formed the basis of aggravated child abuse, and the instructions only informed the jury that the verdict must be unanimous; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred by not providing the jury with a special unanimity instruction requiring it to agree on the act supporting the conviction or to find that Defendant had committed both acts of child abuse. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. White Face" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Brandon Taliaferro of seven charges. The State formally dismissed two charges, and the circuit court granted judgments of acquittal on the remaining five charges. Thereafter, Taliaferro filed a petition for expungement of all seven charges pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 23A-3-27. The circuit court granted the petition of expungement as to the five acquitted charges but denied the petition as to the two dismissed charges on the grounds that the court did not have the prosecutor’s consent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it denied Taliaferro’s petition to expunge the two dismissed charges, as the plain language of section 23A-3-27 only allows for the expungement of dismissed charges when the entire criminal case has been dismissed on the record, not when only part of the case has been dismissed. View "In re Expungement of the Record Concerning Taliaferro" on Justia Law

In 1996, Defendant, who was sixteen years old at the time, pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a term of thirty-three years in prison for kidnapping. In 2012, Defendant filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional based on the United States Supreme Court decisions Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not receive life without parole or a de facto life sentence because he had the opportunity for release at age forty-nine, and therefore, Defendant was unable to establish that Roper, Graham, and Miller applied to him. View "State v. Springer" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of vehicular homicide and two counts of vehicular battery. The sole issue at trial was whether Defendant or the deceased was driving the Corvette when it crashed into a minivan on Interstate 90. After the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, Defendant petitioned successively for habeas corpus relief in state and federal courts. In his fourth amended petition for habeas relief, Defendant asserted a freestanding claim of actual innocence and newly discovered evidence through another witness. The circuit court ruled found the witness’s testimony was newly discovered, that the testimony was credible, persuasive and compelling, and that the testimony established that the witness saw a woman driving a Corvette on Interstate 90 immediately prior to the accident. The circuit court granted Defendant’s request for a writ of habeas corpus, concluding that the newly discovered evidence, in light of the evidence as a whole, would create reasonable doubt of Defendant’s guilt in the mind of a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the circuit court’s conclusion that Defendant established by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty of the underlying offense. View "Engesser v. Young" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with driving under the influence (DUI). A Part II Information alleged that Defendant had two prior convictions of DUI - one in 2004 and a second in 2006. Defendant filed a motion to strike the Part II Information, arguing that his 2004 DUI conviction was unconstitutional because the court neither advised him of the waiver effect of a guilty plea nor inquired into whether the plea was voluntary. The circuit court denied the motion to strike. After a trial, the circuit court entered a final judgment of conviction for third offense DUI. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a defendant may only collaterally attack prior convictions used for enhancement if he or she was unrepresented by counsel when pleading guilty; and (2) because Defendant was represented by counsel during the 2004 plea proceedings, the Court did not need to consider whether his 2004 plea was valid for enhancement purposes. View "State v. Chant" on Justia Law