Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff petitioned for a domestic abuse protection order against Defendant pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws chapter 25-10, arguing that Defendant's conduct constituted stalking under S.D. Codified Laws 22-19A-1 and that stalking under section 22-19A-1 constituted domestic abuse under section 25-10-1(1) if the stalking involved family or household members. The circuit court granted the protection order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly interpreted section 25-10-1(1) and that a domestic abuse protection order based on stalking under chapter 25-10 did not require a criminal conviction for stalking under section 22-19A-1. View "Trumm v. Cleaver" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 1995, Petitioner was convicted of child rape, sexual contact, disseminating harmful material to minors, and indecent exposure. Petitioner was acquitted in the same trial of raping two other children. Approximately a decade later, in a habeas corpus proceeding, the counseling records for the child Petitioner was convicted of raping were first disclosed. The habeas court denied Petitioner's amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus and Petitioner's amended motion for a certificate of probable cause, concluding that Petitioner had not shown "a reasonable probability that the specific timing of the disclosure would have created reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds considering the entire record." The Supreme Court issued a certificate of probable cause, resulting in this appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner was not denied due process because of the State's failure to produce the counseling records, as there was no reasonable probability that, had the evidence been timely disclosed to the defense, the result of Petitioner's trial would have been different.View "Thompson v. Weber" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of three counts of distribution of a controlled drug or substance and three counts of possession of a controlled drug or substance. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the circuit court (1) did not violate Defendant’s due process rights in denying his motion to suppress an in-court identification stemming from an improper photo lineup; (2) did not err in refusing Defendant’s proposed jury instruction regarding cross-racial identification; and (3) did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, as there was sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict. View "State v. Chuol" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and driving while having a 0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the blood. Appellant appealed in part the trial court's admission of certain testimony regarding the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test, which the arresting officer conducted during the stop of Appellant's vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) even if the trial court erred in allowing the arresting officer to testify about the reliability of HGN testing and the correlation between an individual's performance on an HGN test and the individual's blood alcohol content, the error was harmless; and (2) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a judgment of acquittal because there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have convicted Appellant of DUI beyond a reasonable doubt.View "State v. Yuel" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). A part two information alleged that Defendant had two previous DUI convictions within the last ten years, including one in 2011. Defendant filed a motion to strike the 2011 conviction from the part two information, claiming that his guilty plea was invalid because he was not fully advised that he would waive his right to a jury trial, right to confrontation, and right against self-incrimination. The circuit court agreed with Defendant and ordered that the 2011 conviction be stricken from the part two information. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it struck Defendant's 2011 conviction from the part two information, as the record affirmatively showed that Defendant was fully advised of his rights under Boykin v. Alabama during his 2011 conviction and intelligently and voluntarily waived those rights.View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and ingestion of marijuana. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an illegal search of his hotel room. The trial court granted the motion with respect to the drugs seized during the initial illegal search but denied the motion with respect to evidence gathered during a subsequent call to the hotel. After a trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the trial court did not err in denying in part Defendant's motion to suppress evidence, as the second call to police constituted an independent source of evidence against Defendant and that the evidence obtained thereby bore no causal connection to the evidence illegally seized in Defendant's hotel room. View "State v. Heney" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, discharge of a firearm at a car, and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of Defendant’s 2002 conviction as other act evidence under S.D. R. Crim. P. 404(b), where the probative value of the evidence outweighed the potential for unfair prejudice; and (2) the State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict finding Defendant guilty of aggravated assault. View "State v. Boe" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was fifteen years old and a native Spanish speaker, was transported to the police department for questioning in connection with the death of Jasmine Guevara. During her questioning by police, Defendant confessed to the murder. Defendant moved to suppress her confession, arguing that she did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive her Miranda rights. The juvenile court denied the motion. The case was then transferred to adult court in the First Judicial Circuit. The trial court reopened the motion to suppress and granted the motion, concluding that Defendant made her statements voluntarily but did not knowingly and intelligently waive her rights. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in suppressing Defendant’s confession where the State met its burden to show more likely than not that Defendant’s waiver of her Miranda rights was “with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” View "State v. Diaz" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree kidnapping, second-degree rape, and aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions. Defendant subsequently filed an amended application for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, a fair trial, and due process of law. The habeas court denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the habeas court correctly determined that Defendant failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) Defendant's due process claim regarding cross-examination of the victim concerning her sexual activity before the rape and her post-rape drug charge were res judicata; and (3) the habeas court correctly determined that Defendant's remaining due process argument lacked evidentiary support.View "Fast Horse v. Weber" on Justia Law

Defendant and his stepson were jointly charged with thirteen felonies. Prior to trial, Defendant unsuccessfully moved to sever charges and for relief from prejudicial joinder. At trial, Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal on all charges stemming from two of the burglaries, which the trial court also denied. Defendant was subsequently convicted on nine of the thirteen felonies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's convictions; and (2) denying Defendant's motion to sever charges and for relief from prejudicial joinder because the charges were properly joined and Defendant failed to show the denial of his motion to sever charges resulted in clear prejudice to his substantial rights.View "State v. Dowty" on Justia Law