Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and driving while having a 0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the blood. Appellant appealed in part the trial court's admission of certain testimony regarding the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test, which the arresting officer conducted during the stop of Appellant's vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) even if the trial court erred in allowing the arresting officer to testify about the reliability of HGN testing and the correlation between an individual's performance on an HGN test and the individual's blood alcohol content, the error was harmless; and (2) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a judgment of acquittal because there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have convicted Appellant of DUI beyond a reasonable doubt.View "State v. Yuel" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). A part two information alleged that Defendant had two previous DUI convictions within the last ten years, including one in 2011. Defendant filed a motion to strike the 2011 conviction from the part two information, claiming that his guilty plea was invalid because he was not fully advised that he would waive his right to a jury trial, right to confrontation, and right against self-incrimination. The circuit court agreed with Defendant and ordered that the 2011 conviction be stricken from the part two information. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it struck Defendant's 2011 conviction from the part two information, as the record affirmatively showed that Defendant was fully advised of his rights under Boykin v. Alabama during his 2011 conviction and intelligently and voluntarily waived those rights.View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and ingestion of marijuana. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an illegal search of his hotel room. The trial court granted the motion with respect to the drugs seized during the initial illegal search but denied the motion with respect to evidence gathered during a subsequent call to the hotel. After a trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the trial court did not err in denying in part Defendant's motion to suppress evidence, as the second call to police constituted an independent source of evidence against Defendant and that the evidence obtained thereby bore no causal connection to the evidence illegally seized in Defendant's hotel room. View "State v. Heney" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, discharge of a firearm at a car, and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of Defendant’s 2002 conviction as other act evidence under S.D. R. Crim. P. 404(b), where the probative value of the evidence outweighed the potential for unfair prejudice; and (2) the State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict finding Defendant guilty of aggravated assault. View "State v. Boe" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was fifteen years old and a native Spanish speaker, was transported to the police department for questioning in connection with the death of Jasmine Guevara. During her questioning by police, Defendant confessed to the murder. Defendant moved to suppress her confession, arguing that she did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive her Miranda rights. The juvenile court denied the motion. The case was then transferred to adult court in the First Judicial Circuit. The trial court reopened the motion to suppress and granted the motion, concluding that Defendant made her statements voluntarily but did not knowingly and intelligently waive her rights. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in suppressing Defendant’s confession where the State met its burden to show more likely than not that Defendant’s waiver of her Miranda rights was “with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” View "State v. Diaz" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree kidnapping, second-degree rape, and aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions. Defendant subsequently filed an amended application for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, a fair trial, and due process of law. The habeas court denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the habeas court correctly determined that Defendant failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) Defendant's due process claim regarding cross-examination of the victim concerning her sexual activity before the rape and her post-rape drug charge were res judicata; and (3) the habeas court correctly determined that Defendant's remaining due process argument lacked evidentiary support.View "Fast Horse v. Weber" on Justia Law

Defendant and his stepson were jointly charged with thirteen felonies. Prior to trial, Defendant unsuccessfully moved to sever charges and for relief from prejudicial joinder. At trial, Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal on all charges stemming from two of the burglaries, which the trial court also denied. Defendant was subsequently convicted on nine of the thirteen felonies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's convictions; and (2) denying Defendant's motion to sever charges and for relief from prejudicial joinder because the charges were properly joined and Defendant failed to show the denial of his motion to sever charges resulted in clear prejudice to his substantial rights.View "State v. Dowty" on Justia Law

In 2012, Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). A part II information alleged that Defendant had three prior DUI convictions within the last ten years, in 2003, 2004, and 2007. Defendant moved to strike the prior convictions, alleging that he pleaded guilty to the DUI charges without being adequately advised of his Boykin rights, rendering the prior convictions invalid. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that there was a complete absence of any Boykin waiver advisement in the 2007 case, and thus, the circuit court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to strike his 2007 conviction. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Bilben" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to grand theft by insufficient funds check. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to eight years in the penitentiary. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial judge failed properly to advise him of all of his constitutional and statutory rights at his plea hearing and that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea; and (2) Defendant’s contention that his eight-year penitentiary sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment was without merit. View "State v. King" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated grand theft by deception over $100,000 and sentenced to a term of twenty-five years. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by refusing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal, failing to instruct the jury regarding the defense of advice of counsel, and instructing the jury that it should consider Defendant’s flight as it related to consciousness of guilt. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Defendant obtained the “property of another” worth over $100,000, and consequently, the circuit court erred by not granting Defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal. View "State v. Thomason" on Justia Law