Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual contact with a child under the age of sixteen. Defendant appealed, arguing that his arraignment was inadequate and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant had sufficient notice of the charge against him, pleaded not guilty, exercised his rights, and had an adequate opportunity to defend himself at trial, there was no error in the arraignment; and (2) Defendant waived his argument that the trial court erred in failing to enter a specific finding that the minor victim was a competent witness, and therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

A deputy sheriff stopped a pickup truck because he did not see the vehicle's temporary license permit on the rear window. Defendant, the driver, was subsequently arrested for DUI. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop. The circuit court granted the motion, concluding that the deputy unconstitutionally extended the scope of the stop by initiating contact with the driver when the deputy could have first confirmed that the temporary license permit was valid. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it ruled that the initial stop of Defendant's pickup was based on reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle was without a license; (2) when an officer stops a vehicle based on objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, and the officer's suspicion is dispelled, the officer may nonetheless approach the driver and explain the mistake; and (3) it was error for the circuit court to suppress the evidence gathered as a result of the stop and to order dismissal of the case. View "State v. Amick" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault. Defendant appealed, alleging multiple errors in his trial. The Supreme Court (1) remanded for further proceedings on a potential Batson violation for the trial court's grant of a preemptory strike of a Native American juror, holding that Defendant established a prima facie case for purposeful discrimination in the preemptory strike, and because the circuit court failed to determine if Defendant proved that the State was motivated by purposeful discrimination, a limited remand was required to allow the circuit court to engage in the missing analysis; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "State v. Scott" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree manslaughter by means of a dangerous weapon, vehicular homicide, vehicular battery, and DUI. Defendant was acquitted of two charges of first-degree manslaughter while engaged in the commission of a felony. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the language "while engaged in the commission of a felony" was prejudicial when referring to the charge of DUI; and (2) the trial court improperly overruled her objections to the admissibility of testimony regarding the kinetic energy of Defendant's vehicle. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) because the jury did not convict Defendant on the counts containing the language "while engaged in the commission of a felony," Defendant's argument that she was prejudiced was moot; but (2) the trial court erred when it concluded that the disputed testimony was relevant, and the error was not harmless. View "State v. Kvasnicka " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of one to ten pounds of marijuana. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, as the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction; (2) Defendant's proposed jury instructions were properly denied, as the instructions provided to the jury correctly stated the law and informed the jury; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to have the jury view his residence; and (4) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he did not recuse himself on the basis of impartiality where Defendant provided no objective grounds to conclude the trial judge's impartiality might be reasonably questioned. View "State v. Hauge" on Justia Law

Defendant was retried on multiple rape and sexual contact offenses against his daughter after his 2008 conviction was overturned on direct appeal. After a second jury trial, Defendant was convicted on all charges and was sentenced by the trial court to sixty years in the penitentiary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by (1) admitting evidence pertaining to Defendant's subornation of perjury conviction, as evidence of Defendant's act of fabricating evidence was relevant to Defendant's consciousness of guilt, and any prejudicial effect was substantially outweighed by the probative value of the evidence; and (2) denying Defendant's motion to dismiss based on a defective indictment, where the indictment was not fatally defective because it was neither duplicitous nor failed to apprise Defendant of the charges against him. View "State v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to first-degree injury to property and possession of a controlled substance. Appellant was sentenced to twenty-one years in the penitentiary for both convictions, to be served consecutively. Appellant's sentenced commenced on June 18, 2007. According to the Department of Corrections (DOC), Appellant's initial parole date was June 21, 2027. The DOC calculated the initial parole date pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 24-15A-32. Appellant appealed the DOC's determination. The Board of Pardons and Paroles and the circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board acted without authority in determining that Appellant was a Class 2 felon when calculating his initial parole date. Remanded to the Board with directions to calculate Appellant's initial parole date in conformity with this opinion. View "Rowley v. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of first-degree rape of a minor and twelve counts of possessing, manufacturing, or distributing child pornography. Defendant was indicted of the charges after the deputy state's attorney issued subpoenas to Midcontinent Communications requesting the personal information of the subscriber associated with the IP address where officers found child pornography. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the trial court failed to address the pertinent factors and make specific findings regarding its exclusion of the general public from the courtroom when the child victim testified about sexual abuse; and (2) Defendant had no privacy interest in the information obtained by subpoenas issued by the State to Midcontinent, and therefore, Defendant had no standing to challenge the subpoenas. View "State v. Rolfe" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for driving with a revoked license. The indictment stemmed from a traffic stop that a law enforcement officer initiated after he noticed that Defendant's headlights appeared to be at their high-beam setting. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence and statements obtained during the stop of his vehicle, arguing that the stop should have ended after the officer confirmed Defendant did not fail to dim his headlights. The magistrate court denied the motion and later found Defendant guilty. The circuit court affirmed Defendant's conviction, including the magistrate court's denial of Defendant's suppression motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when the officer requested Defendant's driver's license, the officer had not yet completed his investigation of the failure to dim offense, and therefore, the officer's request was within the scope of the investigation attendant to the traffic stop; and (2) accordingly, there was no violation of Defendant's federal or state constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. View "State v. Bonacker" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was serving a life sentence in the South Dakota Penitentiary when he and another inmate assaulted a correctional officer, pled guilty to first-degree murder of the officer. Defendant waived his right to a jury determination of the appropriate sentence. After a pre-sentence hearing, the circuit court sentenced Defendant to death. Defendant appealed his sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in all respects with one exception, holding (1) in selecting a sentence, the circuit court violated Defendant's right to be free from self-incrimination by improperly considering statements made by Defendant to a psychiatrist during a competency evaluation; and (2) the use of this statement was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded to the circuit court to conduct a sentencing without this error. View "State v. Berget" on Justia Law