Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Christopher Jones was convicted of raping a twenty-three-year-old woman who testified that she was too intoxicated to have consented. The defendant appealed, asserting that although S.D. Codified Laws 22-22-1(4) does not explicitly include a knowledge element, the circuit court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that the State must prove that the defendant knew that the woman's intoxicated condition made her unable to consent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Legislature intended that a rape conviction under section 22-22-1(4) requires proof that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim's intoxicated condition rendered her incapable of consenting. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Appellant Mil Hirning pleaded guilty to unauthorized possession of a controlled substance and admitted to being a habitual offender. Hirning made the plea after Hirning's trial counsel withdrew from representing him and Hirning proceeded pro se. On appeal, Hirning argued that his waiver of counsel was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The Supreme Court reversed Hirning's convictions and sentence, (1) finding that Hirning was not warned of the dangers of self-representation, and (2) holding that the record did not indicate circumstances from which the Court could find Hirning was aware of the danger and made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. Remanded. View "State v. Hirning" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dale Guthmiller was convicted of criminal pedophilia and sentenced to life in prison. Petitioner subsequently petitioned the circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging, among other things, that the trial judge made improper comments during the trial, violating Petitioner's constitutional right to a fair trial. The habeas court granted Petitioner's writ on reconsideration, (1) concluding that the trial judge's comments created a structural error negating Petitioner's requirement to establish prejudice, and (2) retracting its earlier ruling that trial counsel's failure to object was not prejudicial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial judge's comments did not constitute a structural error, and (2) despite defense counsel's failure to object to the judge's improper remarks, Petitioner did not meet his burden of showing that the jury's verdict would reasonably likely have been different absent trial counsel's errors. View "Guthmiller v. Weber" on Justia Law

Kenneth Stark, a registered sex offender, was convicted of loitering in a community safety zone in violation of S.D. Codified Laws 22-24B-24. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the state statutes prohibiting sex offenders from loitering in community safety zones are constitutional; (2) the trial court did not err by allowing the State to amend the information to include the correct location of Stark's prior felony conviction; (3) there was sufficient evidence to establish that Stark's primary purpose for remaining in the community safety zones was to observe or contact minors; and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence that an individual in a white mini-van registered to Stark was seen in a community safety zone the day before the charged conduct occurred. View "State v. Stark" on Justia Law

Timothy Farmer, a patrol officer for the Rapid City Police Department, was investigated for excessive use of force relating to the apprehension of the alleged perpetrators of an assault. The Department later fired Farmer after finding, in addition to the most recent incident, Farmer had been the subject of several complaints for excessive force. The Department of Labor upheld the Police Department's decision. The circuit court affirmed, finding ample evidence to support the discharge. On appeal, Farmer contended that he never acted beyond the Department's use of force continuum policy. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Department of Labor and circuit court, holding that sufficient cause existed to discharge Farmer. View "Farmer v. City of Rapid City" on Justia Law

J.L. was fourteen when he engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with his twelve-year-old girlfriend. A juvenile petition was filed against J.L., and the circuit court adjudicated J.L. as a delinquent under S.D. Codified Laws 22-22-1(1), a statute under which the girlfriend was legally incapable of giving consent and under which J.L. would have been convicted of rape in the first degree had J.L. been an adult. On appeal, J.L. argued that the application of the statute to the facts of this case created an absurd result, one not reasonably intended by the legislature. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that application of the statute to the facts did not suggest an unintended absurdity. View "In re J.L. " on Justia Law

Defendant William Jensen was charged with fourth offense driving under the influence. He filed a motion to strike one of his three prior driving under the influence convictions, arguing that because the magistrate court relied on a statement of rights form to establish the voluntariness of his guilty plea during that prior hearing, that prior conviction was invalid for sentence enhancement purposes. The trial court denied Jensen's motion to strike, concluding that the statement of rights form was an adequate record of voluntariness. Jensen appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Jensen did not demonstrate prejudice, his challenge to his prior driving under the influence conviction was not proper for the Court's consideration; and (2) Jensen did not demonstrate that the magistrate court's failure to personally canvass him to establish the voluntariness of his plea violated his due process rights. View "State v. Jensen" on Justia Law

Defendant Ivan Good Plume was found guilty of aggravated assault and of being a habitual offender and was sentenced to eighteen years in prison. On appeal, defendant asserted (1) that the sentencing judge, in referring to a pattern of drunken violence by Good Plume as "going native," evinced his personal bias against defendant and used race as a sentencing factor, thus violating defendant's federal and state due process rights; and (2) the judge abused his discretion in admitting into evidence a letter defendant wrote without considering the requirements of S.D. R. Evid. 404(b) before admitting it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) defendant did not meet his burden of making a specific and substantial showing that a racial or personal bias was used as an aggravating factor in his sentence, and (2) the letter was admitted not to prove defendant engaged in other wrongs, crimes, or acts but as res gestae evidence necessary to prove intent. View "State v. Good Plume" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roger Rodriguez filed an action for sexual abuse as a child against Brother Matthew Miles and John Donadio and the Congregation of the Priests of the Sacred Heart for alleged abuse that occurred in the 1970's while plaintiff was a student at St. Joseph's Indian School. The defendants asserted that, based on plaintiff's deposition testimony, the statute of limitations for plaintiff's action barred plaintiff's claims because plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the childhood sexual abuse caused him injury more than three years before his lawsuit was filed. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that it was undisputed that plaintiff knew of the alleged abuse more than three years before he filed suit and that plaintiff was aware of enough facts to put him on inquiry notice more than three years before he filed suit. View "Rodriguez v. Miles" on Justia Law

Allen Kissner asked Robert Goulding to take Kissner's life with a gun. Goulding agreed and fatally shot Kissner. A jury found Goulding guilty of first degree murder. Goulding appealed, arguing (1) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that as a matter of law it was not suicide if a person other than the decedent performed the overt act resulting in the decedent's death; (2) the court erred in refusing defense instructions that would have supported an alternative assisted suicide conviction; and (3) the court erred in prohibiting Goulding from referring to the assisted suicide statute. After an analysis of the relevant statutes, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because a "killing by the accused" is not an element of assisted suicide, and because there is no dispute that Goulding committed the overt act that directly caused Kissner's death, Goulding could not have committed assisted suicide. View "State v. Goulding" on Justia Law