Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Department of Social Services (DSS) removed Child from the custody of her biological mother two days after Child’s birth. Child was placed in the temporary custody of Foster Parents, who had previously adopted Child’s sister. The parental rights of both biological parents were subsequently terminated. Thereafter, DSS consented to the adoption of Child by Foster Parents instead of Child’s maternal Aunt. Aunt requested a hearing to review DSS’s decision, arguing that she was entitled to adoption placement preference over Foster Parents. The circuit court concluded that DSS did not abuse its discretion in consenting to the adoption by Foster Parents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Aunt failed to establish that she was entitled to placement preference. View "In re Interest of E.M.H." on Justia Law

Attorney Irene Schrunk represented Mary Ellen Nylen in a divorce and was involved subsequent legal matters regarding Mary Ellen and her new husband, Mark Nylen. When Mark served Mary Ellen with a summons and complaint for divorce, Schrunk advised Mary Ellen that Schrunk could not represent her because Schrunk had represented Mark in the past. On July 31, 2014, Mary Ellen’s adult children, Molly and Brendon, commenced this action against Mary Ellen seeking a declaration that Mary Ellen had gifted them personal property. Molly and Brendon sought to depose Schrunk regarding communications she had with Mary Ellen between November 1, 2013, and December 31, 2014. Mary Ellen moved to prohibit the discovery, citing the attorney-client privilege protected the communications. The circuit court determined that the initial communications were privileged but did not extend the privilege to communications and documents shared with Schrunk after January 1, 2014. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Mary Ellen failed to meet her burden of proving entitlement to the attorney-client privilege after January 1, 2014, and Mary Ellen waived the privilege with respect to certain documents when she shared with Schrunk privileged communications between Mary Ellen and her current attorneys. View "Nylen v. Nylen" on Justia Law

In 2014, Mother and Father agreed to divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. After a two-day trial, the circuit court granted Mother primary physical custody of the parties’ two children. Father appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion by basing its decision on findings that were unsupported by the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that awarding primary physical custody of the children to Mother was in their best interests. Rather, the court carefully considered the factors relevant to the best interests of the children analysis and appropriately awarded primary physical custody. View "Van Duysen v. Van Duysen" on Justia Law

The circuit court granted a divorce to Husband and Wife on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. Husband appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in (1) determining that the interest and penalties on the parties’ IRS tax liability was Husband’s nonmarital debt; (2) awarding spousal support of $1,000 per month to Wife for a period of ten years to follow the sale of the marital home; and (3) ordering Husband to pay all mortgage, insurance, and property-tax payments on the marital home until its sale. Further, the Court held that Husband must pay Wife’s appellate attorney fees. View "MacKaben v. MacKaben" on Justia Law

At the time of the divorce of Mother and Father, the parties agreed that Mother would have primary physical custody of the parties’ two children. Five years later, the circuit court changed primary physical custody from Mother to Father. The next year, Mother filed a motion for a change of custody. After a trial, the circuit court held that it was in the best interests of the children for Mother to again have primary physical custody. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in finding that a substantial change in circumstances was not required to change custody; but (2) it was in the best interests of the children to change primary physical custody back to Mother based on a substantial change in circumstances. View "McCarty v. McCarty" on Justia Law

Julie and Grant Rush were married in 1990 in Pennsylvania. In 2012, Grant left the marital home in Pennsylvania and moved into his mother’s home in South Dakota. That same year, Julie filed a “Uniform Support Petition” in Pennsylvania seeking child and spousal support. Five days later, Grant filed for a divorce in South Dakota. The circuit court dismissed the divorce action for lack of jurisdiction and on the grounds of the forum non conveniens doctrine, concluding that Grant was not a true South Dakota resident at the time he filed for divorce and that, under the forum non conveniens doctrine, Pennsylvania was the more appropriate and convenient forum for this divorce matter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because there was substantial evidence in the record that Grant established actual residency in South Dakota in 2012 for purposes other than obtaining a divorce, the circuit court erred when it concluded that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the parties in this proceeding; and (2) the circuit court erred in dismissing Grant’s divorce action based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens because Grant properly commenced the divorce action in South Dakota and no divorce action had ever been commenced in Pennsylvania. View "Rush v. Rush" on Justia Law

Mother brought an action against Father to establish Father’s child support obligation and to determine arrearages. A child support referee recommended that Father receive a credit for mortgage payments as well as for food, clothing, and school supplies Father had purchased for the children after the parties’ separation and when he was absent from the home. The circuit court adopted the recommendation in part and rejected it in part. Specifically, the court allowed a credit for clothing and school supplies but gave Father no credit for mortgage payments and food, concluding (1) Father was financially bound to make mortgage payments and received benefits from the mortgage payments; and (2) the referee clearly erred in finding that Mother’s testimony denying that Father provided food was not credible. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to accept the referee’s recommendation, holding (1) there was no significance in the fact that Father had a contractual obligation to pay the mortgage, and Mother and the children also received the benefit of the payments; and (2) the referee did not clearly err in making his credibility finding, and the circuit court erred in concluding otherwise. View "State ex rel. Tegegne v. Andalo" on Justia Law

In 2013, the circuit court entered a divorce decree dissolving the marriage of James and Jennifer Hiller. In distributing the parties’ marital assets, the court ordered that James assume all of the marital debt but $500,000 and ordered him to make best efforts with the bank and cooperate to remove Jennifer “from the liabilities as otherwise provided herein.” When James did not remove Jennifer from the assigned liabilities, the court ordered that it would compel James to sell personal property if he did not remove Jennifer from his assigned liabilities by a certain date. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred when it impermissibly modified the marital property division by forcing James to sell property if he did not restructure or refinance prior to the set deadline; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied James’s S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-60(b) motion to re-open the property division. View "Hiller v. Hiller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a petition and affidavit for a stalking protection order against Defendant, her former boyfriend. After a hearing, the circuit court entered a written permanent protection order prohibiting Defendant from coming within a distance of 100 yards of Plaintiff for a period of five years. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Plaintiff failed to timely submit written findings of fact, the Court was left with the circuit court’s oral findings of fact and conclusions of law from the hearing, and the court’s oral findings of fact were insufficient to permit a meaningful review of the court decision; and (2) the circuit court did not err in excluding certain evidence on the basis that it was not relevant. Remanded for findings of fact and conclusions of law. View "Repp v. Van Someren" on Justia Law

When Son was born to Mother and Father, Son received the surname of Father. Mother and Father subsequently divorced, and Mother was granted primary physical custody of Son. Mother later married Stepfather. Mother petitioned to change Son’s surname to a hyphenated surname combining Mother’s new last name and Father’s last name. The circuit court found that Son’s name change was in his best interests and granted Mother’s request to change Son’s surname. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in granting Mother’s request to change Son’s surname; and (2) there is no need to modify the best interests of the child standard to include a finding of clear and compelling evidence by the circuit court. View "In re Name Change of J.P.H." on Justia Law