Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A transgender woman petitioned the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court in Hughes County, South Dakota, to amend her birth certificate. She requested that the certificate reflect her legal name change, already recognized by Minnesota, and to change the sex designation from male to female, matching her gender identity. The Department of Health did not initially participate in the proceedings. The petitioner’s main argument on appeal concerned only the sex designation, asserting a right to have her birth certificate reflect her gender identity, referencing her legal documents as proof and citing constitutional guarantees of equal protection.The circuit court denied the petition. It interpreted the governing administrative regulation (ARSD 44:09:05:02) as permitting amendments only if the data was incorrect at the time of or immediately after birth. The court found that the certificate correctly reflected the facts at birth and was not meant to record changes occurring later in life. Regarding the equal protection claim, the court determined that neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification was involved. It applied rational basis review, finding the rule rationally related to legitimate state interests, such as the accurate recording of newborn sex and the integrity of vital records.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed both the regulatory interpretation and the equal protection claim de novo. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the administrative rule unambiguously limits amendments to correcting errors existing at the time of birth and does not permit changes based solely on a subsequent change in gender identity. Furthermore, the court held that the regulation neither classifies on the basis of sex or transgender status nor targets a suspect class, and rational basis review is appropriate. The court concluded that the rule is rationally related to legitimate state objectives and does not violate equal protection. The judgment was affirmed. View "Amended Birth Certificate Of Nielsen" on Justia Law

Two sisters died in a car accident on U.S. Highway 281 in Beadle County, South Dakota, when their vehicle drifted off the paved roadway onto a gravel shoulder that was five to six inches lower than the pavement. While attempting to steer back onto the road, the driver overcorrected, resulting in a collision with an oncoming vehicle. The mother, acting as the personal representative of her daughters’ estates, filed a wrongful death and survivor action against six South Dakota Department of Transportation (DOT) employees. She alleged these employees failed to maintain the gravel shoulder in accordance with DOT policies and federal standards, and that this negligence caused the accident.The case was first heard in the Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Beadle County. The DOT employees sought summary judgment, arguing that sovereign immunity and the public duty doctrine barred the claims. The circuit court dismissed the official capacity claims based on sovereign immunity but denied summary judgment on the individual capacity claims under the same theory. However, it granted summary judgment on the individual capacity claims on the grounds that the public duty doctrine applied, finding that the alleged duties were owed to the public at large, not to any individual.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed both the application of the public duty doctrine and the denial of sovereign immunity for the individual capacity claims. The court held that none of the statutes, policies, or standards cited by the plaintiffs imposed a ministerial duty on the defendants. The court concluded that the actions in question were discretionary and thus shielded by sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the individual capacity claims, but on the basis of sovereign immunity, making it unnecessary to address the public duty doctrine. View "Estate Of Sanborn v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Dakota Bay, LLC owns property adjacent to McCook Lake in Union County, South Dakota, and planned to construct a canal connecting its land to the lake. To facilitate this, Dakota Bay’s owner, Michael Chicoine, applied for a shoreline alteration permit and a water permit to use an existing irrigation well to fill and maintain the canal. The McCook Lake Recreation Area Association, which holds a permit to pump water from the Missouri River into McCook Lake, opposed the project. The Association argued that constructing the canal would require a permit to appropriate water from McCook Lake and that the canal would increase water loss from the lake, potentially impairing the Association’s ability to maintain lake levels.The South Dakota Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources Water Management Board held hearings and ultimately denied the Association’s petition for a declaratory ruling, finding that the canal’s construction would not constitute an appropriation of water from McCook Lake. The Board also granted Dakota Bay’s application to use well water for the canal, finding that unappropriated water was available, the use was beneficial and in the public interest, and that it would not unlawfully impair existing water rights. The Association appealed both decisions to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, which affirmed the Board’s rulings and also upheld the Board’s decision to quash subpoenas issued by the Association.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s decisions. The Court held that constructing the canal would not result in an appropriation of water from McCook Lake and thus did not require a water appropriation permit. The Court also held that Dakota Bay’s proposed use of well water for the canal was a beneficial use in the public interest and that the Board did not abuse its discretion in quashing the subpoenas, clarifying that administrative proceedings are governed by the Administrative Procedures Act, not the rules of civil procedure. View "Mccook Lake Recreation Area V. Dakota Bay, LLC" on Justia Law

Kevin Rowe filed a lawsuit against his ex-wife, Dione Rowe, alleging tortious interference with a business relationship. Dione, with the help of her daughters, sent a letter to the Tribal Land Enterprise (TLE) making disparaging allegations against Kevin, who leased Tribal-owned land from the TLE. The letter requested the TLE to cancel Kevin’s leases and lease the land to her daughters instead. The TLE rescinded Kevin’s leases at their next board meeting, leading Kevin to file the lawsuit.The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Tripp County, South Dakota, denied Dione’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that her letter was an absolutely privileged communication under SDCL 20-11-5(2). The court concluded that the TLE meeting was a quasi-judicial proceeding but held that the privilege did not apply because the TLE did not follow its own procedures, including providing notice to Kevin.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the absolute privilege under SDCL 20-11-5(2) applies to claims of tortious interference with a business relationship. The court found that the TLE board meeting was an official proceeding authorized by law and that Dione’s letter had a logical relation to the TLE’s proceedings. The court also determined that the lack of notice to Kevin did not negate the privilege. Additionally, the court concluded that Dione did not waive the privilege by failing to plead it in her answer, as the issue was tried by implied consent during the summary judgment proceedings. The Supreme Court directed the lower court to enter summary judgment in favor of Dione. View "Rowe v. Rowe" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the South Dakota Department of Corrections' (DOC) decision to purchase state-owned agricultural land in Lincoln County for a new men's state prison, authorized by House Bill 1017 (HB 1017). The plaintiffs, a group of private individuals and a non-profit corporation, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the State of South Dakota, the DOC, and the DOC Secretary, arguing that the State must comply with local zoning regulations, which do not permit a prison in an agricultural district without a conditional use permit or rezoning.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Lincoln County dismissed the plaintiffs' action. The court found that only two plaintiffs had standing based on alleged property value decreases. However, it dismissed the case on the grounds of sovereign immunity and preemption, determining that the DOC's actions were discretionary and that state law preempted local zoning regulations.The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked a justiciable claim of right to enforce the local zoning ordinance against the State. The court emphasized that the Declaratory Judgments Act does not create substantive rights and that the plaintiffs failed to identify any statutory or other legal authority granting them a private right to enforce the zoning ordinance. Consequently, the case was deemed non-justiciable, and the court did not address the merits of the sovereign immunity and preemption claims. View "Jensen v. Dept Of Corrections" on Justia Law

Puffy’s, LLC was first on a waiting list to receive a state registration certificate from the South Dakota Department of Health (Department) to operate a medical cannabis dispensary in Rapid City. After the Department failed to issue the certificate, Puffy’s filed a mandamus action in circuit court to compel the Department to issue the certificate. The circuit court granted the writ of mandamus, and the Department appealed, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction and abused its discretion in granting the writ.The circuit court found that it had jurisdiction because Puffy’s had no administrative remedy to exhaust, as the Department had not taken final action that could be appealed. The court also ruled that the matter was not moot because the Department had not issued the certificate. On the merits, the court concluded that the Department had a clear duty to issue the certificate to Puffy’s under ARSD 44:90:03:16, which mandates that a voided certificate must be awarded to the next applicant on the waiting list. The court found that Puffy’s had no other remedy and was entitled to the writ.The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision. It held that the circuit court had jurisdiction because there was no administrative remedy available for Puffy’s to exhaust. The court also agreed that the matter was not moot. On the merits, the Supreme Court found that the Department had a clear duty to issue the certificate to Puffy’s under the plain language of ARSD 44:90:03:16, which does not require additional application or fees from waitlisted applicants. The court concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the writ of mandamus without an evidentiary hearing, as the case turned on legal interpretation rather than factual disputes. View "Puffy’s LLC v. State of South Dakota" on Justia Law

Donald Blazer was involved in a vehicle accident and voluntarily submitted to a preliminary breath test (PBT), which showed a blood alcohol content of .102 percent. However, he refused to submit to a blood draw. The South Dakota Department of Public Safety (Department) notified Blazer of its intent to disqualify his commercial driver’s license (CDL) for life, citing this refusal as a second violation of SDCL 32-12A-36, with the first being a 2014 DUI conviction. Blazer requested an administrative hearing, and the Department affirmed the disqualification of his CDL for life.Blazer appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the Department’s decision. The circuit court concluded that Blazer’s voluntary submission to the breath test constituted a submission to a chemical analysis, meaning his refusal to submit to the blood draw could not result in the disqualification of his CDL. The Department then appealed to the South Dakota Supreme Court.The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court’s decision. The Court held that under SDCL 32-23-1.2, a preliminary breath test (PBT) is permitted and may be required in addition to a chemical test. The Court determined that Blazer’s refusal to submit to the blood draw constituted a refusal to submit to a chemical analysis as required by SDCL 32-12A-46. This refusal was a second violation under SDCL 32-12A-36, justifying the disqualification of Blazer’s CDL for life under SDCL 32-12A-37. The Court emphasized that a PBT is a preliminary test and does not fulfill the requirement for a chemical analysis under the implied consent laws. View "Blazer v. Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

SCS Carbon Transport, LLC (SCS) plans to develop a pipeline network to transport carbon dioxide (CO2) through South Dakota. Several landowners (Landowners) along the proposed route refused to allow SCS pre-condemnation survey access, which SCS claims is authorized by SDCL 21-35-31. Landowners sued in both the Third and Fifth Judicial Circuits, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the surveys. These proceedings resulted in a consolidated appeal from six lawsuits filed by Landowners and one by SCS.The Third Circuit granted SCS summary judgment, determining that SCS was a common carrier and that SDCL 21-35-31 was constitutional. The Fifth Circuit also granted SCS summary judgment, adopting the Third Circuit’s reasoning. Landowners appealed, arguing that SCS is not a common carrier, CO2 is not a commodity, and that SDCL 21-35-31 violates the takings and due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed the circuit courts’ grants of summary judgment on the common carrier issues. The court held that SCS’s ability to conduct pre-condemnation surveys depends on whether it is a common carrier vested with the power of eminent domain. The record did not demonstrate that SCS is holding itself out to the general public as transporting a commodity for hire. The court also found that the circuit courts abused their discretion in denying Landowners’ request for further discovery.The court further held that SDCL 21-35-31 only authorizes limited pre-condemnation standard surveys, which are minimally invasive superficial inspections. The statute, as strictly interpreted, does not violate the federal or state constitutions. The court concluded that any actual damage caused by the surveys must be justly compensated, with the amount determined by a jury. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Strom Trust v. SCS Carbon Transport, LLC" on Justia Law

The City of Custer applied for a permit from the South Dakota Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR) to discharge treated wastewater into French Creek as part of an upgrade to its wastewater treatment facility. Preserve French Creek, Inc. (Preserve), a group of local citizens, opposed this discharge. Two years after the permit was issued, a Custer County ordinance was passed by citizen initiative, declaring the discharge of treated water into French Creek a nuisance. Preserve demanded the City cease construction based on the new ordinance, but the City did not comply. Preserve then sought mandamus relief to enforce the ordinance, which the circuit court denied.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Custer County found that the ordinance conflicted with state law, specifically SDCL 21-10-2, which states that actions done under the express authority of a statute cannot be deemed a nuisance. The court concluded that the City’s actions, authorized by the DANR permit, could not be considered a nuisance. The court also rejected Preserve’s estoppel argument, stating that the City and County had no duty to enforce an ordinance that conflicted with state law.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the ordinance was preempted by state law because it attempted to declare a nuisance something that state law expressly authorized. The court also found that the City and County were not estopped from asserting the ordinance’s invalidity, as their actions in placing the ordinance on the ballot and canvassing the vote were statutorily required and did not constitute an inconsistent position. Therefore, the writ of mandamus was properly denied. View "Preserve French Creek V. Custer County" on Justia Law

The case involves Melissa Palmer, who applied for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) benefits due to loss of income from her self-employment as a sign-language interpreter during the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite continuing to work her second job at Woofs and Waves, she did not report this income in her weekly requests for benefits. The South Dakota Department of Labor and Regulation, Reemployment Assistance Division (Department) determined that she had misrepresented her income and was therefore ineligible for the benefits she had received. The Department ordered her to repay the benefits and assessed a mandatory penalty.The administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the Department's decision, finding that Palmer had willfully misrepresented her income. The circuit court affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Palmer appealed, arguing that she had not willfully misrepresented her income because she believed she only needed to report her self-employment income.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Court found that the ALJ's finding that Palmer believed she only needed to report her self-employment income was inconsistent with the conclusion that she had willfully misrepresented her income. The Court held that a willful misrepresentation requires evidence of intentional misrepresentation, not merely knowledge of the falsity of the representation. The Court remanded the case for the ALJ to reconsider whether Palmer was at fault for the overpayment and whether she was eligible for a waiver. View "Palmer V. Dep’t Of Labor & Regulation" on Justia Law