Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was the homestead exemption’s prohibition on the collection of real property taxes under S.D. Codified Laws 43-31. In January 2014, prior to turning seventy years old, John Reints filed an application for a prohibition on the collection of real property taxes assessed on his home in 2013. Pennington County denied Reints’s request because he had not turned seventy prior to January 1, 2014. The Department upheld the determination, determining that the prohibition does not apply to taxes assessed prior to the year in which the applicant reaches seventy years of age. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding (1) once a prohibition is granted under chapter 43-31 a county is restrained from collecting any real property taxes on the applicant’s single-family dwelling, regardless of when those taxes were assessed; (2) nevertheless, an applicant cannot establish a base year under the exemption until he actually reaches the age of seventy; (3) because Reints was only sixty-nine years old when he submitted his application, he had not established a base year as required by section 43-31-32; and (4) therefore, Reints’s application was properly denied. View "Reints v. Pennington County" on Justia Law

The South Dakota Department of Revenue assessed Northern Border Pipeline Company, the operator of an interstate pipeline that provides transportation services to natural gas owners who desire to ship their gas, for use tax on the value of the shippers’ gas that the shippers allowed Northern Border to burn as fuel in compressors that moved the gas through the pipeline. An administrative law judge affirmed the assessment. The circuit court reversed, holding that Northern Border’s burning of the shippers’ gas was exempt from use tax under a tax exemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Northern Border did not own the gas, use tax may not be imposed under this Court’s precedents. View "N. Border Pipeline Co. v. S.D. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

Wharf Resources, Inc., a mining company, terminated Lisa Davis for “disruptive behavior in the workplace.” Several months later, Davis filed a gender discrimination claim and a retaliatory discharge claim with the South Dakota Department of Labor, Division of Human Rights (Department). The Department concluded that there was no probable cause for Davis’s claims. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) affirming the Department’s finding of no probable cause; (2) determining that Davis was terminated for permissible factors; and (3) affirming the findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the Department. View "Davis v. Wharf Res. (USA), Inc." on Justia Law

Dakota Trailer Manufacturing, which makes radiator components for an unrelated company, performs its component work in one of Dakota Trailer’s locations that was originally classified as a “machine shop” for workers compensation insurance rating purposes. After an inspection, the National Council on Compensation Insurance changed the location’s classification to “welding or cutting.” Both the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board and the South Dakota Department of Labor affirmed the new classification. The circuit court reversed and reinstated the machine shop code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court properly found that Dakota Trailer’s activities fit within the machine shop code. View "Dakota Trailer Mfg. v. United Fire & Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Teton LLC filed an application with the Grant County Board of Adjustment for a conditional use permit to construct a concentrated animal feeding operation. The Board ultimately approved Teton’s application. The circuit court concluded that the Board had jurisdiction over Teton’s application and pursued its authority in a regular manner. Grant County Concerned Citizens (GCCC) and Timothy Tyler appealed. Specifically, GCCC asserted that Teton’s proposed project violated the Zoning Ordinance for Grant County and, therefore, the Board’s decision was illegal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board regularly pursued its authority in granting Teton’s application for a conditional use permit; and (2) the circuit court did not err in striking Tyler’s affidavit from the record. View "Grant County Concerned Citizens v. Grant County Bd. of Adjustment" on Justia Law

Employee was injured when he ran from a co-worker on the job site after tricking that co-worker. Employee sought workers’ compensation benefits. Employer and Insurer denied workers’ compensation benefits, asserting that Employee’s injury did not “arise out of” or “in the course of” his employment because Employer specifically prohibited horseplay by its employees. Employee petitioned for a hearing. The Department of Labor concluded that Employee’s injury arose “out of” his employment because, but for his work with Employer” he would not have been at the job site where he was injured, but that the injury did not occur “in the course of” the employment. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for an award of benefits, holding that the Department (1) correctly concluded that Employee’s injury arose “out of” the employment; and (2) erred when it did not consider the effect of the mandatory lull in Employee’s work when it determined that the injury did not occur “in the course of” his employment. Because Employee’s act of horseplay was not a substantial deviation from his employment, it occurred “in the course of the employment.” View "Petrik v. JJ Concrete, Inc." on Justia Law

Pro se appellant Robert Mercer submitted a request to the South Dakota Attorney General’s Office under S.D. Codified Laws 1-27-37 seeking the release of the Division of Criminal Investigation’s (DCI) records related to the investigation of Richard Benda’s death. Mercer conceded that S.D. Codified Laws 1-27-1.5(5) precluded public release of the documents but requested the death investigation records because Benda was a public figure and because news reports “raised questions about the death.” The Attorney General’s Office stated that it would make the death investigation records available if certain conditions were met. Because Mercer was unable to fulfill the conditions, the Attorney General’s Office denied Mercer’s request for disclosure. The office of Hearing Examiners (OHE) upheld the Attorney General’s office’s denial of Mercer’s request. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “the public’s significant and legitimate interest” did not warrant access to the death investigation records because Benda’s death investigation records were exempt from disclosure under section 1-27-1.5(5). View "Mercer v. S.D. Attorney General Office" on Justia Law

Patricia Wheeler was employed by Cinna Bakers, Westside Casino, and Get ’N’ Go and held the three separate jobs concurrently. Wheeler was injured in the course of her employment with Cinna Bakers, which rendered her unable to work at any of her jobs. Cinna Bakers and its insurance company (together, Cinna Bakers) accepted Wheeler’s injuries as compensable but disputed whether all three of Wheeler’s concurrent employments should not be aggregated to calculate her Average Weekly Wage (AWW). An administrative law judge determined that only Wheeler’s wage from Cinna Bakers could be utilized to calculate her AWW. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) South Dakota law allows for the aggregation of wages when an injury at one employment renders the worker incapable of performing that employee’s other concurrently held employments; and (2) the Court is persuaded to adopt the “growing minority rule,” which allows for aggregation of wages from all concurrently held employments, not just similar or related employments. View "Wheeler v. Cinna Bakers LLC" on Justia Law

Linda Golden owned a fifty percent mineral interest that was within a “spacing unit” in which Luff Exploration Company desired to drill for oil. Golden declined Luff’s offer to lease her mineral interest or participate with Luff in the cost of the drilling. After Luff decided to proceed with drilling, it filed a petition with the South Dakota Board of Minerals and Environment (Board) seeking to “compulsory pool” the mineral interests in the spacing unit and seeking “risk compensation” from Golden. The Board issued a compulsory pooling order and found that Golden should pay 100 percent risk compensation. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board failed to comply with the plain language of S.D. Codified Laws 45-9-32 by granting a pooling order that contained no provision specifying a time and manner for Golden to elect to participate in the well by paying her proportionate share of the cost of drilling, equipping, and operating the well. View "In re Petition of Luff Exploration Co." on Justia Law

Aaron Terveen was an employee for the South Dakota Department of Transportation. When returning from a work-related trip, Terveen was involved in a one-automobile accident on a dead-end road just off the highway. The Department of Labor awarded workers’ compensation benefits, determining that Terveen sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. The circuit court reversed, concluding that Terveen’s accident and resulting injuries did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of coverage, holding that Terveen had taken a severable side-trip when he was injured, and the side-trip did not arise of or occur in the course of his employment. View "Terveen v. S.D. Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law