Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On December 31, 2009, Employee was injured during the scope of her employment at Employer. One week later, Employee suffered a massive intraventricular hemorrhage in her brain, which caused her to undergo brain surgery. Employer denied Employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits, alleging that Employee’s brain injuries were the result of a different incident on January 4, 2010. After a hearing, the Department of Labor ruled in favor of Employee, finding (1) the work-related injury was a major contributing cause of the hemorrhage and Employee’s resulting disabilities, and (2) the alleged second incident did not take place after the workplace incident as Employer claim, if it occurred at all. After the Department clarified compensable damages, the circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Department was not clearly erroneous in finding that the workplace injury was a major contributing cause to Employee’s injury and disability and that there was no second incident; and (2) the Department did not abuse its discretion in admitting the undisclosed testimony of an expert witness. View "Sorensen v. Harbor Bar, LLC" on Justia Law

Montana Dakota Utilities Co. and Otter Tail Power Company (together, Applicants) applied to the South Dakota Public Utilities Commission (Commission) for a permit to construct a high-voltage electrical transmission line. Applicant’s project would cross one part of Gerald Pesall’s farm. Pesall intervened and was granted party status. Pesall objected to the project, arguing that excavating and moving soil to construct the project could unearth and spread a crop parasite. The Commission granted the permit subject to conditions, including a condition to identify and mitigate the potential parasite problem. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no abuse of discretion in the Commission’s decision to grant a conditional permit rather than requiring reapplication; (2) the permit condition relating to the parasites did not constitute an improper delegation of the Commission’s authority to a private party; and (3) the Commission timely rendered complete findings on the permit application. View "Pesall v. Montana Dakota Utils., Co." on Justia Law

In 2012, the South Dakota Department of Revenue (Department) commenced an audit of Taxpayer’s excise tax and sales tax licenses for tax period 2009 through 2012. At issue in this case was whether Taxpayer’s construction management at-risk services provided to public and non-profit entities were subject to a contractor’s excise tax under S.D. Codified Laws 10-46A-1. Taxpayer did not remit excise tax on the gross receipts it received from its construction management at-risk services provided to public and non-profit entities. As a result of the audit, the Department issued Taxpayer a certificate of assessment for $43,020, which included excise tax and interest. The circuit court reversed the Department’s certificate of assessment, ruling that Taxpayer’s services were not subject to a contractor’s excise tax under section 10-46A-1. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Taxpayer’s act of entering into a contract with a public entity to guarantee a satisfactorily completed public improvement project by a specific date for a specific cost was subject to excise tax under section 10-46A-1. View "Puetz Corp. v. S.D. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the homestead exemption’s prohibition on the collection of real property taxes under S.D. Codified Laws 43-31. In January 2014, prior to turning seventy years old, John Reints filed an application for a prohibition on the collection of real property taxes assessed on his home in 2013. Pennington County denied Reints’s request because he had not turned seventy prior to January 1, 2014. The Department upheld the determination, determining that the prohibition does not apply to taxes assessed prior to the year in which the applicant reaches seventy years of age. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding (1) once a prohibition is granted under chapter 43-31 a county is restrained from collecting any real property taxes on the applicant’s single-family dwelling, regardless of when those taxes were assessed; (2) nevertheless, an applicant cannot establish a base year under the exemption until he actually reaches the age of seventy; (3) because Reints was only sixty-nine years old when he submitted his application, he had not established a base year as required by section 43-31-32; and (4) therefore, Reints’s application was properly denied. View "Reints v. Pennington County" on Justia Law

The South Dakota Department of Revenue assessed Northern Border Pipeline Company, the operator of an interstate pipeline that provides transportation services to natural gas owners who desire to ship their gas, for use tax on the value of the shippers’ gas that the shippers allowed Northern Border to burn as fuel in compressors that moved the gas through the pipeline. An administrative law judge affirmed the assessment. The circuit court reversed, holding that Northern Border’s burning of the shippers’ gas was exempt from use tax under a tax exemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Northern Border did not own the gas, use tax may not be imposed under this Court’s precedents. View "N. Border Pipeline Co. v. S.D. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

Wharf Resources, Inc., a mining company, terminated Lisa Davis for “disruptive behavior in the workplace.” Several months later, Davis filed a gender discrimination claim and a retaliatory discharge claim with the South Dakota Department of Labor, Division of Human Rights (Department). The Department concluded that there was no probable cause for Davis’s claims. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) affirming the Department’s finding of no probable cause; (2) determining that Davis was terminated for permissible factors; and (3) affirming the findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the Department. View "Davis v. Wharf Res. (USA), Inc." on Justia Law

Dakota Trailer Manufacturing, which makes radiator components for an unrelated company, performs its component work in one of Dakota Trailer’s locations that was originally classified as a “machine shop” for workers compensation insurance rating purposes. After an inspection, the National Council on Compensation Insurance changed the location’s classification to “welding or cutting.” Both the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board and the South Dakota Department of Labor affirmed the new classification. The circuit court reversed and reinstated the machine shop code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court properly found that Dakota Trailer’s activities fit within the machine shop code. View "Dakota Trailer Mfg. v. United Fire & Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Teton LLC filed an application with the Grant County Board of Adjustment for a conditional use permit to construct a concentrated animal feeding operation. The Board ultimately approved Teton’s application. The circuit court concluded that the Board had jurisdiction over Teton’s application and pursued its authority in a regular manner. Grant County Concerned Citizens (GCCC) and Timothy Tyler appealed. Specifically, GCCC asserted that Teton’s proposed project violated the Zoning Ordinance for Grant County and, therefore, the Board’s decision was illegal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board regularly pursued its authority in granting Teton’s application for a conditional use permit; and (2) the circuit court did not err in striking Tyler’s affidavit from the record. View "Grant County Concerned Citizens v. Grant County Bd. of Adjustment" on Justia Law

Employee was injured when he ran from a co-worker on the job site after tricking that co-worker. Employee sought workers’ compensation benefits. Employer and Insurer denied workers’ compensation benefits, asserting that Employee’s injury did not “arise out of” or “in the course of” his employment because Employer specifically prohibited horseplay by its employees. Employee petitioned for a hearing. The Department of Labor concluded that Employee’s injury arose “out of” his employment because, but for his work with Employer” he would not have been at the job site where he was injured, but that the injury did not occur “in the course of” the employment. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for an award of benefits, holding that the Department (1) correctly concluded that Employee’s injury arose “out of” the employment; and (2) erred when it did not consider the effect of the mandatory lull in Employee’s work when it determined that the injury did not occur “in the course of” his employment. Because Employee’s act of horseplay was not a substantial deviation from his employment, it occurred “in the course of the employment.” View "Petrik v. JJ Concrete, Inc." on Justia Law

Pro se appellant Robert Mercer submitted a request to the South Dakota Attorney General’s Office under S.D. Codified Laws 1-27-37 seeking the release of the Division of Criminal Investigation’s (DCI) records related to the investigation of Richard Benda’s death. Mercer conceded that S.D. Codified Laws 1-27-1.5(5) precluded public release of the documents but requested the death investigation records because Benda was a public figure and because news reports “raised questions about the death.” The Attorney General’s Office stated that it would make the death investigation records available if certain conditions were met. Because Mercer was unable to fulfill the conditions, the Attorney General’s Office denied Mercer’s request for disclosure. The office of Hearing Examiners (OHE) upheld the Attorney General’s office’s denial of Mercer’s request. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “the public’s significant and legitimate interest” did not warrant access to the death investigation records because Benda’s death investigation records were exempt from disclosure under section 1-27-1.5(5). View "Mercer v. S.D. Attorney General Office" on Justia Law