Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Hyperion Refining, LLC applied for an air quality permit to begin construction of a proposed petroleum refinery and power plant. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) issued the permit, and the Board of Minerals and Environment (Board) approved DENR's issuance of the permit. Three citizens appealed the issuance of the permit to the circuit court. Hyperion also appealed a permit condition that limited the amount of carbon monoxide that could be emitted from the proposed facility. The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision in all respects. The citizens and Hyperion appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board did not abuse its discretion in issuing the air quality permit; and (2) the Board did not clearly err in determining the carbon monoxide limit. View "In re Application of Hyperion Refining, LLC" on Justia Law

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved plans and specifications for the Brant Lake Sanitary District's wastewater treatment facility in 2012. The Brant Lake facility plans proposed to join and expand the Chester Sanitary District's existing wastewater disposal system. The plans included the construction of an additional treatment lagoon to tie into Chester's existing two-cell lagoon system. The plans also included the construction of additional piping to transport wastewater to the treatment lagoons. Plaintiffs' home and business were near the proposed lagoon. Plaintiffs filed an application for a writ of mandamus requiring DENR to comply with applicable state statutes, administrative rules, and DENR internal guidelines in approving the plans and specifications for the Brant Lake facility. The trial court denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden to show that DENR disregarded a clear duty to act under the applicable statutes, administrative rules, or manuals, and accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' application for writ of mandamus. View "Krsnak v. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res." on Justia Law

Claimant was injured on a job site while working in North Dakota for the North Dakota office of Hamm & Phillips Service Company. Claimant worked about sixty percent of the time in North Dakota and about thirty-five percent of the time in South Dakota and lived in South Dakota. Claimant filed for and received benefits through North Dakota's workers' compensation agency, but after about nine months of benefits, he received a benefit denial notification from the agency. Claimant then filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits in South Dakota. While awaiting adjudication of that claim, Claimant died of causes unrelated to his injury. His wife (Wife) sought to substitute herself as a party in the South Dakota claim. The South Dakota Department of Labor granted Wife's motion to substitute but dismissed the claim for lack of statutory jurisdiction. The circuit court reversed the motion to substitute Sharon and affirmed the dismissal for lack of statutory jurisdiction. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court's dismissal for lack of statutory jurisdiction because South Dakota was not the location of the employment relationship; and (2) did not reach the issue of substitution. View "Knapp v. Hamm & Phillips" on Justia Law

Lamar Advertising submitted applications to Rapid City for sign building permits, which would allow Lamar to convert six traditional billboards to digital signs. The City denied Lamar's applications, finding that a conditional use permit was required to alter an existing off-premises sign. Lamar petitioned the circuit court for a writ of certiorari, arguing (1) the City, in at least 100 prior instances, allowed Lamar to alter existing signs without first obtaining a conditional use permit, and therefore, the City should be estopped from now requiring a conditional use permit; and (2) the City's denial was beyond its jurisdiction as an effort to improperly regulate digital billboards in contravention of existing ordinances. The circuit court denied Lamar's petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City acted in an irregular pursuit of its authority when it denied Lamar's six applications for sign building permits. View "Lamar Adver. of S.D., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment" on Justia Law

Claimant-Appellant Megan Peterson worked at a nursing home owned by The Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society (Good Samaritan). Claimant alleged that she sustained a work-related injury to her back when assisting a resident with a wheelchair. Good Samaritan denied the claim. Two doctors, who testified by deposition, disagreed whether Claimant suffered a work-related injury and whether employment was a major contributing cause of her back condition. The Department of Labor (Department), after considering the depositions and Claimant's medical records, determined that she failed to prove she sustained a compensable work-related injury. The Department also determined that Claimant failed to prove that her employment remained a major contributing cause of her condition and need for treatment. The circuit court affirmed. On de novo review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court concluded that one of the doctor's opinions was sufficient to meet Claimant's burden of proving that her employment caused a work-related injury and that was and remained a major contributing cause of her back condition and need for treatment. View "Peterson v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society" on Justia Law

M.A.S. (Father) appealed the termination of his parental rights to P.S.E. At the time P.S.E. was removed from Mother’s care, Father lived in California and did not know he had a child in South Dakota. The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied to these proceedings because P.S.E. was an enrolled member of the Fort Peck Sioux Tribe. Father argued on appeal that the Department of Social Services (DSS) did not make active efforts to reunite the Indian family and that any efforts made were successful. Because the evidence presented shows that DSS provided active and reasonable, though abbreviated, efforts to place P.S.E. with Father, and those efforts were unsuccessful, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order terminating Father's parental rights. View "In the interest of P.S.E." on Justia Law

Michael Manuel, the sole owner of Toner Plus, Inc., closed his business on May 30, 2009. Manuel then filed a personal claim for unemployment compensation benefits. The South Dakota Department of Labor determined that Manuel was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits because he "voluntarily" dissolved his business and did not have "good cause" for doing so under S.D. Codified Laws 61-6-13 to -13.1 The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ALJ did not err in finding the Department met its burden of showing Manuel's decision to terminate his employment with Toner Plus was voluntary; and (2) the Court did not need to address whether Manuel had "good cause" for voluntarily terminating his employment. View "Manuel v. Toner Plus, Inc." on Justia Law

Pooled Advocate Trust, Inc. (PATI), the managing corporation for a Medicaid pooled trust, brought a declaratory judgment action on Medicaid eligibility issues associated with the trust and named the South Dakota Department of Social Services (DSS) as a necessary party. The circuit court granted declaratory judgment for PATI. Fred and Gladys Matthews transferred assets to the pooled trust. When the Matthews subsequently applied for Medicaid long-term care benefits, DSS imposed a penalty period because they were over age sixty-five at the time of the transfers. PATI petitioned for further relief, seeking a declaration that DSS could not impose penalty periods for transfers made by pooled trust beneficiaries age sixty-five or older. The circuit court granted PATI's petition. The Matthews also appealed DSS's application of a penalty period, but an ALJ upheld the decision and another circuit court affirmed. DSS appealed the circuit court's order granting PATI's petition and the Matthews appealed the other circuit court's affirmance of the ALJ's ruling. The Supreme Court affirmed the administrative appeal and reversed the declaratory judgment, holding that transfers of assets into pooled trusts by beneficiaries age sixty-five or older may be subject to a transfer penalty period for Medicaid eligibility purposes. View "In re Pooled Advocate Trust" on Justia Law

Rapid City ordinances required a developer to complete certain public improvements before the City accepted a final plat, but in lieu of completing the improvements before the City accepted a plat, the City could accept a surety from a developer. In this case, several Developers provided sureties, which the City accepted. The sureties expired, after which the City sued Developers, seeking relief to have the required public improvements completed or repaired to meet the City's standards. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Developers, concluding that when the sureties expired, Developers were no longer liable for the improvements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the ordinances and specifications, Developers remained liable until the City accepted the improvements by a final acceptance letter. Remanded. View "City of Rapid City v. Estes" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a zoning ordinance adopted by the City of Sioux Falls requiring that an on-sale alcoholic beverage business seeking to place video lottery machines in the establishment must meet certain location requirements and apply for a conditional use permit. Plaintiff Rick Law, who conditionally held a liquor license, brought a declaratory action against the City to determine the constitutionality of the ordinance. The South Dakota Lottery intervened in the action. The circuit court ruled that the City exceeded its authority when it enacted the ordinance, concluding that South Dakota's constitutional and statutory scheme indicated that the State intended to fully occupy the field of video lottery to the exclusion of municipal regulation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) municipalities do not have the freedom or power to regulate video lottery as the South Dakota Constitution specifically reserves that right to the State and (2) existing legislation does not give municipalities power to license video lottery establishments or otherwise control the location of such establishments. View "Law v. City of Sioux Falls" on Justia Law