Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Timothy Farmer, a patrol officer for the Rapid City Police Department, was investigated for excessive use of force relating to the apprehension of the alleged perpetrators of an assault. The Department later fired Farmer after finding, in addition to the most recent incident, Farmer had been the subject of several complaints for excessive force. The Department of Labor upheld the Police Department's decision. The circuit court affirmed, finding ample evidence to support the discharge. On appeal, Farmer contended that he never acted beyond the Department's use of force continuum policy. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Department of Labor and circuit court, holding that sufficient cause existed to discharge Farmer. View "Farmer v. City of Rapid City" on Justia Law

The South Dakota Department of Transportation (DOT) obtained title to land once owned by Defendants Philip Clark, P&J Enterprises, LLC and Hansen Manufacturing Corporation by eminent domain. The jury determined the amount of compensation to award for the taking. The trial court subsequently awarded prejudgment interest and attorneyâs fees to Defendants. The DOT challenged the award of attorneyâs fees. The Supreme Court found that the plain language of the applicable state law allows for an award of prejudgment interest and attorneyâs fees in connection with eminent domain takings. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial courtâs decision.

Appellees Nine, Inc. and GDT, Inc. own and operate a private bar and/or restaurant businesses in Brookings. These businesses are authorized to sell alcoholic beverages under operating agreements with Brookings. Appellees sought a declaration that a Brookings ordinance and resolution establishing the fee for additional full-service restaurant on-sale liquor operating agreements/licenses violated state law because the fee was based on city population rather than the market value of existing operating agreements/licenses. Brookings is a "local option community" in that there is only one liquor "license" and that license is held by the city. Local option cities then enter into "operating agreements" with private businesses to sell alcoholic beverages. Because there are technically no licenses or license sales to determine current fair market value, a question arose whether Brooking's operating agreements should be considered the same as licenses for the purpose of determining the fee under SDCL 35-4-117. Brookings took the position that because there wee no "license sales upon which current market value could have been established under the statute, the city was authorized to set the new license fee at the minimum amount based on population as provided for in SDCL 35-4-116. Appellees brought suit; the circuit court ruled that the operating licenses were the same as licenses for the purposes of determining the fee under the new statutes. The court declared the Brookings ordinance and resolution invalid because they established the new license fee at an amount far less than current fair market value under SDCL 35-4-117. On review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court correctly determined the Brookings ordinance and resolution were invalid and affirmed the lower court's decision.