Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed for and obtained an ex parte temporary protection order against Defendant, a former social acquaintance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the protection order; (3) Defendant received the notice that due process requires; (4) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in permitting “other acts” evidence; (5) S.D. Codified Laws 22-19A-1, as applied in this case, was not unconstitutionally vague; and (6) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in crafting the protection order. View "Donat v. Johnson" on Justia Law

This dispute arose from Plaintiff’s purchase from David Bisson of seventy heifers whose health certifications were incorrect and origin could not be determined. As a result, the heifers had to be quarantined for approximately five months. Plaintiff sued Defendants, including Bisson, Mihm Transportation Co. and Paul Radloff, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and deceit and civil conspiracy. The circuit court entered a default summary judgment against Bisson for fraudulent misrepresentation and deceit in the amount of $100,004 in actual damages and $1 million in punitive damages. After a trial on the remaining claims, the jury found in favor of Plaintiff on the civil conspiracy claim as to Mihm and Radloff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in failing to impose upon Bisson, Mihm, and Radloff joint and several liability for the totality of the summary judgment award, including punitive damages; and (2) did not err in denying Plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter of law against defendant Rod Spartz. View "Huether v. Bisson" on Justia Law

A.H. Meyer & Sons, Inc. produced honey and beeswax at a plant in Winfred, South Dakota. Barton Solvents, Inc. sold the heptane to A.H. Meyer that A.H. Meyer used in its beeswax rendering process. The heptane was manufactured by CITGO Petroleum Corporation. In 2009, A.H. Meyer suffered a heptane explosion at its plant. Nationwide Mutual Insurance paid for the damage. Nationwide subsequently filed suit seeking subrogation from Barton Solvents and CITGO on causes of action alleging strict liability, negligence, and breach of express and implied warranties. All theories were premised on the theory that Defendants failed adequately to warn of heptane’s dangers. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was appropriate because no material issues of disputed fact existed with respect to the adequacy of the warnings. View "Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barton Solvents, Inc." on Justia Law

Atlas Hydraulics, Inc. constructed an addition to its manufacturing plant on the side of its existing building that abutted residential property owned by Sherri Strong. After years of enduring water flow from the Atlas property onto her property, Strong sued Atlas for nuisance, negligence, and negligence per se and also filed a motion for preliminary and permanent injunctions. The circuit court granted both the preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting Atlas from allowing surface water to uncontrollably discharge onto Strong’s property in a manner that would threaten Strong’s property and residential structure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding primarily that the circuit court did not misapply the relevant statutes and case law in granting an injunction regarding ground water nuisance. View "Strong v. Atlas Hydraulics, Inc." on Justia Law

Kreisers Inc., a Subchapter S corporation, hired First Dakota Title to assist it with a like-kind property exchange in order to receive tax deferred benefits under 26 U.S.C. 1031. The like-kind exchange partially failed. Kreisers subsequently sued First Dakota for negligence and negligent misrepresentation. The circuit court rejected Kreiser’s negligent misrepresentation claim but determined that First Dakota was negligent in assisting Kreisers with the exchange. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in applying tort law rather than contract law to determine the duty that First Dakota owed to Kreisers; (2) did not err in concluding that Kreisers was not contributorily negligent; and (3) did not err in its calculation of damages. View "Kreisers Inc. v. First Dakota Title Ltd. P’ship" on Justia Law

Megan Ruschenberg, Jessica Cornelius, and Heather Rensch (collectively, Appellants) were employees at two businesses that sold adult movies, clothing, and other sexual products. Keith Johnson was a majority owner of the businesses, and David Eliason was a minority owner and helped to manage both businesses. Each Appellant alleged that she was sexually assaulted by Eliason during her employment. Ruschenberg was allegedly raped by Eliason, which resulted in a pregnancy and an abortion. Appellants filed complaints against Eliason and the businesses (together, Defendants), alleging several causes of action. The jury returned a verdict for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants’ motion in limine to exclude evidence of Ruschenberg’s abortion or in denying Appellants’ motion for a mistrial based on Johnson’s statements at trial. View "Ruschenberg v. Eliason" on Justia Law

An employee (Isack) was injured during the course and scope of his employment with his employer. Acuity, the employer’s workers’ compensation insurer, paid workers’ compensation benefits to Isack. Isack then retained attorney John Knight for legal representation in a suit against the tortfeasor and his employer. In turn, Acuity retained an attorney to represent its statutory rights of recovery and offset in Isack’s claim. Isack and the tortfeasor’s employer reached a litigation settlement. The trial judge subsequently awarded Knight one-third of Acuity’s recovery and offset award. Acuity appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by giving Knight a thirty-three percent contingent fee from Acuity’s settlement portion because Acuity retained its own attorney to represent its interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court’s application of S.D. Codified Laws 62-4-39 and its allocation of the entire contingent fee to Knight was not clearly erroneous. View "Isack v. Acuity" on Justia Law

Ten-month-old Kimimila Win Sunny Sarah Iron Cloud (Kimi) died while being cared for Jolyn Erickson. Kelly Laughlin was present when Kimi died from positional asphyxiation in her car seat. Prudence Millea, as special administrator for Kimi’s estate, brought a negligence action against Erickson and Laughlin for Kimi’s death. Default judgment was entered against Erickson, and the circuit court granted summary judgment for Lauglin, concluding that he had no legal duty to Kimi. Millea appealed, arguing (1) Laughlin interfered in Kimi’s care by instructing Erickson to place Kimi in her car seat and in the bedroom, and Laughlin had influence over Erickson such that she deferred to him in providing care for Kimi; and (2) therefore, Laughlin assumed a legal duty to provide reasonable care for Kimi. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Laughlin had no legal duty to care for Kimi. View "Millea v. Erickson" on Justia Law

While responding to an emergency, Tim Bauman, a volunteer firefighter for the Chester Fire Department, activated his hazard lights and sped toward the fire station. While crossing an intersection, Bauman’s vehicle collided with a vehicle driven by Areyman Gabriel. Both Gabriel and his passenger were injured. Gabriel sued Bauman and Chester Fire, alleging that Bauman’s conduct was willful, wanton, and reckless and that Chester Fire negligently trained Bauman and inadequately equipped Bauman’s vehicle. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it used the Supreme Court’s definition of “willful and wanton misconduct” from South Dakota’s repealed guest statute to rule as a matter of law that Bauman did not act willfully, wantonly, or recklessly; (2) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment for Bauman; and (3) the circuit court erred when it granted summary judgment to Chester Fire on Gabriel’s negligent training and equipment claims based on the immunity in S.D. Codified Laws 20-9-4.1. View "Gabriel v. Bauman" on Justia Law

Steven Thomas & Sons (T&S), LLC did excavation and soil compaction work for an addition to a school building in the Kimball School District. The School District was later informed that problems in the building caused by settling issues were due to negligently performed work by T&S. The School District brought suit against T&S and other defendants. T&S’s commercial general liability insurer, Employers Mutual Casualty Company (EMC) withdrew from contributing to T&S's defense, asserting that the policy excluded coverage for continuous or progressive property damage that occurred before the effective date of the policy, and the problems to the building were observed before the 2007 policy date. In 2005 and 2006, T&S was insured by AMCO Insurance Company. Ultimately, AMCO paid defense costs and indemnified T&S for its share of the arbitration award in favor of the School District. AMCO subsequently brought a declaratory judgment action against EMC seeking a ruling that EMC had a joint duty to defend T&S and a declaration that EMC’s policy exclusion was void as against public policy. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of EMC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that EMC’s exclusion did not violate public policy. View "AMCO Ins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co." on Justia Law