Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Cindy Tolle sued Peter Lev for damages for failing to transfer ownership of a cabin situated on land owned by the government in a national park. Tolle also sued Lev for tortious interference with a business relationship she claimed with an employer. The circuit granted granted summary judgment in favor of Lev on both claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the tortious interference claim, but (2) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Lev on the claim for damages for failure to transfer the cabin, as (i) the statute of frauds did not bar the claim because an email from Lev confirming his agreement to transfer ownership of the cabin to Tolle was a sufficient writing and because the cabin agreement was for the sale of personal property, not real estate, (ii) neither the doctrine of merger nor the integration clause defeated Tolle's claim to enforce the oral agreement, and (iii) the parol evidence rule did not bar Lev's email. View "Tolle v. Lev" on Justia Law

Employee submitted a workers' compensation claim to his Employer after suffering a reaction that some doctors attributed to work-related exposure. Employee petitioned the Department of Labor for a hearing on his workers' compensation claim. The Department denied Employee's claim, concluding that Employee failed to demonstrate that he sustained a compensable injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. The circuit court affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether Employee's efforts to prove causation were thwarted by Employer's refusal to allow collection of samples of various materials in areas around the plant and its later destruction of potential samples. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department failed to properly consider the spoliation question and Employee was entitled to a new hearing before the Department. View "Thyen v. Hubbard Feeds, Inc." on Justia Law

Lita St. John sued Dr. Linda Peterson, alleging medical malpractice in repairing a vesicovaginal fistula. The jury entered a verdict for Peterson. St. John appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of other cases where Peterson failed to repair vesicovaginal fistulas. The Supreme Court held that the trial court misstated and apparently misapplied the balancing test of S.C. R. Evid. 403, which states that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Because it was possible that the exclusion of the evidence in all probability affected the outcome of the jury's verdict and thereby constituted prejudicial error, the Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded. View "St. John v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Vera Martin, who lived in South Dakota, worked at an American Colloid plant in Wyoming. After suffering a work-related injury at the Wyoming plant, Martin received Wyoming workers' compensation benefits. Martin then filed a claim for South Dakota workers' compensation benefits. The South Dakota Department of Labor dismissed her claim for lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) while Martin was a South Dakota resident throughout her employment with American Colloid, that fact was not alone sufficient to create the substantial connection necessary to conclude that South Dakota was the place of the employment relationship; and (2) because South Dakota was not the place of the employment relationship, the department did not have jurisdiction over this matter. View "Martin v. American Colloid Co." on Justia Law

Denise Estes filed suit against Dr. David Lonbaken, a podiatrist, for medical malpractice, alleging that Lonbaken negligently treated a neuroma on her foot and seeking damages. Estes filed the complaint in Buffalo County. Lonbaken moved to change venue to Hughes County, claiming Hughes County was the proper venue because Estes' surgery and follow-up treatment took place in Hughes County. The trial court granted Lonbaken's motion to change venue. At issue on appeal was whether Buffalo County was a proper venue for the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the facts creating the necessity for bringing the action took place exclusively in Hughes County, and as such, the proper venue was Hughes County. View "Estes v. Lonbaken" on Justia Law

After self-insured Employer filed for bankruptcy, it continued to take payroll deductions from Employees for medical coverage but stopped paying the provider hospital for the covered charges. The hospital then directly billed Employees for services that should have been paid by Employer. Employees filed suit to stop the hospital's attempts to collect payment, seeking relief under the theories of declaratory judgment, injunction, breach of contract, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and bad faith breach of contract. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital on all of Employees' claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Employees had standing as third party beneficiaries to enforce the provisions of the hospital agreement and payer agreement; and (2) Employees were not obligated to pay for covered medical services under the agreements. Remanded. View "Jennings v. Rapid City Reg'l Hosp., Inc." on Justia Law

Tabitha Pourier was seriously injured in an automobile accident and suffered damages in excess of $250,000. After receiving $25,000 from the tortfeasor's liaility carrier and $100,000 in underinsured motorist coverage from her primary insurer, Pourier sought an additional $100,000 in underinsured coverage from her excess carrier, De Smet Insurance Company. De Smet denied coverage, asserting that an exclusion in the policy precluded coverage. On cross motions for summary judgment, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of De Smet, ruling that the policy exclusion was valid and enforceable. At issue on appeal was whether De Smet's owned-but-not-insured exclusion was void as against public policy because it prohibited Pourier, who was riding in a vehicle owned by her but insured by another company, from recovering for uncompensated damages by De Smet as the secondary insurer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the policy exclusion was not against public policy. View "De Smet Ins. Co. v. Pourier" on Justia Law

Rose Pray fell and was injured when a rottweiler broke loose from its owner and dashed across the street toward her. Pray brought an action for damages against the dog owner and the City. As against the City, Pray asserted that it knew the dog was dangerous and failed to enforce its vicious animal ordinance. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the City, ruling that, under Tipton v. Town of Tabor, the city owed Pray no special duty and, therefore, owed no duty to control the conduct of third persons. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in ruling that Pray needed to prove each of the four Tipton elements to establish that a special duty existed, but (2) as a matter of law, Pray did not meet the legal requirements to show such a duty. View "Pray v. City of Flandreau " on Justia Law

Pizza Hut hired Norman Williams, who was at the time on parole for a felony conviction involving a gang-related incident of mutual combat resulting in serious injury. While working at the restaurant, Williams allegedly attacked David Iverson. Iverson filed suit against Williams and Pizza Hut, asserting (1) vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior, (2) negligent hiring, (3) breach of duty to control an employee, and (4) negligent supervision. The circuit court granted summary judgment in Pizza Hut's favor on all four theories of liability. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was proper where (1) Pizza Hut's agency relationship was immaterial to Williams's tort, (2) because at the time Williams was hired he was only to have incidental contact with the public, Pizza Hut did not have a duty to inquire further into Williams's background, (3) because Iverson did not satisfy the foreseeability prong, he failed to show that Pizza Hut had a duty to control Williams, and (4) given the facts and circumstances, it was not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty on Pizza Hut to prevent Iverson from meeting with Williams at the restaurant. View "Iverson v. NPC Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellees Floyd Demaray and James Hagemann were sued for repeated tortious activity in discharging of pollutants into lakes and streams of a nearby property. Appellees, who owned separate but identical insurance policies with De Smet Farm Mutual Insurance, notified De Smet of the lawsuit. De Smet declined defense of the suit, asserting it owed no duty to defend under the insurance contract. Appellees obtained their own defense counsel and defended the matter through trial, where a jury ruled in their favor. Appellees then sued De Smet, alleging that the company breached its duty to defend them in the previous lawsuit and seeking indemnification for all costs and fees incurred as a result. The trial court granted Appellees' motion for summary judgment, holding that De Smet owed Appellees a duty to defend because the alleged claim, if true, fell within policy coverage. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the policy language was unambiguous and the complaint asserted no claim that would arguably invoke coverage. Remanded with directions to grant summary judgment for De Smet. View "Demaray v. De Smet Farm Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law