Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

David Zerfas swerved to avoid a deer carcass in his lane of travel and lost control of his vehicle. Zerfas died after his vehicle was hit by oncoming traffic. Zerfas’s wife, Stacey, sought uninsured motorist benefits with their automobile insurance company, AMCO Insurance Company, alleging that an unidentified driver left the deer carcass in the lane of travel, which caused Zerfas to lose control of his vehicle. AMCO denied Stacey’s claim on the grounds that Stacey would not legally be entitled to recover damages from the unidentified driver. Stacey subsequently brought a breach of contract action against AMCO. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of AMCO, concluding that the unidentified driver did not have a legal duty to Zerfas to remove the carcass or warn of its existence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no common law or statutory duty existed between the unidentified driver and Zerfas, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in granting AMCO summary judgment. View "Zerfas v. AMCO Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Dakota Trailer Manufacturing, which makes radiator components for an unrelated company, performs its component work in one of Dakota Trailer’s locations that was originally classified as a “machine shop” for workers compensation insurance rating purposes. After an inspection, the National Council on Compensation Insurance changed the location’s classification to “welding or cutting.” Both the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board and the South Dakota Department of Labor affirmed the new classification. The circuit court reversed and reinstated the machine shop code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court properly found that Dakota Trailer’s activities fit within the machine shop code. View "Dakota Trailer Mfg. v. United Fire & Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Employee was injured when he ran from a co-worker on the job site after tricking that co-worker. Employee sought workers’ compensation benefits. Employer and Insurer denied workers’ compensation benefits, asserting that Employee’s injury did not “arise out of” or “in the course of” his employment because Employer specifically prohibited horseplay by its employees. Employee petitioned for a hearing. The Department of Labor concluded that Employee’s injury arose “out of” his employment because, but for his work with Employer” he would not have been at the job site where he was injured, but that the injury did not occur “in the course of” the employment. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for an award of benefits, holding that the Department (1) correctly concluded that Employee’s injury arose “out of” the employment; and (2) erred when it did not consider the effect of the mandatory lull in Employee’s work when it determined that the injury did not occur “in the course of” his employment. Because Employee’s act of horseplay was not a substantial deviation from his employment, it occurred “in the course of the employment.” View "Petrik v. JJ Concrete, Inc." on Justia Law

Troy Dowling, the operator of a crop-spraying business, owned a John Deere sprayer that was a scheduled item on his commercial general liability insurance policy through Berkley Regional Insurance Company. Dowling also had a commercial automobile insurance policy with Great West Casualty Company. Dowling had borrowed a different sprayer and was driving the sprayer to one of his customer’s fields when the sprayer collided with a motorcycle. James and Kimberly Seiler, who were both seriously injured in the collision, sought damages. The circuit court granted declaratory judgments for Berkley and Great West, concluding that the insurers had no duty to defend or indemnify Dowling. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for Berkley and reversed and remanded the judgment for Great West, holding (1) under the terms of Dowling’s policy with Berkley, Berkley had no duty to defend or indemnify Dowling for any claims arising from the accident; and (2) under the terms of Dowling’s policy with Great West, Great West had the duty to defend and indemnify Dowling for claims related to the accident. View "Berkley Reg’l Specialty Ins. Co. v. Dowling Spray Serv." on Justia Law

In 2005, Plaintiff suffered a compensable, work-related injury to his neck and back while employed by Ridco, Inc. Twin City Fire Insurance Company, which insured Ridco for purposes of workers’ compensation, paid temporary disability benefits. Plaintiff subsequently sought additional workers’ compensation benefits, which the administrative law judge granted. In 2010, Plaintiff filed suit against Twin City and Ridco, alleging bad faith handling of his workers’ compensation claim. During the discovery stage, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel Twin City to produce wholly unredacted claim files, personnel files, and privilege logs. The circuit court ordered Twin City to produce the disputed documents in in unredacted form, concluding that Twin City impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that Twin City implied the attorney-client privilege without conducting an in camera inspection of the documents. Remanded for findings as to whether Twin City injected its reliance upon the advice of counsel into the bad faith litigations, thereby making the disputed communications relevant to the case such that would constitute an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege. View "Andrews v. Ridco, Inc." on Justia Law

Employee was injured in an automobile accident during the course of his employment with Employer. Employer and its Insurer paid workers’ compensation benefits. Employee subsequently settled a claim against the other driver involved in the accident. From that settlement, Employee reimbursed Insurer for the workers’ compensation benefits already paid out at the time of the settlement. The remaining amount of the settlement was determined to be “like damages” for which Employer and Insurer would receive an offset against future medical expenses related to the work injury. Thereafter, Employee submitted bills for ongoing care related to the work injury to his insurers, which paid the bills. Employee then filed a petition requesting workers’ compensation benefits. Employer and Insurer denied benefits, asserting that the amounts paid by other insurers could not be used to reduce the offset against future medical expenses. An administrative law judge and the circuit court concluded that medical expenses paid by Employee’s insurance were properly used to reduce the offset. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although Employee’s insurance paid medical bills resulting from his compensable injury, those payments were properly considered to reduce the offset because Employee would otherwise be entitled to receive compensation for those expenses. View "Milbrandt v. Bibb’s, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved an intersection collision between a crop sprayer and a motorcycle. The driver of the crop sprayer was insured through two insurance policies, and the owner of the crop sprayer was insured through a third policy issued by Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company. The injured motorcyclists sought damages for their injuries through the insurance policies of the driver and the owner of the crop sprayer. All three insurance companies sought declaratory judgment that they had no duty to defend or indemnify the driver. The circuit court ruled that Farm Bureau had a duty to defend and indemnify the driver on the claims from the collision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the language of the Farm Bureau policy unambiguously provided that no coverage existed for the claims against the driver. View "Berkley Reg’l Specialty Ins. Co. v. Dowling Spray Serv." on Justia Law

In 2000, while working at Homestake Mining Company, Michael Martz injured his shoulder. Martz was paid workers’ compensation benefits. In 2002, while working for McLaughlin Sawmill (Hills Materials), Martz injured the same shoulder. Hills Materials began paying benefits but, several years later, denied liability for further benefits. Martz petitioned the Department of Labor, contending that both employers were liable for benefits. Homestake was granted summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. In regards Hills Materials, the Department rejected Martz’s argument that promissory estoppel precluded Hills Materials from denying liability and concluded that Martz failed to satisfy his burden of showing that the 2002 injury was a “major contributing cause” of his current condition. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Hills Materials was not estopped from denying liability for Martz’s current condition and need for treatment; and (2) Martz failed to establish that Hills Materials was liable for benefits where he did not prove a sufficient causal relationship between his 2002 injury and his current condition and need for treatment. View "Martz v. Hills Materials" on Justia Law

Appellant injured his lower back in 2007 while working for Employer. Employer denied further treatment that same year. Appellant filed a petition for hearing in 2009, alleging that he was entitled to medical benefits. Based on a deposition of Dr. Dale Anderson, Employer filed an amended answer admitting that Appellant’s work activities were a major contributing cause to his need for medical treatment. The Department of Labor dismissed the case in 2010. In 2011, Employer denied further medical treatment based upon a recent independent medical evaluation by another doctor. Appellant petitioned for a hearing, arguing that res judicata applied to prevent Employer from changing its position from its previous admittance. The Department found res judicata inapplicable and that Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof on causation. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Dr. Anderson’s opinion was adopted by Employer and judicially accepted by the Department through its 2010 order of dismissal, Employer was judicially estopped from taking an inconsistent position; and (2) Appellant met his burden of proving that his work-related activities as of 2010 were a major contributing cause of his disability. Remanded. View "Hayes v. Rosenbaum Signs & Outdoor Advertising, Inc. " on Justia Law

S.D. Codified Laws 53-9-6 prohibits parties from contractually limiting the statute of limitations except in the case of a “surety contract.” In this case, First Dakota National Bank purchased a financial institution bond from BancInsure, Inc. to provide coverage for liability issues that could arise in the course of the bank’s operations. The bond outlined that claims must be brought within two years of the discovery of a loss. In 2004, First Dakota issued a loan, which was obtained through forgery. First Dakota sought coverage under the bond for the loan, but BancInsure denied coverage on the ground that First Dakota had not brought suit within two years since the loss was discovered. First Dakota sued BancInsure in federal court seeking coverage under the bond and damages for the bank’s refusal to pay the claim. The district court certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether the financial institution bond in this case was a surety contract. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding that the bond in this case was not a surety contract. View "First Dakota Nat’l Bank v. BancInsure, Inc." on Justia Law