Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In September 2015, Josh Brewer suffered a work-related injury while employed by Tectum Holdings, Inc. d/b/a Truxedo. Brewer filed a workers' compensation claim for permanent total disability (PTD) benefits, which was denied by his employer and their insurer, Berkshire Hathaway. Brewer's claim was initially denied by an administrative law judge (ALJ) and subsequently by the Department of Labor (Department), which found that Brewer did not prove his work-related injury was a major contributing cause of his current condition and ongoing need for treatment. Brewer appealed the Department's decision to the circuit court, which affirmed the Department's ruling. Brewer then appealed to the Supreme Court of South Dakota.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo, focusing on the documentary evidence and expert testimonies. The court found that Brewer's treating physician, Dr. Rothrock, provided a more credible causation opinion than the employer's expert, Dr. Jensen. Dr. Rothrock opined that Brewer's work injury was a major contributing cause of his current condition and need for treatment, based on his personal treatment of Brewer and the results of various diagnostic tests. The court concluded that Brewer met his burden of proving causation and reversed the Department's determination on this issue.Regarding Brewer's claim for PTD benefits, the court reviewed the ALJ's findings for clear error. The court found that Brewer did not establish obvious unemployability due to his physical condition, age, training, and experience. Additionally, Brewer's job search efforts were deemed unreasonable, as he did not follow application instructions and highlighted his physical limitations on his résumé. The court also noted that the employer presented sufficient evidence of suitable employment opportunities available to Brewer within his limitations. Consequently, the court affirmed the Department's denial of PTD benefits.The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Brewer v. Tectum Holdings" on Justia Law

Seven members of the South Dakota Air National Guard, who also work as federal civilian employees of the Department of the Air Force, alleged that the South Dakota Adjutant General wrongfully denied them military leave while they were serving on active duty, in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA). The plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to 15 days of paid military leave each year in their civilian roles, which they were denied while on active duty.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, dismissed the USERRA claims sua sponte after a court trial, concluding that the plaintiffs must demonstrate the existence of an antimilitary animus to prevail. The court did not reach the merits of the parties’ arguments and found that the plaintiffs had failed to plead or prove such animus. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiffs are entitled to military leave. The court held that the plaintiffs did not need to show antimilitary animus because the benefit in question, military leave, is only available to members of the military. The court found that the plaintiffs' active duty under Title 10 orders was not "active Guard and Reserve duty" as defined by 10 U.S.C. § 101(d)(6), and therefore, the exception in 32 U.S.C. § 709(g)(2) did not apply. Consequently, the plaintiffs were entitled to accrue military leave under 5 U.S.C. § 6323(a)(1) while serving on active duty under Title 10. The court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Christiansen v. Morrell" on Justia Law

Black Hills Adventure Lodging (BHAL) manages rental cabins in the Black Hills and hired Stephanie Hammer to clean these cabins. After her relationship with BHAL ended, Hammer applied for reemployment assistance benefits, which BHAL contested, claiming she was an independent contractor. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined Hammer was an employee and ordered BHAL to pay into the unemployment compensation fund based on her wages and those of others similarly situated. The circuit court affirmed this decision, and BHAL appealed.The ALJ found that Hammer was free to accept or decline cleaning jobs, was not trained or supervised by BHAL, and provided her own cleaning supplies and transportation. Despite these findings, the ALJ concluded that Hammer was not free from BHAL's control and was not customarily engaged in an independently established trade. The circuit court affirmed the ALJ's decision.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and determined that BHAL did not exercise control over Hammer's work, as she had the freedom to accept or decline jobs, set her own hours, and provide her own supplies. However, the court found that Hammer was not customarily engaged in an independently established trade, as she did not provide cleaning services to others, did not advertise her services, and was wholly dependent on BHAL for work.The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision that Hammer was an employee of BHAL and that BHAL must contribute to the unemployment compensation fund for her wages. However, the court reversed the decision that BHAL was liable for wages paid to "others similarly situated" to Hammer, as each individual's employment status must be determined based on their unique relationship with BHAL. The case was remanded for the circuit court to vacate that portion of the Department's decision. View "Black Hills Adventure Lodging, LLC v. South Dakota Department of Labor and Regulation" on Justia Law

Krista Dittus sued her former employer, Black Hills Care and Rehabilitation Center, LLC, and the company that took over its operations, RC North SD Skilled Nursing Facility, LLC d/b/a Avantara North, alleging wrongful termination in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. Avantara denied the allegations, asserting it had no employment relationship with Dittus at the time of her termination. Black Hills Care did not respond or appear in the case.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County, South Dakota, granted summary judgment in favor of Avantara after striking Dittus's untimely response to the motion for summary judgment. The court found no genuine issues of material fact and ruled that Avantara was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Written orders were entered, and Avantara's counsel served notice of entry of the orders on Dittus's counsel via the court's electronic filing system on September 15, 2023. Dittus's counsel filed a notice of appeal and a civil case docketing statement through the same system on October 13, 2023, but only the docketing statement was served on Avantara's counsel.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and determined that it lacked appellate jurisdiction due to Dittus's failure to serve the notice of appeal on Avantara's counsel as required by SDCL 15-26A-4. The court emphasized that both timely filing and service of the notice of appeal are mandatory jurisdictional requirements. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "Dittus v. Black Hills Care & Rehab and Avantara" on Justia Law

Angel Matta was hired by Dakota Provisions in February 2020 as a production worker. Matta had attendance issues documented by his employer and was injured at work on March 23, 2020, leading to several weeks of missed work. He filed a workers' compensation claim and was terminated by Dakota Provisions one month later. Matta then filed a lawsuit alleging wrongful termination and violation of public policy. Dakota Provisions moved for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted. Matta appealed the decision.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit in Beadle County, South Dakota, reviewed the case. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Dakota Provisions, concluding that Matta was an at-will employee and could be terminated for any lawful reason. The court also found that Matta failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his disability discrimination claim and did not recognize a common law tort for retaliatory discharge based on a disability.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court affirmed the circuit court's decision in part, agreeing that Matta was an at-will employee and that his termination did not violate public policy based on disability discrimination. However, the court reversed the summary judgment regarding Matta's claim of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim. The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Matta's termination was pretextual and retaliatory, given the proximity of his termination to his workers' compensation claim and the inconsistent reasons provided by Dakota Provisions for his termination. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this claim. View "Matta v. Dakota Provisions" on Justia Law

Michael Arneson, while working for GR Management, LLC, suffered an electric shock that he claimed caused atrial fibrillation (AFib) and numbness in his right hand. The employer and its insurer paid for initial medical treatment but denied further benefits, arguing the conditions were not caused by the shock. The Department of Labor found the electric shock was a major contributing cause of both conditions and that Arneson was permanently and totally disabled under the odd-lot category.The employer and insurer appealed to the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, which found the electric shock was a major contributing cause of Arneson’s hand condition but not his heart condition. The circuit court also determined that Arneson was not permanently and totally disabled. Arneson appealed, and the employer and insurer filed a notice of review.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case. It affirmed the Department of Labor’s finding that the electric shock was a major contributing cause of Arneson’s heart condition, based on the testimony of Dr. Holloway, who treated Arneson and found the electric shock likely caused the AFib. The court found Dr. Holloway’s testimony more persuasive than that of the employer’s experts, Drs. Brody and Elkins, who attributed the AFib to hyperthyroidism. The court also affirmed the Department’s finding that the electric shock was a major contributing cause of Arneson’s hand condition.Regarding Arneson’s claim of permanent total disability, the Supreme Court found the Department’s determination that Arneson was obviously unemployable was supported by the evidence, including the testimony of vocational expert Tom Audet. The court concluded that the employer and insurer failed to show suitable employment was available for Arneson within his limitations. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s ruling on Arneson’s heart condition and permanent total disability, reinstating the Department’s original order. View "Arneson v. Gr Management, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing this administrative appeal brought by Brittain Kovac from a final decision of the South Dakota Department of Labor of Regulation's Reemployment Assistance Division (RAD) determining that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over this administrative appeal.An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Kovac was ineligible to have received $20,278 in federal pandemic unemployment benefits and ordered her to repay them. Kovac attempted to filed notices of appeal, but the pleadings were returned unfiled for not meeting the requirements set forth in S.D. Codified Laws 1-26-31. Kovac then appealed with assistance of counsel. The circuit court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to Kovac's failure to timely perfect an appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a notice of appeal is considered filed under section 1-26-31 on the date of receipt by the clerk of courts' office, regardless of the date the office formally accepts notice of appeal; and (2) Kovac's notice of appeal was sufficient to constitute a timely "filing" under the statute. View "Kovac v. S.D. Reemployment Assistance Division" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court reversing an administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision determining that Appellant was disqualified from receiving reemployment assistance benefits because he was discharged for work-connected misconduct, holding that this Court could not conduct a meaningful appellate review.The ALJ in this case determined that Appellant could not entitled to reemployment assistance benefits because he was discharged for work-related misconduct, as defined by S.D. Codified Laws 61-6-14.1. The circuit court reversed, concluding that Appellant's habit of hugging co-workers did not constitute misconduct. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the ALJ failed to enter findings on Appellant's alleged sexual misconduct, this Court could not conduct a meaningful appellate review. View "Bankston v. New Angus, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the administrative and circuit court decisions ordering Appellant to repay $14,080 in Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) benefits that Appellant had received under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), holding that the circuit court erred.After Congress passed the CARES Act creating a temporary, state-administered PUA benefits program for unemployed individuals, Appellant, a self-employed individual who owned a small bed and breakfast, applied for PUA benefits after becoming unemployed "as a result of COVID-19[.]" The Department of Labor and Regulation, Reemployment Assistance Division determined Appellant was eligible for PUA benefits and issued a series of payments totaling $14,080. Later, however, the Department determined that Appellant was not eligible for benefits because she was "not considered unemployed" under any of the bases listed in the CARES Act. The Department then ordered Appellant to repay the PUA benefits. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ALJ erred in applying the causation standard in the Self-Employment Rule and further erred in concluding that Appellant was ineligible for PUA benefits. View "Bracken v. Dep't of Labor & Regulation, Reemployment Assistance Division" on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation case, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Employee's appeal of the decision of the the administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissing Employee's petition claiming entitlement to workers' compensation benefits, holding that the circuit court correctly dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.Employee petitioned the Department of Labor for a hearing on his claim that he was entitled to additional workers' compensation benefits. When Employee did not disclose and identify his experts by the date set in the scheduling order, Employer/Insurer moved for summary judgment. The ALJ granted the motion, concluding that Employee did not create a genuine issue of material fact in dispute precluding summary judgment. View "Hussein v. Showplace Wood Products Inc." on Justia Law