Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The county commission in a South Dakota county adopted an ordinance amending its zoning regulations. The key change was to substitute the “board of adjustment” in place of the “county commission” and “planning and zoning board” as the authority to consider conditional use permit (CUP) applications and variances. Save Centennial Valley Association, a local group, submitted a petition to the county auditor seeking to refer the ordinance to a public vote, arguing that the amendments were legislative actions subject to referendum under state law. The auditor, after consulting with the commission, rejected the petition, determining the ordinance was administrative and not subject to referendum. The petitioners then requested a writ of mandamus from the circuit court to compel the auditor to refer the ordinance to a vote.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Lawrence County, considered the pleadings and granted judgment on the pleadings to the county, denying the request for mandamus. The court found that the ordinance did not constitute a legislative decision and was therefore not subject to the referendum process. The petitioners appealed this determination.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the matter de novo, considering whether the ordinance was legislative or administrative under SDCL 7-18A-15.1. The court held that the ordinance merely executed a plan already adopted by the governing body or by the Legislature and did not create a new rule or policy. The court also clarified that decisions on CUPs, whether made by the commission or the board of adjustment, are quasi-judicial and not subject to referendum. Therefore, the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that the ordinance was an administrative decision not subject to the referendum process, and the petitioners were not entitled to mandamus relief. View "Save Centennial Valley Association v. Mcgruder" on Justia Law

A California company repurposed decommissioned military bunkers in South Dakota as survival shelters, offering them for sale or long-term lease. In 2020, an individual entered into a 99-year lease with the company for one of these bunkers, paying $35,000 upfront. The lease agreement incorporated a set of community rules, which the company reserved the right to modify with 30 days’ written notice. In 2021, the company amended the rules to expressly prohibit the brandishing of firearms except in designated areas. In 2023, the lessee was alleged to have brandished a firearm during an altercation, prompting the company to issue notices to vacate and, ultimately, to file a forcible entry and detainer action when the lessee secured the bunker but refused to return possession.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Fall River County granted summary judgment in favor of the lessee. The court reasoned that the lease was illusory because the company could unilaterally modify the rules at any time, leaving the lessee with no recourse. The court concluded that this rendered the entire lease void and unenforceable, thereby preventing the company from evicting the lessee under the lease.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the circuit court’s summary judgment order. The Supreme Court held that the lease agreement was supported by valid consideration and was not illusory merely because the company retained the right to modify community rules, as such modifications were constrained by requirements of reasonableness and good faith. The Court ruled that the ability to modify rules, when exercised subject to notice and implied duties of good faith and fair dealing, does not make the underlying contract unenforceable. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Vivos Xpoint v. Sindorf" on Justia Law

Leslie and Karen Turgeon own property in Spearfish, South Dakota, which can only be accessed by the Thoen Stone Road. The City of Spearfish owns the Thoen Stone Monument and the surrounding parkland, and has maintained a locked gate at the northern entrance of the Road for over forty years, providing keys to certain property owners, including the Turgeons. The Turgeons occasionally experienced issues with the key, hindering their access. They filed a declaratory action seeking a determination that the Road is a public right-of-way, asking the court to order the City to remove the gate and any other obstructions, and to enjoin the City from restricting access for themselves and the public.The Circuit Court for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Lawrence County, reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court determined that earlier documents (the 1953 Easement, 1971 Agreement, and 1972 Warranty Deed) did not manifest an intent to dedicate the Road for public use. The court found that the 2012 Plat expressly dedicated the Road as a public right-of-way but concluded that the City had not accepted this dedication, either expressly or impliedly, in part because the locked gate was inconsistent with public use. On this basis, the court granted summary judgment to the City and denied all relief to the Turgeons.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision that the Road was not dedicated for public use until the 2012 Plat, and that there was no express acceptance of dedication by the City. However, it reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment regarding implied acceptance, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the City impliedly accepted the dedication of the Road as a public right-of-way. The case was remanded for trial on this issue. View "Turgeon v. City Of Spearfish" on Justia Law

Jay Bryant initiated an action to partition a 40-acre parcel of land, originally conveyed in 1978 to his parents, Lenora and Paul Bryant, as joint tenants. Upon their divorce in 1991, a property settlement stipulated that Paul would receive the parcel as his own, and Lenora would receive a different property. Although the divorce decree incorporated this agreement, Lenora never deeded her interest in the 40 acres to Paul. Paul subsequently transferred his interest to a third party, who then conveyed the property to Jay and his brother Jed. After Paul’s death in 2021 and during probate, a title report revealed that Lenora still legally owned an undivided one-half interest in the property.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Meade County, allowed Jay to amend his complaint to add Lenora and bifurcated the quiet title and partition actions. At trial, the court took judicial notice of the divorce file and stipulation and reviewed the chain of warranty deeds. After considering testimony and evidence, the circuit court found that Jay and Jed had a legal interest in the property and that Lenora’s claim was inconsistent with her prior agreement. The court applied judicial estoppel to preclude Lenora from asserting a continuing interest, extinguished her claim, and quieted title in favor of Jay and Jed. The court issued a final judgment on the quiet title action under SDCL 15-6-54(b).The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the appeal. It held that Jay had standing under SDCL 21-41-1 to pursue a quiet title action and that the claim was not barred by the 20-year statute of limitations in SDCL 15-2-6. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s application of judicial estoppel, concluding Lenora was precluded from asserting an ownership interest after accepting the benefits of the stipulated property settlement. The circuit court’s judgment quieting title in favor of Jay and Jed was affirmed. View "Bryant v. Bryant" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a property in Sioux Falls owned by Charles and Heather Gustafson, located near the intersection of 41st Street and Carolyn Avenue. The State of South Dakota initiated a condemnation action in 2020 to acquire portions of the Gustafsons’ property for the reconstruction of the Interstate 29 and 41st Street interchange. As part of the project, the State permanently closed the intersection of 41st Street and Carolyn Avenue, eliminating the most direct access route from 41st Street to the Gustafsons’ property. The Gustafsons asserted that this closure significantly impaired access to their property, diminishing its value, particularly for high-traffic commercial uses.The Second Judicial Circuit Court reviewed the case after the Gustafsons argued that the loss of access was compensable. Following a court trial, the circuit court found the Gustafsons had a special right of access to 41st Street through the Carolyn Avenue intersection, that the closure caused a substantial impairment unique to their property, and that the injury was peculiar, not merely shared by the general public. The court therefore ruled that the change in access was compensable and the Gustafsons were entitled to seek just compensation for this loss. The State appealed, challenging these conclusions.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the circuit court’s decision. It held that the Gustafsons did not retain a special right of access to 41st Street or the Carolyn Avenue intersection, as their predecessors had relinquished such rights in a 1958 agreement. The Court further determined that the closure did not substantially impair the Gustafsons’ reasonable access to the general road system, and any inconvenience or increased travel distance was shared by the public at large, not unique to their property. As a result, the closure was not compensable. View "Dept. of Transportation v. Gustafson" on Justia Law

A married couple with two minor children experienced significant changes in their financial and professional circumstances during their marriage. The husband started several businesses, including an insurance agency and other ventures with local investors. In early 2023, he faced serious legal and regulatory issues, including a large default judgment and revocation of his insurance and gaming licenses, followed by criminal indictments. Amid these developments, the wife discovered evidence of his extramarital affair and initiated divorce proceedings, seeking an equitable division of marital property and debts. During the divorce, the husband retained counsel and used marital funds to commence a lawsuit against his former business partners to recover money he had invested in their shared businesses.The divorce case was tried in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Lincoln County, South Dakota. Both parties disputed the classification and valuation of assets, notably the pending lawsuit. The husband argued that the lawsuit should be treated as his separate property due to an alleged pretrial agreement. The wife disputed the existence of such an agreement and asserted that the lawsuit was a marital asset. The circuit court found no binding agreement on the lawsuit’s classification, treated the pending lawsuit as marital property, valued it at $350,000 based on the invested retainer and a percentage of the claimed amount, and assigned it to the husband.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in classifying the pending lawsuit as marital property subject to equitable division. The Supreme Court found that the valuation of the lawsuit was not clearly erroneous, as it reasonably reflected the evidence presented at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decisions regarding classification and valuation, and granted the wife’s request for appellate attorney fees. View "King v. King" on Justia Law

The City sought to condemn two portions of property owned by Johnson Properties, located at the intersection of Arrowhead Parkway and Six Mile Road in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, as part of a road realignment project. The property housed the Alibi Bar & Grill, and the City's action resulted in the loss of direct access from Arrowhead Parkway to the business. The City initially offered $32,454 for the property interests, later increasing its offer to $250,000. Johnson Properties rejected these offers, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial solely on the issue of just compensation, with Johnson Properties’ appraiser valuing the loss at $405,000 and the City’s appraiser at $51,711.After a three-day trial in the Second Judicial Circuit Court, the jury awarded Johnson Properties $382,600, which was more than 20% above the City’s final offer. Johnson Properties subsequently moved for attorney fees pursuant to SDCL 21-35-23, submitting evidence of a contingent fee agreement and customary regional practices in eminent domain litigation. The City did not contest the statutory entitlement to fees, the hours worked, or the hourly rate, but argued that the lodestar calculation of $61,740 was sufficient and objected to any enhancement based on the contingency arrangement.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed whether the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding $139,724.60 in attorney fees. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court properly began with the lodestar method and then applied the Kelley factors, including the specialized nature of eminent domain law, customary contingent fee practices, and the substantial results obtained. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the circuit court’s award of $139,724.60 in attorney fees. View "City Of Sioux Falls v. Johnson Properties" on Justia Law

RTI, LLC and RTI Holdings, LLC sought to construct a specialized clinical research facility in Brookings, South Dakota, designed for animal health research trials with stringent air filtration and ventilation requirements. Acting as the general contractor, RTI hired designArc Group, Inc. as architect and several contractors, including Pro Engineering, Inc., Ekern Home Equipment Company, FM Acoustical Tile, Inc., and Trane U.S. Inc., to design and build the facility. After completion in April 2016, RTI experienced significant issues with air pressure, ventilation, and ceiling integrity, leading to contamination problems that disrupted research and resulted in financial losses.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Brookings County, reviewed RTI’s claims for breach of contract and breach of implied warranties against the architect and contractors. All defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that RTI’s claims were based on professional negligence and required expert testimony, which RTI failed to provide. The circuit court agreed, finding RTI’s CEO unqualified as an expert, and granted summary judgment to all defendants. The court also denied RTI’s motion to amend its complaint to add negligence claims, deeming the amendment untimely and futile due to the lack of expert testimony.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the summary judgment for designArc, Pro Engineering, and FM Acoustical, holding that expert testimony was required for claims involving specialized design and construction issues, and that RTI’s CEO was not qualified to provide such testimony. However, the court reversed the summary judgment for Trane and Ekern, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding Trane’s alleged faulty installation and Ekern’s potential vicarious liability. The court also reversed the denial of RTI’s motion to amend the complaint, concluding the proposed amendments were not futile and would not prejudice Trane or Ekern. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "RTI, LLC v. Pro Engineering" on Justia Law

Jeremy and Abbey Coyle brought a civil trespass action against Kenneth and Kelli McFarland, alleging that a portion of the McFarlands’ driveway and vehicles encroached on the Coyles’ property, Lot Q1, in Belle Fourche, South Dakota. The dispute centered on whether a public right-of-way (Walworth Street) extended along the entire southeastern boundary of the McFarlands’ Lot 25A, which would affect the property boundaries and the alleged trespass. The Coyles claimed the right-of-way ended at a certain point, while the McFarlands argued it continued along the full boundary, relying on subdivision plats, improvement agreements, and city ordinances.After the Coyles filed their complaint, the McFarlands answered and asserted their defense based on the Subdivision Improvements Agreement and city records. The Coyles then moved for partial summary judgment before any discovery had occurred. The McFarlands failed to respond within the statutory deadline and subsequently moved for a continuance under SDCL 15-6-56(f), submitting affidavits explaining the need for additional discovery and citing personal circumstances for the delay. The Circuit Court for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Butte County, denied the continuance and granted partial summary judgment to the Coyles, finding the right-of-way ended as the Coyles claimed and ordering the McFarlands to remove their assets from Lot Q1. The court later denied the McFarlands’ motion for reconsideration and motion for relief from judgment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying the McFarlands’ motion for a continuance. The Supreme Court found that the McFarlands’ affidavits met the requirements for additional time under Rule 56(f), that excusable neglect was present due to counsel’s personal circumstances, and that no prejudice to the Coyles was shown. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "Coyle v. Mcfarland" on Justia Law

Dakota Bay, LLC owns property adjacent to McCook Lake in Union County, South Dakota, and planned to construct a canal connecting its land to the lake. To facilitate this, Dakota Bay’s owner, Michael Chicoine, applied for a shoreline alteration permit and a water permit to use an existing irrigation well to fill and maintain the canal. The McCook Lake Recreation Area Association, which holds a permit to pump water from the Missouri River into McCook Lake, opposed the project. The Association argued that constructing the canal would require a permit to appropriate water from McCook Lake and that the canal would increase water loss from the lake, potentially impairing the Association’s ability to maintain lake levels.The South Dakota Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources Water Management Board held hearings and ultimately denied the Association’s petition for a declaratory ruling, finding that the canal’s construction would not constitute an appropriation of water from McCook Lake. The Board also granted Dakota Bay’s application to use well water for the canal, finding that unappropriated water was available, the use was beneficial and in the public interest, and that it would not unlawfully impair existing water rights. The Association appealed both decisions to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, which affirmed the Board’s rulings and also upheld the Board’s decision to quash subpoenas issued by the Association.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s decisions. The Court held that constructing the canal would not result in an appropriation of water from McCook Lake and thus did not require a water appropriation permit. The Court also held that Dakota Bay’s proposed use of well water for the canal was a beneficial use in the public interest and that the Board did not abuse its discretion in quashing the subpoenas, clarifying that administrative proceedings are governed by the Administrative Procedures Act, not the rules of civil procedure. View "Mccook Lake Recreation Area V. Dakota Bay, LLC" on Justia Law