Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Mother executed a power of attorney that appointed her son (Son) as her attorney-in-fact. Mother held a life estate in several properties to which her daughters (Daughters) held remainder interests. Prior to Mother’s death in 2013, Son had been leasing from Mother the land in which Daughters held remainder interests. In 2014, Daughters initiated this suit alleging that Son had breached his farmland lease by failing to pay rent on the property in which they received their remainder interests. The Estate also brought suit alleging that Son breached the fiduciary duties he owed to Mother. Prior to trial, the court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude extrinsic evidence of Mother’s intent with regards to the power of attorney. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Daughters on the breach of contract claim and in favor of the Estate on the breach of fiduciary duty claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it prevented Son from introducing relevant evidence related to, inter alia, the circumstances surrounding Mother’s arrangement of leasing her land to her family without charging rent. Remanded for a new trial. View "Hein v. Zoss" on Justia Law

A landowner’s successor in interest, a landowner’s straw man, and judgment lien creditors engaged in competing attempts to redeem in two mortgage foreclosures. The successor in interest successfully redeemed from a judgment lien creditor in the first foreclosure, but a senior mortgagee started a second foreclosure. A second judgment lien creditor redeemed in the second foreclosure, and the second foreclosure court concluded that the landowner and successor in interest waived the right to an owner’s final right of redemption. On appeal from the second foreclosure court’s waiver ruling, the landowner and successor in interest lost the land to the second judgment lien creditor. In the first foreclosure court, the successor in interest and landowner made equitable claims for the recovery of redemption money paid and still in the custody of the sheriff. The circuit court concluded that the landowner and successor in interest had no equitable claim to the money and awarded the money on deposit to the judgment lien creditor from who the redemption had been made. The landowner and successor in interest appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "Farmpro Services, Inc. v. Finneman" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Sully County Board of Adjustment granted a conditional use permit (CUP) to Ring-Neck Energy & Feed, LLC for an ethanol plant. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the circuit court alleging that the Board’s decision granting the CUP was illegal. Ring-Neck Energy intervened and moved to quash the writ and dismiss the petition as untimely. The circuit court determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the petition was untimely under S.D. Codified Laws 11-2-61. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioners failed timely to appeal the Board’s decision to grant a CUP to Ring-Neck Energy. View "Hyde v. Sully County Bd. of Adjustment" on Justia Law

In 2007, Brant Lake enacted an ordinance regulating the use of public and private sewers and requiring connection to the public sewer. In 2014, Brant Lake notified Steven and Gloria Thornberry that, pursuant to the ordinance, they must install suitable toilet and sanitation facilities in their dwelling and connect those facilities to the main public sewer line within sixty days. When the Thornberrys had no taken any steps to connect to the main sewer system over a year later, Brant Lake brought this action seeking to enjoin the Thornberrys from using or occupying their property until they connected their dwelling to Brant Lake’s sewer line. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Thornberrys, concluding that the ordinance did not apply to the Thornberrys. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Brant Lake’s ordinances, as written, did not require the Thornberrys to connect to its public sewer system. View "Brant Lake Sanitary Dist. v. Thornberry" on Justia Law

At issue in this dispute was property that consisted of a one-car garage and the land on which it sat. The dispute involved several properties, including Lot 8A, the property formerly owned by Rocky Mattson, who used and maintained the garage. Ron Underhill, the record owner of the other properties involved in this dispute, brought suit against Mattson, Mattson's wife, and Carmen Walton, the current record owner of Lot 8A, to quiet title to the disputed property. Underhill also sought damages and punitive damages on the ground that Walton’s use of the garage amounted to conversion. The trial court concluded that Walton had acquired the disputed property by adverse possession through her predecessors in interest and that Underhill’s conversion claim was moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Underhill’s claims for quiet title and conversion. View "Underhill v. Mattson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and Defendants owned abutting properties. This lawsuit centered on the drainage of water from Defendants’ property onto Plaintiffs’ property. Specifically, Plaintiffs contended that Defendants caused an increased amount of drainage on Plaintiffs’ land by altering the natural flow of water across Defendants’ land. After a jury trial, Plaintiffs were awarded $9,950 in damages. Defendants requested judgment as a matter of law, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to offer proof that Defendants caused the increase in drainage. The court denied the motions. The court subsequently granted Plaintiffs a permanent injunction ordering Defendants to pay an additional $28,936 to Plaintiffs for repairs and preventive landscaping. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err by Defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law, as Plaintiffs’ testimony was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that Defendants caused the water invasion; and (2) erred in granting the injunction, as S.D. Codified Laws 21-8-14 did not authorize the first half of the injunction, and, even if it did, the second half of the injunction was overbroad and an abuse of discretion. View "Magner v. Brinkman" on Justia Law

Attorney Irene Schrunk represented Mary Ellen Nylen in a divorce and was involved subsequent legal matters regarding Mary Ellen and her new husband, Mark Nylen. When Mark served Mary Ellen with a summons and complaint for divorce, Schrunk advised Mary Ellen that Schrunk could not represent her because Schrunk had represented Mark in the past. On July 31, 2014, Mary Ellen’s adult children, Molly and Brendon, commenced this action against Mary Ellen seeking a declaration that Mary Ellen had gifted them personal property. Molly and Brendon sought to depose Schrunk regarding communications she had with Mary Ellen between November 1, 2013, and December 31, 2014. Mary Ellen moved to prohibit the discovery, citing the attorney-client privilege protected the communications. The circuit court determined that the initial communications were privileged but did not extend the privilege to communications and documents shared with Schrunk after January 1, 2014. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Mary Ellen failed to meet her burden of proving entitlement to the attorney-client privilege after January 1, 2014, and Mary Ellen waived the privilege with respect to certain documents when she shared with Schrunk privileged communications between Mary Ellen and her current attorneys. View "Nylen v. Nylen" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the homestead exemption’s prohibition on the collection of real property taxes under S.D. Codified Laws 43-31. In January 2014, prior to turning seventy years old, John Reints filed an application for a prohibition on the collection of real property taxes assessed on his home in 2013. Pennington County denied Reints’s request because he had not turned seventy prior to January 1, 2014. The Department upheld the determination, determining that the prohibition does not apply to taxes assessed prior to the year in which the applicant reaches seventy years of age. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding (1) once a prohibition is granted under chapter 43-31 a county is restrained from collecting any real property taxes on the applicant’s single-family dwelling, regardless of when those taxes were assessed; (2) nevertheless, an applicant cannot establish a base year under the exemption until he actually reaches the age of seventy; (3) because Reints was only sixty-nine years old when he submitted his application, he had not established a base year as required by section 43-31-32; and (4) therefore, Reints’s application was properly denied. View "Reints v. Pennington County" on Justia Law

Matthew and Caralynn Fonder purchased a home and obtained a mortgage from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Wells Fargo selected Wells Fargo Insurance, Inc. Flood Services (WFFS) to conduct a flood hazard determination on the Fonders’ home. WFFS determined the home was not in a special flood hazard area, and therefore, the Bank did not require the Fonders to obtain flood insurance. A flood later destroyed the Fonders’ home. Wells Fargo later filed a complaint to foreclose on the Fonders’ home. The Fonders cross-claimed against WFFS seeking to recover damages sustained a result of their reliance on WFFS’s erroneous flood determination. The circuit court dismissed the cross-claim for failure to state a claim and dismissed the Fonders’ motion to amend their third-party complaint to assert a claim of negligent misrepresentation on the grounds that WFFS did not owe the Fonders a duty. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred when it dismissed the Fonders’ claims for professional negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress but did not err in dismissing the Fonders’ breach-of-fiduciary duty claim; and (2) upon remand, the Fonders may amend their cross-claim to include negligent misrepresentation. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Fonder" on Justia Law

Matthew and Caralynn Fonder purchased a home and obtained a mortgage from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Wells Fargo selected Wells Fargo Insurance, Inc. Flood Services (WFFS) to conduct a flood hazard determination on the Fonders’ home. WFFS determined the home was not in a special flood hazard area, and therefore, the Bank did not require the Fonders to obtain flood insurance. A flood later destroyed the Fonders’ home. Wells Fargo later filed a complaint to foreclose on the Fonders’ home. The Fonders cross-claimed against WFFS seeking to recover damages sustained a result of their reliance on WFFS’s erroneous flood determination. The circuit court dismissed the cross-claim for failure to state a claim and dismissed the Fonders’ motion to amend their third-party complaint to assert a claim of negligent misrepresentation on the grounds that WFFS did not owe the Fonders a duty. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred when it dismissed the Fonders’ claims for professional negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress but did not err in dismissing the Fonders’ breach-of-fiduciary duty claim; and (2) upon remand, the Fonders may amend their cross-claim to include negligent misrepresentation. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Fonder" on Justia Law