Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Brant Lake enacted an ordinance regulating the use of public and private sewers and requiring connection to the public sewer. In 2014, Brant Lake notified Steven and Gloria Thornberry that, pursuant to the ordinance, they must install suitable toilet and sanitation facilities in their dwelling and connect those facilities to the main public sewer line within sixty days. When the Thornberrys had no taken any steps to connect to the main sewer system over a year later, Brant Lake brought this action seeking to enjoin the Thornberrys from using or occupying their property until they connected their dwelling to Brant Lake’s sewer line. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Thornberrys, concluding that the ordinance did not apply to the Thornberrys. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Brant Lake’s ordinances, as written, did not require the Thornberrys to connect to its public sewer system. View "Brant Lake Sanitary Dist. v. Thornberry" on Justia Law

At issue in this dispute was property that consisted of a one-car garage and the land on which it sat. The dispute involved several properties, including Lot 8A, the property formerly owned by Rocky Mattson, who used and maintained the garage. Ron Underhill, the record owner of the other properties involved in this dispute, brought suit against Mattson, Mattson's wife, and Carmen Walton, the current record owner of Lot 8A, to quiet title to the disputed property. Underhill also sought damages and punitive damages on the ground that Walton’s use of the garage amounted to conversion. The trial court concluded that Walton had acquired the disputed property by adverse possession through her predecessors in interest and that Underhill’s conversion claim was moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Underhill’s claims for quiet title and conversion. View "Underhill v. Mattson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and Defendants owned abutting properties. This lawsuit centered on the drainage of water from Defendants’ property onto Plaintiffs’ property. Specifically, Plaintiffs contended that Defendants caused an increased amount of drainage on Plaintiffs’ land by altering the natural flow of water across Defendants’ land. After a jury trial, Plaintiffs were awarded $9,950 in damages. Defendants requested judgment as a matter of law, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to offer proof that Defendants caused the increase in drainage. The court denied the motions. The court subsequently granted Plaintiffs a permanent injunction ordering Defendants to pay an additional $28,936 to Plaintiffs for repairs and preventive landscaping. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err by Defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law, as Plaintiffs’ testimony was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that Defendants caused the water invasion; and (2) erred in granting the injunction, as S.D. Codified Laws 21-8-14 did not authorize the first half of the injunction, and, even if it did, the second half of the injunction was overbroad and an abuse of discretion. View "Magner v. Brinkman" on Justia Law

Attorney Irene Schrunk represented Mary Ellen Nylen in a divorce and was involved subsequent legal matters regarding Mary Ellen and her new husband, Mark Nylen. When Mark served Mary Ellen with a summons and complaint for divorce, Schrunk advised Mary Ellen that Schrunk could not represent her because Schrunk had represented Mark in the past. On July 31, 2014, Mary Ellen’s adult children, Molly and Brendon, commenced this action against Mary Ellen seeking a declaration that Mary Ellen had gifted them personal property. Molly and Brendon sought to depose Schrunk regarding communications she had with Mary Ellen between November 1, 2013, and December 31, 2014. Mary Ellen moved to prohibit the discovery, citing the attorney-client privilege protected the communications. The circuit court determined that the initial communications were privileged but did not extend the privilege to communications and documents shared with Schrunk after January 1, 2014. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Mary Ellen failed to meet her burden of proving entitlement to the attorney-client privilege after January 1, 2014, and Mary Ellen waived the privilege with respect to certain documents when she shared with Schrunk privileged communications between Mary Ellen and her current attorneys. View "Nylen v. Nylen" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the homestead exemption’s prohibition on the collection of real property taxes under S.D. Codified Laws 43-31. In January 2014, prior to turning seventy years old, John Reints filed an application for a prohibition on the collection of real property taxes assessed on his home in 2013. Pennington County denied Reints’s request because he had not turned seventy prior to January 1, 2014. The Department upheld the determination, determining that the prohibition does not apply to taxes assessed prior to the year in which the applicant reaches seventy years of age. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding (1) once a prohibition is granted under chapter 43-31 a county is restrained from collecting any real property taxes on the applicant’s single-family dwelling, regardless of when those taxes were assessed; (2) nevertheless, an applicant cannot establish a base year under the exemption until he actually reaches the age of seventy; (3) because Reints was only sixty-nine years old when he submitted his application, he had not established a base year as required by section 43-31-32; and (4) therefore, Reints’s application was properly denied. View "Reints v. Pennington County" on Justia Law

Matthew and Caralynn Fonder purchased a home and obtained a mortgage from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Wells Fargo selected Wells Fargo Insurance, Inc. Flood Services (WFFS) to conduct a flood hazard determination on the Fonders’ home. WFFS determined the home was not in a special flood hazard area, and therefore, the Bank did not require the Fonders to obtain flood insurance. A flood later destroyed the Fonders’ home. Wells Fargo later filed a complaint to foreclose on the Fonders’ home. The Fonders cross-claimed against WFFS seeking to recover damages sustained a result of their reliance on WFFS’s erroneous flood determination. The circuit court dismissed the cross-claim for failure to state a claim and dismissed the Fonders’ motion to amend their third-party complaint to assert a claim of negligent misrepresentation on the grounds that WFFS did not owe the Fonders a duty. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred when it dismissed the Fonders’ claims for professional negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress but did not err in dismissing the Fonders’ breach-of-fiduciary duty claim; and (2) upon remand, the Fonders may amend their cross-claim to include negligent misrepresentation. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Fonder" on Justia Law

Matthew and Caralynn Fonder purchased a home and obtained a mortgage from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Wells Fargo selected Wells Fargo Insurance, Inc. Flood Services (WFFS) to conduct a flood hazard determination on the Fonders’ home. WFFS determined the home was not in a special flood hazard area, and therefore, the Bank did not require the Fonders to obtain flood insurance. A flood later destroyed the Fonders’ home. Wells Fargo later filed a complaint to foreclose on the Fonders’ home. The Fonders cross-claimed against WFFS seeking to recover damages sustained a result of their reliance on WFFS’s erroneous flood determination. The circuit court dismissed the cross-claim for failure to state a claim and dismissed the Fonders’ motion to amend their third-party complaint to assert a claim of negligent misrepresentation on the grounds that WFFS did not owe the Fonders a duty. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred when it dismissed the Fonders’ claims for professional negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress but did not err in dismissing the Fonders’ breach-of-fiduciary duty claim; and (2) upon remand, the Fonders may amend their cross-claim to include negligent misrepresentation. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Fonder" on Justia Law

Voorhees Cattle Co. brought a foreclosure action against Dakota Feeding Co. (DFC). In answering the complaint, DFC brought a third party complaint against B and B Equipment, Inc. (B&B) for breach of contract. B&B counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and impossibility of performance. After a jury trial, judgment was entered for Voorhees on the foreclosure claim and for B&B on its counterclaims against DFC. DFC satisfied the judgment granted to Voorhees, leaving DFC and B&B as the remaining parties to this appeal. DFC appealed, arguing that evidence admitted at trial violated the attorney-client privilege and that the error prejudicially tainted the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the privileged evidence should not have been allowed, but the evidence did not prove, nor go to the heart of B&B’s claims; and (2) as a result, the erroneous admission of the privileged communications was not unfairly prejudicial to DFC as against B&B. View "Voorhees Cattle Co. v. Dakota Feeding Co." on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over a road located on property owned by David and Roxie Niemi in Fredlund Township. The Neimis brought suit against the Township seeking a declaratory judgment that the portion of Lewton Road that traverses their property is not a public road. After a trial, the circuit court concluded that the Niemis and their predecessors in interest had dedicated the road to the public by implication. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not when in ruling that the entire length of the disputed roadway was a public road by operation of an implied common-law dedication. View "Niemi v. Fredlund Township" on Justia Law

In 2009, 2010, and 2011, the Dowling Family Partnership and Dowling Brothers Partnership (collectively, the Partnerships) entered into a series of cash farm leases with Midland Farms, LLC. The 2012 crop year lease created a right of first refusal held by the Partnerships regarding the 2013, 2014, and 2015 crop years, a right that ripened into an option when Midland received an offer from Clement Farms and relayed the new price to the Partnerships. In 2012, Midland sought a legal determination that the parties had not extended the prior lease. The circuit court concluded that an enforceable contract existed between the Partnerships and Midland, and the Partnerships exercised their right to lease the property for the 2013 through 2015 crop years. The Partnerships were subsequently restored to possession of the leased property. The Partnerships sued Midland a second time seeking damages for being denied possession of the property from August 2012 to March 2013. Midland sought restitution from the Partnerships for the amount it paid to Clement as reimbursement for Clement’s planting expenses. The circuit court concluded that the Partnerships did not suffer damage, Midland was not entitled to restitution, and Midland had unclean hands. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that Midland breached its lease with the Partnerships and that the Partnerships were not unjustly enriched. View "Dowling Family P’ship v. Midland Farms, LLC" on Justia Law