Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2007, four members of the Stabler family - Stan and Rose Stabler, their child, Brad, and Brad’s wife Brenda - brought fraud actions against the First State Bank of Roscoe (FSB) and its president, John Beyers, alleging that FSB and Beyers conspired to induce the Stablers to sign notes and mortgages to pay debt that had been discharged due to bankruptcy. The circuit court rescinded one note and mortgage as to Brad and Brenda and allowed another note with a third-party bank to be enforced against them. After a trial, a jury found that FSB and Beyers fraudulently induced Stan and Rose to sign a promissory note and collateral real estate mortgage. Both sides appealed the circuit court’s judgment with respect to multiple transactions that they engaged in over the years. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court erred in (1) setting aside the $20,000 punitive damage award to Stan and Rose; and (2) ruling that a prior mortgagee that no longer holds any interest in a collateral real estate mortgage may file an addendum for the current mortgagee, and therefore, one collateral real estate mortgage lapsed for failure of the mortgagee, Beyers, to file an addendum. View "Stabler v. First State Bank of Roscoe" on Justia Law

Todd and Joanne Egge placed obstructions on a platted but unimproved service road north of their property. Gary Busselman sued the Egges for damages and sought an injunction to prevent the Egges’ obstruction of the service road, contending that the service road was open to public travel because it had been dedicated and accepted by the City of Sioux Falls and Minnehaha County. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Busselman. The Egges appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in failing to require joinder of the relevant governmental entity responsible for acceptance of the purported dedication. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for joinder of the appropriate governmental entity, holding that, under Thieman v. Bohman, the appropriate governmental entity was an indispensable party to Busselman’s action. View "Busselman v. Egge" on Justia Law

Frank and Josephine Kaberna established two trusts for the equal distribution of real property to their four children: Karen, Frank, Jean, and Don. After Frank and Josephine died, each of the four children, along with their spouses, received a one-fourth undivided interest in the real property. Plaintiffs later brought the underlying partition action against Karen and her husband due to disputes among the family members. The circuit court ultimately adopted a “Modified Maas Plan” that divided the real property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in adopting the Modified Maas Plan. View "Kaberna v. Brown" on Justia Law

Borrower, a hotel, obtained a loan from Bank in exchange for a promissory note and mortgage on the hotel. To further secure the obligation, Bank obtained separate commercial guaranties from individual Guarantors. Borrower subsequently defaulted on the note. Bank filed an amended complaint for foreclosure and receivership against Borrower. Borrower did not answer the complaint, and the circuit court entered a default judgment against Borrower and ordered that the mortgaged premises be sold at public auction. After obtaining the property, Bank filed a complaint against the Guarantors alleging that each Guarantor owed Bank over $3 million and other expenses associated with Bank having to run the hotel. The trial court granted the Guarantors summary judgment, concluding that Bank’s choice to bid the entire amount of Borrower’s obligation at the auction left no deficiency on Borrower’s obligation to Bank, and therefore, there was no indebtedness for the Guarantors to guarantee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the guaranties were unenforceable because the Borrower’s obligation had been extinguished. View "First Dakota Nat’l Bank v. Graham" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant claimed mineral rights to the same 280 acres of U.S. Forest Service land in Lawrence County, South Dakota. Plaintiff filed a complaint to quiet title. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff, concluding that Defendant failed to follow federal and state law regarding the proper location of placer mining claims but that Plaintiff followed all applicable laws and was therefore entitled to the mining claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in deciding that Defendant’s fourteen placer mineral claims on property at issue were invalid; and (2) Defendant’s invalid placer mineral claims did not preclude Plaintiff’s subsequent claims. View "Pete Lien & Sons, Inc. v. Zellmer" on Justia Law

In 1999, James Stadheim entered into a lease with Flack Signs that gave Flack Signs the right to erect advertising signs on Stadheim’s property. The lease provided for a ten-year term. In 2002, Guy Carlson acquired the property, and Lamar Advertising Co. acquired Flack Signs. Carlson began giving mortgages on the property Dacotah Bank. In 2009, Carlson, believing the lease had terminated, entered into a second lease with Lamar that provided a term of fifteen years. In 2012, Carlson defaulted on the mortgages to Dacotah Bank and entered into an agreement for non-judicial voluntary foreclosure. Jermar Properties, LLC purchased the property from Dacotah Bank. Lamar refused to remove its signs at Jermar’s request, claiming it still had a leasehold interest. Jermar brought this quiet title action against Lamar to determine whether Jermar held title to the property free of Lamar’s purported leasehold interest. The circuit court granted judgment for Jermar, finding that the 2009 lease was a novation of the 1999 lease, and therefore, Lamar did not continue to have a leasehold interest by virtue of the 1999 lease that was senior to the mortgage given to Dacotah Bank. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it found that a novation occurred. View "Jermar Props., LLC v. Lamar Advertising Co." on Justia Law

The Department of Social Services (DSS) provided Medicaid benefits to Darlene Hollman while she was in a nursing home. Hollman had an interest in real estate at the time, but DSS did not record a lien on the property for the benefits it had provided until after Hollman died. Hollman’s children challenged the validity of the lien. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of DSS, concluding that an enforceable medical assistance lien was created on the property at the time the nursing home assistance was provided and that Hollman’s interest in the property transferred at death to the children subject to the lien. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) DSS’s medical assistance lien did not attach to Hollman’s interest in the property before her death, and Hollman’s interest passed to her children immediately upon her death; (2) because the lien had not been recorded at the time of Hollman’s death, Hollman had no interest upon which the lien could attach; and (3) therefore, Hollman’s interest passed to her children free of DSS’s lien. View "Hollman v. S.D. Dep’t of Soc. Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff obtained a default judgment against Barker & Little, Inc. (BLI). BLI was a general partner in Barker & Little Limited Partnership III (BLLP) and the operating entity for the management of rental properties, including property titled to BLLP. Doug Hamilton owned BLI, BLLP and Barker & Little Manufactured Homes, Inc. (BLMHI). Great Western Bank extended a line of credit to BLI secured by mobile homes and rent-to-own contracts owned by BLMHI. The Bank later initiated foreclosure proceedings against BLMHI and BLLP. BLI was named as a codefendant in each action. The Bank, however, did not join Plaintiff as a defendant or notify her of the foreclosure actions. The Bank and Hamilton privately negotiated a settlement agreement. When she learned of the Bank’s foreclosure actions, Plaintiff initiated this action against the Bank. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Bank. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff did not have an interest in, or lien on, the foreclosure property on the date the Bank filed its foreclosure actions, and therefore, there were no genuine issues of material fact, and the Bank was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Peters v. Great Western Bank, Inc." on Justia Law

Sister and Brother were co-trustees of a family Trust established by the siblings' parents. Before their mother died, she entered into a contract for deed with Brother for the sale of 480 acres of trust farmland. After the mother died, the siblings stipulated for court supervision of the Trust. Within the Trust action, Sister sued Brother and his wife for undue influence on his contract for deed with their mother. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Brother, concluding that Sister’s claim of undue influence was barred by the statute of limitations and that any oral agreement associated with the contract for deed was barred by the statute of frauds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Sister did not timely bring her claim for undue influence, the circuit court correctly ruled that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) because Sister sought to enforce her asserted interest in the sale of real estate, the circuit court correctly ruled that any oral agreement regarding the real estate was barred by the statute of frauds. View "In re Matheny Family Trust" on Justia Law

The Morris Family LLC (Morris Family) owns certain property abutting U.S. Highway 212 in the City of Watertown. In a 1970 condemnation action against Morris Family’s predecessor in title, the State sought to acquire the necessary “right of way and rights of access” in accordance with its plan to turn Highway 212 into a four-lane, controlled-access highway. The parties to the condemnation action eventually settled. In 2010, Morris Family filed a complaint against the City and State, claiming unconstitutional taking or damaging of property for the loss of access from their property to Highway 212 and violation of due process stemming from the State’s and City’s denial of access. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that the State was granted complete control of access for the land in the 1970 judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the motion for summary judgment was properly before the circuit court and that the court did not err when it granted summary judgment on all claims and dismissed the case. View "Morris Family LLC v. S.D. Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law