Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1999, James Stadheim entered into a lease with Flack Signs that gave Flack Signs the right to erect advertising signs on Stadheim’s property. The lease provided for a ten-year term. In 2002, Guy Carlson acquired the property, and Lamar Advertising Co. acquired Flack Signs. Carlson began giving mortgages on the property Dacotah Bank. In 2009, Carlson, believing the lease had terminated, entered into a second lease with Lamar that provided a term of fifteen years. In 2012, Carlson defaulted on the mortgages to Dacotah Bank and entered into an agreement for non-judicial voluntary foreclosure. Jermar Properties, LLC purchased the property from Dacotah Bank. Lamar refused to remove its signs at Jermar’s request, claiming it still had a leasehold interest. Jermar brought this quiet title action against Lamar to determine whether Jermar held title to the property free of Lamar’s purported leasehold interest. The circuit court granted judgment for Jermar, finding that the 2009 lease was a novation of the 1999 lease, and therefore, Lamar did not continue to have a leasehold interest by virtue of the 1999 lease that was senior to the mortgage given to Dacotah Bank. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it found that a novation occurred. View "Jermar Props., LLC v. Lamar Advertising Co." on Justia Law

The Department of Social Services (DSS) provided Medicaid benefits to Darlene Hollman while she was in a nursing home. Hollman had an interest in real estate at the time, but DSS did not record a lien on the property for the benefits it had provided until after Hollman died. Hollman’s children challenged the validity of the lien. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of DSS, concluding that an enforceable medical assistance lien was created on the property at the time the nursing home assistance was provided and that Hollman’s interest in the property transferred at death to the children subject to the lien. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) DSS’s medical assistance lien did not attach to Hollman’s interest in the property before her death, and Hollman’s interest passed to her children immediately upon her death; (2) because the lien had not been recorded at the time of Hollman’s death, Hollman had no interest upon which the lien could attach; and (3) therefore, Hollman’s interest passed to her children free of DSS’s lien. View "Hollman v. S.D. Dep’t of Soc. Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff obtained a default judgment against Barker & Little, Inc. (BLI). BLI was a general partner in Barker & Little Limited Partnership III (BLLP) and the operating entity for the management of rental properties, including property titled to BLLP. Doug Hamilton owned BLI, BLLP and Barker & Little Manufactured Homes, Inc. (BLMHI). Great Western Bank extended a line of credit to BLI secured by mobile homes and rent-to-own contracts owned by BLMHI. The Bank later initiated foreclosure proceedings against BLMHI and BLLP. BLI was named as a codefendant in each action. The Bank, however, did not join Plaintiff as a defendant or notify her of the foreclosure actions. The Bank and Hamilton privately negotiated a settlement agreement. When she learned of the Bank’s foreclosure actions, Plaintiff initiated this action against the Bank. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Bank. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff did not have an interest in, or lien on, the foreclosure property on the date the Bank filed its foreclosure actions, and therefore, there were no genuine issues of material fact, and the Bank was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Peters v. Great Western Bank, Inc." on Justia Law

Sister and Brother were co-trustees of a family Trust established by the siblings' parents. Before their mother died, she entered into a contract for deed with Brother for the sale of 480 acres of trust farmland. After the mother died, the siblings stipulated for court supervision of the Trust. Within the Trust action, Sister sued Brother and his wife for undue influence on his contract for deed with their mother. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Brother, concluding that Sister’s claim of undue influence was barred by the statute of limitations and that any oral agreement associated with the contract for deed was barred by the statute of frauds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Sister did not timely bring her claim for undue influence, the circuit court correctly ruled that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) because Sister sought to enforce her asserted interest in the sale of real estate, the circuit court correctly ruled that any oral agreement regarding the real estate was barred by the statute of frauds. View "In re Matheny Family Trust" on Justia Law

The Morris Family LLC (Morris Family) owns certain property abutting U.S. Highway 212 in the City of Watertown. In a 1970 condemnation action against Morris Family’s predecessor in title, the State sought to acquire the necessary “right of way and rights of access” in accordance with its plan to turn Highway 212 into a four-lane, controlled-access highway. The parties to the condemnation action eventually settled. In 2010, Morris Family filed a complaint against the City and State, claiming unconstitutional taking or damaging of property for the loss of access from their property to Highway 212 and violation of due process stemming from the State’s and City’s denial of access. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that the State was granted complete control of access for the land in the 1970 judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the motion for summary judgment was properly before the circuit court and that the court did not err when it granted summary judgment on all claims and dismissed the case. View "Morris Family LLC v. S.D. Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

The property at issue in this case was transferred to Deadwood Stage Run, LLC (Developer) in early 2006. On December 18, 2006, the City of Deadwood created Tax Incremental District Number Eight (the District) out of the property. After the City and Developer entered into a contract for private development of the District, Lawrence County sent its 2007 assessment of the property reflecting the most recent assessment of $934,520. The Developer sought a declaratory judgment prospectively establishing the 2006 assessed valuation of the District as the appropriate tax incremental base rather than the 2007 assessed valuation, arguing that the Department of Revenue incorrectly calculated the tax incremental base for the District in the City by using the County’s November 1, 2006 annual assessment rather than the Department’s August 25, 2006 annual Certificate of Assessment, Equalization, and Levy. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in calculating the tax incremental base for a tax incremental district, the Department is statutorily required to use the last aggregate assessed valuation certified by the Department prior to the date of creation of the tax incremental district. View "Deadwood Stage Run, LLC v. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

Terry and Cindy Leonhardt sued Terry’s father, Delbert Leonhardt, for specific performance of an oral lease and right of first refusal. The Leonhardts alleged that they had entered into an oral lease with Delbert whereby they would have the right to lease Delbert’s farmland during the lifetime of Delbert and his wife and that Delbert orally promised them a right of first refusal to purchase the farmland after he and his wife died. The Leonhardts claimed that Delbert breached the agreements when he gave Terry notice of his intent to terminate the Leonardts’ lease. On remand, the circuit court entered judgment against the Leonhardts, concluding that no credible evidence existed to support the existence of a lifetime lease or right of first refusal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err when it ruled that the Leonhardts failed to meet their burden of proof that a lifetime lease and right of first refusal existed. View "Leonhardt v. Leonhardt" on Justia Law

Appellant Merle Temple and Appellee Bradley Gartner owned 3,375 acres of land as tenants in common. After relations between Temple and Gartner deteriorated, Gartner brought an action for partition. After appointing three referees and adopting the referees’ report, the circuit court ordered a partition in kind and ordered Gartner to make a compensatory payment to Temple. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a partition in kind, as Temple did not show that partition in kind would cause great prejudice to the owners; (2) the circuit court did not err in adopting the referees’ report; and (3) the circuit court did not err in refusing to reduce the compensatory payment in favor of allocating additional land to Temple. View "Gartner v. Temple" on Justia Law

Eastern Farmers Cooperative (EFC) applied for and was granted a conditional use permit to build and operate an agronomy facility on sixty acres of land near Colton, South Dakota. Appellants’ residence was directly across a county road from the proposed facility. Appellants appealed. The Minnehaha County Commission upheld the decision to grant the conditional use permit to EFC, as did the circuit court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the County Commission’s decision to uphold the approval of the permit was not arbitrary and capricious in violation of Appellants’ due process rights; and (2) any alleged due process concerns arising out of a certain commissioner’s participation in the County Commission’s action were remedied by invalidating that commissioner’s vote. View "Hanson v. Minnehaha County Comm'n" on Justia Law

Atlas Hydraulics, Inc. constructed an addition to its manufacturing plant on the side of its existing building that abutted residential property owned by Sherri Strong. After years of enduring water flow from the Atlas property onto her property, Strong sued Atlas for nuisance, negligence, and negligence per se and also filed a motion for preliminary and permanent injunctions. The circuit court granted both the preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting Atlas from allowing surface water to uncontrollably discharge onto Strong’s property in a manner that would threaten Strong’s property and residential structure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding primarily that the circuit court did not misapply the relevant statutes and case law in granting an injunction regarding ground water nuisance. View "Strong v. Atlas Hydraulics, Inc." on Justia Law