Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Kreisers Inc., a Subchapter S corporation, hired First Dakota Title to assist it with a like-kind property exchange in order to receive tax deferred benefits under 26 U.S.C. 1031. The like-kind exchange partially failed. Kreisers subsequently sued First Dakota for negligence and negligent misrepresentation. The circuit court rejected Kreiser’s negligent misrepresentation claim but determined that First Dakota was negligent in assisting Kreisers with the exchange. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in applying tort law rather than contract law to determine the duty that First Dakota owed to Kreisers; (2) did not err in concluding that Kreisers was not contributorily negligent; and (3) did not err in its calculation of damages. View "Kreisers Inc. v. First Dakota Title Ltd. P’ship" on Justia Law

After Elliott defaulted on his mortgage GMAC Mortgage sued to foreclose. The circuit court granted GMAC summary judgment on his right to foreclose, finding (1) Freddie Mac was the owner of the promissory note (Note), and GMAC was the Note’s holder and servicer; and (2) GMAC, as holder and service, had authority to enforce the Note. Elliott appealed, arguing that GMAC lacked standing at the time it initiated foreclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by granting GMAC’s motion for summary judgment because GMAC ultimately provided a properly indorsed bearer Note, mortgage, and evidence of default, thus providing evidence that GMAC had standing. View "Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Elliott" on Justia Law

Shane Liebig testified that he and Edward Kirchoff orally agreed that Kirchoff would purchase real property and later convey it to Liebig on certain terms. When Kirchoff did not convey the property to Liebig, Liebig sued for enforcement of the alleged purchase agreement and for fraud and deceit. Kirchoff counterclaimed, alleging unjust enrichment/quantum meruit. After a bench trial, the circuit court ruled that Liebig failed to establish a contractual right to purchase the property. A jury decided the remaining claims. The jury awarded Liebig compensatory and punitive damages on his fraud-and-deceit claim and awarded Kirchoff damages on his unjust enrichment/quantum meruit claim. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the parties never reached a meeting of the minds as to the material terms of the contract; (2) the circuit court did not err in denying Kirchoff’s motion for summary judgment on Liebig’s fraud-and-deceit claim; and (3) the jury’s award of damages on the fraud-and-deceit claim exceeded the amount Liebig was entitled to claim. Remanded for a new trial on damages related to Liebig’s fraud-and-deceit claim. View "Leibig v. Kirchoff" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned property located in Lincoln County that was unplatted and zoned for agricultural use. The property owner voluntarily petitioned for its annexation to the City of Sioux Falls. Sioux Falls subsequently adopted an annexation resolution under S.D. Codified Laws 9-4-1 annexing the property to be developed for a Walmart store. Neighbors of the property, joined as “Save Our Neighborhood,” petitioned the circuit court for writs of prohibition and certiorari, seeking to invalidate the City’s annexation resolution and to prohibit the City from rezoning the property. Petitioners argued that S.D. Codified Laws 9-4-5 required the City to obtain approval from the Lincoln County Board of County Commissioners before adopting a rule to annex the property. The circuit court denied the petitions. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Petitioners’ writs of certiorari and prohibition, holding that the Legislature did not intend section 9-4-5 to apply to a resolution adopted for a voluntary petition for annexation under section 9-4-1. View "Save our Neighborhood v. City of Sioux Falls" on Justia Law

In 1980, Joseph and C. Elaine Lingscheit transferred 240 acres in fee simple to their seven children. In 2001, the Lingscheits executed a warranty deed conveying in fee simple 240 acres to their son, Brian. The 2001 deed, however, mistakenly conveyed 80 acres that had previously been conveyed to all seven children. The Lingscheits held only a life estate interest in these 80 acres. During the probate proceedings, the children learned their parents had twice transferred the 80-acre tract of land and that their parents owned, in fee simple, a different 80-acre tract of land that was never transferred. Two siblings, Brian and Bradley, brought suit against the remaining siblings asking the circuit court to reform and revise the 2001 warranty deed, contending that the Lingscheits intended to convey to Brian the 80 acres owned by the Lingscheits in fee simple. The trial court declined to reform the 2001 deed and ruled that this deed transferred to Brian a life estate interest in 80 acres. The SupremeCourt affirmed, holding that Brian did not present clear and convincing evidence that the 2001 deed failed to express the intent of the Lingscheits. View "Hines v. Hines" on Justia Law

In 2003, Appellants entered into a mortgage with Countrywide Home Loans that secured a promissory note in the amount of $165,750 and encumbered certain property. Plaintiffs later refinanced the loan by executing a promissory note in favor of Countrywide in the amount of $236,900 and executed a mortgage in the property in favor of BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP. In 2009, Appellants defaulted under the terms of the subject note and mortgage. In 2011, BAC filed an amended complaint to foreclose the mortgage. The circuit court granted BAC’s motion for summary judgment. The court also awarded attorney fees to BAC and reformed the mortgage by changing the legal description. The property was subsequently sold to BAC at a sheriff’s sale. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in granting BAC summary judgment to foreclose the mortgage; (2) the circuit court did not err in awarding BAC attorney fees and costs; and (3) the circuit court’s revision of the mortgage reflected the true intention of the parties and therefore, was not error. View "BAC Homes Loans Servicing, LP v. Trancynger" on Justia Law

In 1967, Severt Kvalheim conveyed certain real property to Gordon Holsti by warranty deed. Kvalheim reserved fifty percent of the mineral rights for himself. That same year, Kvalheim executed a will devising to each of his heirs a one-eighth interest in his estate. Kvalheim died in 1969. In 2007, Gordon Holsti conveyed the surface estate to his sons (the Holstis). Believing Kvalheim’s mineral interest had lapsed and been abandoned because of nonuse, the Holstis published a notice of lapse of mineral interest in the official county newspaper. When no one filed a statement of claim asserting ownership of the mineral interest severed from the property, the Holstis brought a quiet title action. The circuit court ruled that the Holstis were the owners of the entire mineral interest, concluding (1) Kvalheim’s mineral interest had been abandoned under section S.D. Codified Laws 43-30A-2, -3; and (2) the Holstis gave proper notice of the lapse of the mineral interest even though they did not serve notice of the lapse on Kvalheim’s heirs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the mineral interests were not abandoned under section 43-30A-2. Remanded. View "Holsti v. Kimber" on Justia Law

Belmont, Inc., a meat and produce business, leased unfinished commercial real estate space from Tri-City Associates, LP, the owner and developer of a shopping center. The parties later filed claims against each other for breach of the lease. After a court trial, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Belmont on all claims, concluding that Tri-City materially breached the lease by failing to deliver the space in “broom clean” condition and failing to complete its allocated portion of the initiated construction, and that these failures excused Belmont from performance. Tri-City appealed, arguing, among other things, that it was excused by Belmont’s failure to give notice of the breach and an opportunity to cure under a notice-and-cure provision in the lease. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that conflicting authority and the circuit court’s failure to address the notice-and-cure provision prevented effective appellate review. Remanded to the circuit court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law on the effect of Belmont’s failure to give notice of breach and an opportunity to cure. View "Tri-City Assocs., LP v. Belmont, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a continuing dispute between Appellants, David and Connie Finneman and Rock Creek Farms Partnership (RCF), and Ann Arnoldy concerning the ownership of 16,700 acres of farmland. After a series of lawsuits, appeals, and various filings, the circuit court granted Arnoldy equitable ownership of the real estate outlined in two contracts for deed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, primarily, that the circuit court did not err in granting Arnoldy equitable ownership of the real estate in the contracts for deed and the right to cure the contracts for deed default under S.D. Codified Laws 21-50-3. View "L&L P’ship v. Rock Creek Farms" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant for specific performance of Plaintiff’s option to purchase a ranch owned by Defendant. Defendant counterclaimed, alleging that Plaintiff owed him rent. After a trial, the circuit court (1) denied Plaintiff’s request for specific performance, concluding that Plaintiff had not performed all the conditions precedent on his part; and (2) concluded that the parties had an implied or express contract requiring Plaintiff to pay Defendant rent. The Supreme Court (1) held that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding Plaintiff was the party who was materially at fault for the failure of the conditions and in therefore denying specific performance, but because the record did not reflect that the court considered whether specific performance was appropriate under the exception set forth in S.D. Codified Laws 21-9-5, the case was remanded for reconsideration of specific performance under this exception; and (2) the circuit court erred in concluding that either an express or an implied contract required Plaintiff to pay rent. View "Humble v. Wyant" on Justia Law