Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants owned three lots in the Eagle Crest subdivision adjacent to the Eagle Ridge Estates (Eagle Ridge) subdivision. Defendants' predecessor in title obtained a private access easement from the prior owners of Eagle Ridge, which allowed Defendants to access their property in Eagle Crest by way of roads running through Eagle Ridge. In exchange, the grantee of the easement agreed to pay an annual general road assessment for each lot. The Eagle Ridge Homeowners Association (Association) brought suit against Defendants for their failure to pay general assessments for three assessment years. Defendants argued that the Association only had authority to assess general road assessments against them and not general assessments. Ultimately, the trial court found in favor of the Association and awarded attorney fees, finding that the expenditures made by the Association were associated with roads. The Supreme Court affirmed on all issues with the exception of the Association's request for certain attorney fees because of contradictory findings and conclusions by the trial court. Remanded. View "Eagle Ridge Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In 1994, Plaintiff granted a drainage easement to Pennington County on land he owned. In 1996, silt began to accumulate near the bottom of the canyon on part of Plaintiff's land due to the County's repair of a section of road abutting Plaintiff's land. In 2010, Plaintiff filed suit against the County for nuisance, constructive taking, trespass, and unlawful taking. The trial court granted summary judgment for the County, determining that there was no continuing tort and that the statute of limitations had run. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for the County, as the County's actions did not constitute a continuing tort, and thus, Plaintiff's action was untimely filed. View "Brandt v. County of Pennington" on Justia Law

Curley Haisch and his wife Rose owned Mulehead Ranch. Joe Duling was the Haisches' financial advisor as well as a realtor and broker. When Curley was ninety years old, he decided to sell the ranch and signed a listing agreement with Joe. Approximately one year later, Joe suggested that Curley and Rose form a charitable remainder trust (Trust) into which the ranch and chattels could be gifted. Curley and Rose executed the Trust, to which the Ranch was transferred. The Trustee then sold the Ranch to Joe and Lynne Duling. Later, it was discovered that the Trust contained multiple defects. The Trustee brought suit against the Dulings, their businesses, and the Mulehead Ranch on behalf of the Trust and the Haisches. The complaint alleged negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duties. A jury found in favor of the Trust awarded Plaintiffs $1,568,200, including punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for a new trial on damages, holding (1) the circuit court erred in failing to give a proper instruction on the statutes of limitation applicable to Plaintiffs' claims for future tax consequences related to the defects in the Trust; and (2) the court did not err in the remainder of its judgment. View "Bailey v. Duling" on Justia Law

The City of Rapid City applied a deicer to the streets adjacent to property owned by the Ruperts. The Ruperts sued the City, claiming that the deicer ran onto their property and destroyed several pine trees. The trial court granted the Ruperts' motion for summary judgment on their inverse condemnation claim, and a jury awarded the Ruperts $126,530 to compensate them for the damage to their property. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Ruperts on their inverse condemnation claim, but the measure of damages used at trial for purposes of calculating the just compensation award was erroneous; (2) the trial court properly denied the Ruperts' request for attorney fees; and (3) the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City on the Ruperts' claims of negligence and trespass did not constitute reversible error. Remanded for a new trial on damages. View "Rupert v. City of Rapid City" on Justia Law

In 1967, Raymond and Margaret Becker's eight child inherited an undivided one-eighth interest in patented fee land located within the boundaries of the Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Reservation. None of the Beckers were Indians. In 2006, one of the Becker children sold her interest to Patrick and Carletta Aberle. Patrick was a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, and Carletta was a non-Indian. Due to certain conveyances, Patrick and Carletta each owned an undivided one-sixteenth interest in the property. The Becker children later commenced this action seeking a sale of the entire property. The Aberles counterclaimed for partition. Patrick also contended that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute because he was a member of the Tribe, which had jurisdiction. The circuit court ordered a sale of the entire property, concluding that state jurisdiction did not infringe upon tribal sovereignty. In considering the state-tribal jurisdiction issue, the Supreme Court noted that a determination of the disputed land's alienability was necessary. The Court then remanded the matter to the circuit court to reconsider the jurisdiction question after further development of a factual record and consideration of land alienation cases. View "McGuire v. Aberle" on Justia Law

Walter Henderson brought a quiet title action to claim ownership of an undivided thirty percent interest in a mineral estate. Following a court trial, which confirmed Walter's ownership of the mineral interest in fee, Walter's half-sister, Susan Henderson, individually and as representative of her deceased mother, Dora Henderson, appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that Walter's cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations under S.D. Codified Laws 15-2-13(1) and 15-3-2. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly quieted title in Walter's favor and concluded that Walter was the owner of the thirty percent mineral interest described in an agreement between Walter and his father. View "Estate of Henderson v. Estate of Henderson" on Justia Law

Terry Leonhardt and his wife, Cindy, alleged that they entered into an oral lease with Terry's father, Delbert Leonhardt, which was to extend for the lives of Delbert and his wife, Ellen. They claimed the oral lease contained a right of first refusal that Terry could exercise after the death of both Delbert and Ellen. Delbert later entered into a written lease with his grandson, Matthew Oswald. The written lease encompassed some of the farmland Terry and Cindy alleged was part of their oral lease with Delbert. Terry and Cindy initiated a declaratory judgment action against Delbert, seeking a declaration that the oral lease and right of first refusal were valid. Matthew intervened in the lawsuit. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Delbert and Matthew on the ground that the lease was invalid under the statute of frauds. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court erred in failing to provide them with notice that it would consider granting summary judgment on a legal theory different from the legal theory advances by Delbert and Matthew in their summary judgment pleadings and brief, and Terry and Cindy were prejudiced by the error. View "Leonhardt v. Leonhardt" on Justia Law

James Kesling executed a holographic will. After James died, the will was admitted into probate and James's three daughters were appointed as co-personal representatives of James's estate. Both the Estate and James's wife, Sandra, petitioned the circuit court to construe the will. The circuit court granted the Estate's motion for summary judgment. Sandra appealed, arguing that the will was ambiguous, and thus, the court erred by not considering extrinsic evidence as to James's intent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) James's intent was clearly expressed within the four corners of his holographic will and extrinsic evidence was not needed; and (2) the unambiguous language of the will demonstrated James's intent to give Sandra a life estate in his property with his three daughters as remaindermen. View "In re Estate of Kesling" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court interpreted a trust instrument to decide whether the death of Betty Plouf triggered the offset provision of the Plouf Family Trust, and thus, instantaneously satisfied the mortgage lien the Trust held on the home of a beneficiary. The trial court held that it did. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court had inherent authority to revisit an earlier order finding that the Trust had a first-priority lien; (2) the trial court did not err in ruling that the unambiguous terms of the Trust mandated an offset at the time of Betty's death, thus extinguishing the underlying mortgage; and (3) neither party was entitled to appellate attorney fees. View "SBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Plouf Family Trust" on Justia Law

Arla Johnson deeded farmland to her daughter Linda, and son-in-law, Claude Miller. Linda subsequently filed for divorce from Claude. Arla then sued Claude, claiming she was fraudulently induced by him into deeding the land. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Claude. Claude appealed the denial of his motion for attorney’s fees. On appeal, Claude argued Arla's suit was malicious and frivolous, and therefore when the trial court ruled in his favor, he was entitled to attorney's fees. The Supreme Court deferred to the trial court's discretion when it decided the suit was not malicious or frivolous, and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Johnson v. Miller" on Justia Law