Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Rapid City ordinances required a developer to complete certain public improvements before the City accepted a final plat, but in lieu of completing the improvements before the City accepted a plat, the City could accept a surety from a developer. In this case, several Developers provided sureties, which the City accepted. The sureties expired, after which the City sued Developers, seeking relief to have the required public improvements completed or repaired to meet the City's standards. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Developers, concluding that when the sureties expired, Developers were no longer liable for the improvements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the ordinances and specifications, Developers remained liable until the City accepted the improvements by a final acceptance letter. Remanded. View "City of Rapid City v. Estes" on Justia Law

Clarkson and Company owned and leased land on which Continental Resources conducted oil and gas exploration activities. Continental agreed to pay Clarkson for use of and damage to Clarkson's property. Clarkson sued Continental, seeking declaratory relief to clarify the terms of the payment agreement Continental and Clarkson made. The trial court granted judgment to Clarkson for $164,102. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that (1) Clarkson's claim was not barred by laches; (2) the agreement called for annual escalation of road use payments; (3) roads on land that Clarkson leased in 1981 and subsequently purchased were subject to the road use payment provision of the agreement; and (4) Clarkson was not entitled to a road use payment for a portion of existing road that Continental used to construct a new road. View "Clarkson & Co. v. Continental Res., Inc." on Justia Law

In this land contract dispute, Landowners arranged for the sale of several thousand acres of their property. Landowners and Buyer executed three separate contracts, one that conveyed to Buyer a majority of the land, the second that gave Buyer the option to purchase the remaining acreage, and the third that leased the remaining acreage to Buyer. A dispute between the parties later arose concerning the purchase price of the remaining acreage under the option agreement. Buyer brought suit against Landowners, alleging breach of contract. At issue during trial was whether the option agreement was ambiguous and required the admission of parol evidence to ascertain the parties' intent. The trial court held that the option agreement was not fully integrated and relied on parol evidence to calculate the purchase price, awarding Buyer the acreage for $171 per acre. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that Buyer was entitled to specific performance but at a different price because (1) the trial court erred when it went outside the parties' agreement to set the price per acre at $171; and (2) according to the parties' agreement, the price per acre at the option price was $289 per acre. Remanded. View "Pankratz v. Hoff" on Justia Law

Landowners owned property abutting former Exit 66 on I-90, a controlled-access highway that passed by an air force base. Part of Landowners' property was taken by condemnation in 1961 for the construction of I-90 and Exit 66. In that condemnation proceeding, the State mitigated the severance damages for the property not taken because of the "special benefit" the remaining property would receive from access that was designated to be provided at Exit 66. However, in 2003, the State removed the Exit 66 interchange to enhance the viability of the air force base. Landowners subsequently filed suit for inverse condemnation based on the closure of Exit 66. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that Landowners never possessed any property right that could have been taken. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Landowners were entitled to damages for inverse condemnation occasioned by the removal of the designated access. Remanded for a trial on damages. View "Hall v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Cindy Tolle sued Peter Lev for damages for failing to transfer ownership of a cabin situated on land owned by the government in a national park. Tolle also sued Lev for tortious interference with a business relationship she claimed with an employer. The circuit granted granted summary judgment in favor of Lev on both claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the tortious interference claim, but (2) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Lev on the claim for damages for failure to transfer the cabin, as (i) the statute of frauds did not bar the claim because an email from Lev confirming his agreement to transfer ownership of the cabin to Tolle was a sufficient writing and because the cabin agreement was for the sale of personal property, not real estate, (ii) neither the doctrine of merger nor the integration clause defeated Tolle's claim to enforce the oral agreement, and (iii) the parol evidence rule did not bar Lev's email. View "Tolle v. Lev" on Justia Law

For almost twenty years, Lincoln Neugebauer rented his mother Pearl Neugebauer's farm under an oral lease. In 2008, Lincoln purchased the farm by contract for deed. Pearl later brought an action to rescind the contract on the ground of undue influence. The circuit court found that Lincoln had exerted undue influence, and the court rescinded the contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding (1) Pearl was susceptible to undue influence, (2) Lincoln had the opportunity to exert undue influence over Pearl, (3) Lincoln was disposed to exert undue influence, and (4) the resulting contract for deed clearly showed the effects of undue influence. View "Neugebauer v. Neugebauer" on Justia Law

Appellants, ranchers, owned property in Alto Township separated by a section-line highway. Appellants historically fenced across the highway to join the adjacent pastures and installed gates at the highway. The township requested an injunction requiring Appellants to remove the fences that extended across the highway. Meanwhile, the county board of commissioners passed a resolution authorizing Appellants to erect and maintain fences across the section-line highway if the fences and gates met certain criteria. The trial court then enjoined Appellants from erecting and maintaining fences or gates across the highway unless they met the criteria of the resolution. After Appellants installed cattle guards and gates, the township brought a motion for contempt citation against Appellants, alleging they willfully and contumaciously failed to comply with the trial court's order. The county board of commissioners subsequently determined Appellants had complied with the resolution. The trial court found Appellants in contempt of court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's finding of contempt was clearly erroneous because a reasonable person could conclude that Appellants complied with the trial court's order. View "Alto Township v. Mendenhall" on Justia Law

In 2007, Davison County adopted a county-wide plan to reassess agricultural structures. The County reassessed agricultural structures in four of its twelve townships that year. Donald and Gene Stehly, who owned agricultural structures in the four reassessed townships, initiated a declaratory judgment action, alleging that the plan to reassess four townships each year created an unconstitutional lack of uniform taxation within the county. The trial court concluded that the Stehlys' claim failed because they did not establish lack of uniformity within a single taxing district as required by the South Dakota Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) townships are taxing districts under the Constitution, and (2) a reassessment plan that creates a temporary lack of uniform taxation among townships within a county is constitutional. View "Stehly v. Davison County" on Justia Law

Over a period of two years, the City of Sioux Falls issued Daniel Daily four citations for a concrete extension to his driveway. Daily appealed each of the citations, but a hearing was held only on the final two citations received. Daily then initiated a declaratory judgment action against the City. The trial court ultimately concluded that the City's administrative appeals process, both as written and as applied, and the City's enforcement of its zoning ordinances violated Daily's constitutional rights to procedural due process and equal protection. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the hearing examiner in this case did not hold the City to its burden of proof, the City's administrative appeals process deprived Daily of a protected property interest without due process of law; and (2) the hearing examiner's application of the rules of evidence deprived Daily of a fair hearing. View "Dailey v. City of Sioux Falls" on Justia Law

The personal representative of an estate sold real property that had been specifically devised to several heirs. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous appeal that the personal representative lacked the authority to sell the property and remanded the case to allow the buyers of the real property to intervene to protect their interests. After remand, the buyers filed suit against the estate. The heirs who objected to the sale intervened. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the buyers, finding that the buyers were good faith purchasers for value of specifically devised land and thus were protected by S.D. Codified Laws 29A-3-714 as a matter of law. The intervening heirs appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed but on narrower grounds, holding that based on lack of notice of the heirs' interest in the land or the law at issue, the buyers were good faith purchasers for value, and as such, were protected by the statute. View "Muhlbauer v. Estate of Olson" on Justia Law