Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Sellers hired Agent to list their ranch for sale. Buyers purchased the ranch after Agent represented that the well on the ranch would produce as much water as they would need for their farming and ranching operation. Later, Buyers sued Sellers and Agent for negligent misrepresentation, maintaining that they were misled about the condition of the well and its potential to meet their farming and ranching needs. Buyers sought $513,000 in damages, which was the estimated cost of installing a new well. The circuit court (1) granted Sellers' motion to prohibit evidence of the cost of a new well as a measure of damages, and (2) prohibited Buyers from testifying on the cost of the well as a means of proving the devaluation of their property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth the proper measure of damages in South Dakota for negligent misrepresentation; (2) plaintiffs asserting misrepresentation claims may recover reliance damages but not expectation damages, and therefore, Buyers' evidence of the estimated cost for a new well was properly excluded; and (3) the circuit court properly precluded Buyers from testifying on their land's value. View "Steineke v. Delzer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff ranchers sued the State because of ongoing damage to their property from incursions of prairie dogs from public lands. Relying on multiple statutes requiring the State to manage and control prairie dog populations, Plaintiffs requested injunctive relief, abatement, and damages. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and ordered a trial on damages. When the case was reassigned, the State moved the new judge to reexamine the first judge's ruling. On reconsideration, the court vacated the first summary judgment and granted summary judgment for the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the second circuit court judge did not err in granting summary judgment for the State where the acts mandated by the statutes cited by Plaintiffs were discretionary and the State was protected from suit by sovereign immunity. View "Adrian v. Vonk" on Justia Law

When Rita Fix's son and daughter-in-law, Jeff and Marie, secured a loan from the First State Bank of Roscoe by obtaining a warranty deed for the property, the Bank assured Fix she could retain possession of the house. After Jeff and Marie conveyed the house and property to the Bank, the Bank sold the property and sought to remove Fix from the house. Fix sued the Bank for, inter alia, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Meanwhile, Fix, Jeff, and Marie were indicted on multiple criminal counts. The State attorney who brought the charges and who represented the Bank civilly offered to dismiss the criminal charges against Fix if she would deed the house back to the Bank. Fix then amended her complaint to include a claim of abuse of process against the Bank. The trial court granted summary judgment against Fix on her IIED claim. A jury then returned a verdict finding the Bank liable for abuse of process but awarded no damages to Fix. The Supreme Court reversed on the abuse of process claim, holding that the trial court provided the jury with the incorrect legal standard for the recovery of emotional damages. Remanded for a new trial. View "Fix v. First State Bank of Roscoe" on Justia Law

Rapid City ordinances required a developer to complete certain public improvements before the City accepted a final plat, but in lieu of completing the improvements before the City accepted a plat, the City could accept a surety from a developer. In this case, several Developers provided sureties, which the City accepted. The sureties expired, after which the City sued Developers, seeking relief to have the required public improvements completed or repaired to meet the City's standards. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Developers, concluding that when the sureties expired, Developers were no longer liable for the improvements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the ordinances and specifications, Developers remained liable until the City accepted the improvements by a final acceptance letter. Remanded. View "City of Rapid City v. Estes" on Justia Law

Clarkson and Company owned and leased land on which Continental Resources conducted oil and gas exploration activities. Continental agreed to pay Clarkson for use of and damage to Clarkson's property. Clarkson sued Continental, seeking declaratory relief to clarify the terms of the payment agreement Continental and Clarkson made. The trial court granted judgment to Clarkson for $164,102. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that (1) Clarkson's claim was not barred by laches; (2) the agreement called for annual escalation of road use payments; (3) roads on land that Clarkson leased in 1981 and subsequently purchased were subject to the road use payment provision of the agreement; and (4) Clarkson was not entitled to a road use payment for a portion of existing road that Continental used to construct a new road. View "Clarkson & Co. v. Continental Res., Inc." on Justia Law

In this land contract dispute, Landowners arranged for the sale of several thousand acres of their property. Landowners and Buyer executed three separate contracts, one that conveyed to Buyer a majority of the land, the second that gave Buyer the option to purchase the remaining acreage, and the third that leased the remaining acreage to Buyer. A dispute between the parties later arose concerning the purchase price of the remaining acreage under the option agreement. Buyer brought suit against Landowners, alleging breach of contract. At issue during trial was whether the option agreement was ambiguous and required the admission of parol evidence to ascertain the parties' intent. The trial court held that the option agreement was not fully integrated and relied on parol evidence to calculate the purchase price, awarding Buyer the acreage for $171 per acre. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that Buyer was entitled to specific performance but at a different price because (1) the trial court erred when it went outside the parties' agreement to set the price per acre at $171; and (2) according to the parties' agreement, the price per acre at the option price was $289 per acre. Remanded. View "Pankratz v. Hoff" on Justia Law

Landowners owned property abutting former Exit 66 on I-90, a controlled-access highway that passed by an air force base. Part of Landowners' property was taken by condemnation in 1961 for the construction of I-90 and Exit 66. In that condemnation proceeding, the State mitigated the severance damages for the property not taken because of the "special benefit" the remaining property would receive from access that was designated to be provided at Exit 66. However, in 2003, the State removed the Exit 66 interchange to enhance the viability of the air force base. Landowners subsequently filed suit for inverse condemnation based on the closure of Exit 66. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that Landowners never possessed any property right that could have been taken. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Landowners were entitled to damages for inverse condemnation occasioned by the removal of the designated access. Remanded for a trial on damages. View "Hall v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Cindy Tolle sued Peter Lev for damages for failing to transfer ownership of a cabin situated on land owned by the government in a national park. Tolle also sued Lev for tortious interference with a business relationship she claimed with an employer. The circuit granted granted summary judgment in favor of Lev on both claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the tortious interference claim, but (2) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Lev on the claim for damages for failure to transfer the cabin, as (i) the statute of frauds did not bar the claim because an email from Lev confirming his agreement to transfer ownership of the cabin to Tolle was a sufficient writing and because the cabin agreement was for the sale of personal property, not real estate, (ii) neither the doctrine of merger nor the integration clause defeated Tolle's claim to enforce the oral agreement, and (iii) the parol evidence rule did not bar Lev's email. View "Tolle v. Lev" on Justia Law

For almost twenty years, Lincoln Neugebauer rented his mother Pearl Neugebauer's farm under an oral lease. In 2008, Lincoln purchased the farm by contract for deed. Pearl later brought an action to rescind the contract on the ground of undue influence. The circuit court found that Lincoln had exerted undue influence, and the court rescinded the contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding (1) Pearl was susceptible to undue influence, (2) Lincoln had the opportunity to exert undue influence over Pearl, (3) Lincoln was disposed to exert undue influence, and (4) the resulting contract for deed clearly showed the effects of undue influence. View "Neugebauer v. Neugebauer" on Justia Law

Appellants, ranchers, owned property in Alto Township separated by a section-line highway. Appellants historically fenced across the highway to join the adjacent pastures and installed gates at the highway. The township requested an injunction requiring Appellants to remove the fences that extended across the highway. Meanwhile, the county board of commissioners passed a resolution authorizing Appellants to erect and maintain fences across the section-line highway if the fences and gates met certain criteria. The trial court then enjoined Appellants from erecting and maintaining fences or gates across the highway unless they met the criteria of the resolution. After Appellants installed cattle guards and gates, the township brought a motion for contempt citation against Appellants, alleging they willfully and contumaciously failed to comply with the trial court's order. The county board of commissioners subsequently determined Appellants had complied with the resolution. The trial court found Appellants in contempt of court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's finding of contempt was clearly erroneous because a reasonable person could conclude that Appellants complied with the trial court's order. View "Alto Township v. Mendenhall" on Justia Law