Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A neighbor's complaint about marijuana directed Spearfish police officers to an apartment unit, where the officers smelled the odor of burnt marijuana outside the door. One tenant let the officers inside, but when the officers observed raw marijuana in plain view, another tenant demanded that the officers obtain a search warrant before they conducted any search. While the officers sought a warrant, they secured the apartment and detained all the tenants at the police station. On a motion to suppress, the circuit court found that the officers had probable cause to arrest two of the three tenants and search their apartment, but the detention at the station was unreasonable and violated their constitutional rights. The court suppressed all evidence. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for intermediate appeal to consider whether the circuit court erred as a matter of law when it suppressed defendants' statements and the evidence seized under the search warrant. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the search was not at issue as it was "indisputably" based on a valid warrant. Further, none of the information police used to secure the warrant related in any way to the seizure of the apartment. Had the officers never seized the apartment, "but instead conducted a perimeter stakeout to prevent anyone from entering the apartment and destroying evidence, the contraband now challenged would have been discovered and seized precisely as it was here." The Court reversed the suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "South Dakota v. Tillman" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant James Brown owned interests in several businesses. In late 2004, he acquired and redesigned two convenience stores on opposite sides of Exit 2 on Interstate 29 in North Sioux City, South Dakota. Plaintiff-Appellee Stern Oil, a fuel distributor for Exxon Mobil Corporation, contacted Brown while he was remodeling the properties. Although Brown was negotiating with another fuel distributor, he ultimately elected to do business with Stern Oil. When Brown notified Stern Oil that he would no longer purchase its fuel, Stern Oil initiated this breach of contract action. Brown filed a counterclaim, alleging fraudulent inducement. Stern Oil argued that Brown contracted to purchase a minimum amount of fuel for a ten-year period. The circuit court granted Stern Oil's motion for summary judgment on both the breach of contract claim and on Brown's counterclaim, but the issue of damages proceeded to trial. After trial, the circuit court awarded Stern Oil eight years of lost profits. Brown appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment. Both Brown's fraudulent inducement counterclaim and Stern Oil's breach of contract claim involved disputed material facts. Therefore, the Court concluded the circuit court erred in granting Stern Oil summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Stern Oil Co. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Randy Kramer initiated a breach of contract action against Mike D. Murphy and the William F. Murphy Self-Declaration of Trust (Trust). Tri-State Ethanol, LLC owned an ethanol plant in Rosholt, South Dakota. Kramer was one of the members and managers of Tri-State Ethanol. Kramer was also a member of White Rock Pipeline, LLC, which owned a pipeline that supplied natural gas to Tri-State Ethanol. In order to comply with various federal regulations, Tri-State Ethanol determined it was necessary to purchase the membership interests of Kramer, Murphy, Woods, and the Trust. To accomplish this, Tri-State Ethanol entered into a loan agreement (Loan Agreement) with Murphy and the Trust. Tri-State Ethanol was unable to meet its financial obligations and eventually filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. During the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, Murphy and the Trust reached a settlement agreement regarding payment of the Loan Agreement and the Disbursement Agreement. Murphy and the Trust, through its trustee, represented to the bankruptcy court that they would use the settlement proceeds to pay Kramer the amounts owed under the Disbursement Agreement. The bankruptcy court approved the settlement agreement. After the settlement proceeds from Tri-State Ethanol’s bankruptcy estate were distributed, Murphy and the Trust refused to pay Kramer the full amount listed in the Disbursement Agreement. Kramer then filed a complaint against Murphy and the Trust for breach of the Disbursement Agreement. Murphy filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue. He claimed that the forum-selection clauses contained in the Loan Agreement, the Balloon Note, and the Promissory Note controlled for any suit brought on the Disbursement Agreement. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the case. It found that while the Disbursement Agreement itself had no forum-selection clause, the other three agreements contained forum-selection clauses providing that the Fourteenth Judicial District in Rock Island County, Illinois was the proper forum. The circuit court reasoned that the agreements must be considered as a whole. After examining each of documents collectively as one contract, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in finding that the parties intended the venue for any suit on the Disbursement Agreement to be the Fourteenth (14th) Judicial District in Rock Island County, Illinois. The circuit court’s dismissal of this case was affirmed. View "Kramer v. William F. Murphy Self-Declaration of Trust" on Justia Law

Allison Marie and James (Jim) Joseph Marko married on September 26, 1998. Three children were born of the marriage. Allison was granted a divorce from Jim on grounds of extreme mental cruelty. Jim's visitation with his children was conditioned on his having absolutely no contact with his mistress "Emmy" when the children were in his presence. Allison received sole custody of the children. In this divorce appeal, Jim asserted that the trial judge (1) should have disqualified himself because the judge presided over another case in which Emmy had been "enmeshed"; (2) abused his discretion in restricting visitation; and (3) erred in granting the Allison Marie a divorce on grounds of extreme mental cruelty. Finding no merit to any of Jim's issues on appeal and that the evidence presented at trial sufficient to support the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Marko v. Marko" on Justia Law

Claimant-Appellant Megan Peterson worked at a nursing home owned by The Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society (Good Samaritan). Claimant alleged that she sustained a work-related injury to her back when assisting a resident with a wheelchair. Good Samaritan denied the claim. Two doctors, who testified by deposition, disagreed whether Claimant suffered a work-related injury and whether employment was a major contributing cause of her back condition. The Department of Labor (Department), after considering the depositions and Claimant's medical records, determined that she failed to prove she sustained a compensable work-related injury. The Department also determined that Claimant failed to prove that her employment remained a major contributing cause of her condition and need for treatment. The circuit court affirmed. On de novo review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court concluded that one of the doctor's opinions was sufficient to meet Claimant's burden of proving that her employment caused a work-related injury and that was and remained a major contributing cause of her back condition and need for treatment. View "Peterson v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Adam Olson entered into a plea agreement with the State, under the terms of which he pleaded guilty to one count of grand theft and one count of aggravated eluding of a law enforcement officer. Olson also admitted to being a habitual offender. In addition, Olson pleaded guilty to an additional count of grand theft, which the State charged him with, in a separate Information. Defendant later filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The circuit court denied his motion and sentenced him to fifteen years for the grand theft conviction and two years for the aggravated eluding of a law enforcement officer conviction. Defendant's sentence for aggravated eluding of a law enforcement officer was to run consecutive to his sentence for grand theft. The court also sentenced Defendant to serve ten years for the grand theft conviction that was charged in the separate Information. This sentence was to be served consecutive to his other sentences. Defendant appealed, raising: (1) whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas; (2) whether Defendant's sentences constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion nor a violation of Defendant's constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "South Dakota v. Olson" on Justia Law

The Surgical Institute of South Dakota, P.C. filed suit against Dr. Matthew Sorrell who was formerly employed by the practice. The practice alleged breach of contract against the physician for failing to give required notice of resignation and breach of an implied contract resulting in unjust enrichment. The implied contract claim was dismissed by summary judgment; a jury found the physician did not breach the contract. The practice timely appealed the dismissal of its implied contract claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that there was sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury's verdict, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the practice's motion for a new trial. Additionally, the Court found that the practice did not show a "clear abuse of discretion" in excluding certain evidence from trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Surgical Institute of South Dakota, PC v. Sorrell" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant Leonard Alan Toohey guilty of first degree rape of a child. On appeal, he asserts that the child victim was not available for cross-examination as required under the Confrontation Clause, that the circuit court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of other acts, and that there was insufficient evidence to support proof of penetration. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that "rational jurors could [have found] proof of penetration" beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "South Dakota v. Toohey" on Justia Law

M.A.S. (Father) appealed the termination of his parental rights to P.S.E. At the time P.S.E. was removed from Mother’s care, Father lived in California and did not know he had a child in South Dakota. The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied to these proceedings because P.S.E. was an enrolled member of the Fort Peck Sioux Tribe. Father argued on appeal that the Department of Social Services (DSS) did not make active efforts to reunite the Indian family and that any efforts made were successful. Because the evidence presented shows that DSS provided active and reasonable, though abbreviated, efforts to place P.S.E. with Father, and those efforts were unsuccessful, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order terminating Father's parental rights. View "In the interest of P.S.E." on Justia Law

Defendant Paul Wentzlaff, an insurance agent, stole thousands of dollars from Harvey Severson, an elderly man who asked Defendant to help manage his financial affairs. Plaintiff Donald Hass, as personal representative for Severson’s estate, sued Defendant and two insurance companies who appointed Defendant as an agent, North American Company for Life and Health Insurance (North American) and Allianz Life Insurance of North America (Allianz). Hass and North American each moved for summary judgment and Allianz joined North American’s motion. After a hearing, the circuit court denied Plaintiff's motion and granted the insurance companies’ motion. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the insurance companies were vicariously liable for Defendant's acts. Based on undisputed material facts on the record in this case, the Supreme Court found that Defendant Wentzlaff was not acting within the scope of his employment when he stole money from Severson, and thus, as a matter of law, North American and Allianz were not vicariously liable for his acts. The Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurance companies. View "Hass v. Wentzlaff" on Justia Law