Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Lacy March sought a protection order against Roger Thursby, which the circuit court granted. The testimony elicited at trial concerned stalking. Thursby appealed, alleging, among other things, that the findings of fact were insufficient to support the order as signed. The Supreme Court reversed due to insufficiency of the findings of fact, holding the circuit court failed to insure that the findings of fact and conclusions of law were clearly entered. Specifically, the Court found that although the circuit court indicated that it believed March's version of the events, the written finding did not correspond with the oral testimony of March, and the court did not indicate how the evidence met the statutory elements of stalking. View "March v. Thursby" on Justia Law

Clarkson and Company owned and leased land on which Continental Resources conducted oil and gas exploration activities. Continental agreed to pay Clarkson for use of and damage to Clarkson's property. Clarkson sued Continental, seeking declaratory relief to clarify the terms of the payment agreement Continental and Clarkson made. The trial court granted judgment to Clarkson for $164,102. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that (1) Clarkson's claim was not barred by laches; (2) the agreement called for annual escalation of road use payments; (3) roads on land that Clarkson leased in 1981 and subsequently purchased were subject to the road use payment provision of the agreement; and (4) Clarkson was not entitled to a road use payment for a portion of existing road that Continental used to construct a new road. View "Clarkson & Co. v. Continental Res., Inc." on Justia Law

Lucas Waugh was charged with attempted rape of a woman and the rape of a minor. The incidents occurred one after the other within walking distance of each other. The circuit court joined the cases for trial, and a jury found Waugh guilty of both offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in joining the charges for trial because (i) the two incidents in this case were closely related in time, location, and manner of execution, and (ii) there was no undue prejudice because the evidence of each incident could have been admitted in the trial of the other; and (2) the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to have found Waugh guilty of both offenses. View "State v. Waugh" on Justia Law

In this land contract dispute, Landowners arranged for the sale of several thousand acres of their property. Landowners and Buyer executed three separate contracts, one that conveyed to Buyer a majority of the land, the second that gave Buyer the option to purchase the remaining acreage, and the third that leased the remaining acreage to Buyer. A dispute between the parties later arose concerning the purchase price of the remaining acreage under the option agreement. Buyer brought suit against Landowners, alleging breach of contract. At issue during trial was whether the option agreement was ambiguous and required the admission of parol evidence to ascertain the parties' intent. The trial court held that the option agreement was not fully integrated and relied on parol evidence to calculate the purchase price, awarding Buyer the acreage for $171 per acre. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that Buyer was entitled to specific performance but at a different price because (1) the trial court erred when it went outside the parties' agreement to set the price per acre at $171; and (2) according to the parties' agreement, the price per acre at the option price was $289 per acre. Remanded. View "Pankratz v. Hoff" on Justia Law

Landowners owned property abutting former Exit 66 on I-90, a controlled-access highway that passed by an air force base. Part of Landowners' property was taken by condemnation in 1961 for the construction of I-90 and Exit 66. In that condemnation proceeding, the State mitigated the severance damages for the property not taken because of the "special benefit" the remaining property would receive from access that was designated to be provided at Exit 66. However, in 2003, the State removed the Exit 66 interchange to enhance the viability of the air force base. Landowners subsequently filed suit for inverse condemnation based on the closure of Exit 66. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that Landowners never possessed any property right that could have been taken. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Landowners were entitled to damages for inverse condemnation occasioned by the removal of the designated access. Remanded for a trial on damages. View "Hall v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Employee was injured while working for Employer, a railroad corporation, by falling on snow-covered ice. Employee filed a personal injury claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), which permits suit against railroads for an employee's injury that results in whole or in part from the railroad's negligence. A jury returned a verdict in Employee's favor and awarded Employee $300,000 in damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in allowing evidence of drainage problems and failing to enter a judgment as a matter of law on foreseeability; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Employer's motion for a new trial; (3) the trial court did not err in permitting Employee to receive post-judgment interest from the date of the verdict until the entry of judgment; and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting Employer a set-off on the judgment. View "Jacobs v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp." on Justia Law

Cindy Tolle sued Peter Lev for damages for failing to transfer ownership of a cabin situated on land owned by the government in a national park. Tolle also sued Lev for tortious interference with a business relationship she claimed with an employer. The circuit granted granted summary judgment in favor of Lev on both claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the tortious interference claim, but (2) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Lev on the claim for damages for failure to transfer the cabin, as (i) the statute of frauds did not bar the claim because an email from Lev confirming his agreement to transfer ownership of the cabin to Tolle was a sufficient writing and because the cabin agreement was for the sale of personal property, not real estate, (ii) neither the doctrine of merger nor the integration clause defeated Tolle's claim to enforce the oral agreement, and (iii) the parol evidence rule did not bar Lev's email. View "Tolle v. Lev" on Justia Law

For almost twenty years, Lincoln Neugebauer rented his mother Pearl Neugebauer's farm under an oral lease. In 2008, Lincoln purchased the farm by contract for deed. Pearl later brought an action to rescind the contract on the ground of undue influence. The circuit court found that Lincoln had exerted undue influence, and the court rescinded the contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding (1) Pearl was susceptible to undue influence, (2) Lincoln had the opportunity to exert undue influence over Pearl, (3) Lincoln was disposed to exert undue influence, and (4) the resulting contract for deed clearly showed the effects of undue influence. View "Neugebauer v. Neugebauer" on Justia Law

In December 2007, Kjerstad Realty brought suit against Bootjack Ranch for breach of a realty contract. In October 2009, the case was remanded. After remand, the assigned judge retired and a temporary judge presided over the case for six months. In the interim, Kjerstad pursued discovery. Once a new judge was appointed, Kjerstad requested a trial date within the one-year statutory deadline, which the judge did not grant. In November 2010, Bootjack moved to dismiss for Kjerstad's failure to commence trial within one year from the date of remand pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 15-30-16. The trial court granted Bootjack's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed Kjerstad's suit against Bootjack because good cause existed to extend the deadline under section 15-30-16. View "Kjerstad Realty, Inc. v. Bootjack Ranch, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants Thomas and Robin Branhan borrowed money from Appellee Great Western Bank. As collateral for the loan, the Branhans gave Great Western a security interest in their shares of Glacial Lakes stock. The Branhans later defaulted on their loan. Great Western subsequently brought a foreclosure action against the Branhans. As part of a settlement agreement, the Branhans agreed to surrender and transfer to Great Western all their rights to Glacial Lakes stock they were unable to sell by a certain date. After Great Western issued a satisfaction of judgment, Glacial Lakes announced a capital call repayment. In response, the Branhans filed a motion to determine which party was entitled to the capital call repayments. The circuit court concluded that Great Western owned the stock and was therefore entitled to the repayments. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that Great Western was entitled to the capital call repayment because the benefit of capital call repayment transferred with the shares. View "Great Western Bank v. Branhan" on Justia Law