Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in South Dakota Supreme Court
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Defendant, who was born in Mexico but moved to the United States before he was one year old, pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana. The United States later commenced removal proceedings against Defendant and Defendant was deported. Defendant later re-entered the United States. Defendant filed a motion to re-open and vacate his conviction for felony possession of marijuana, arguing that his counsel was deficient and that he would not have pleaded guilty if his counsel had advised him of the potential deportation consequences. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky does not apply retroactively to a conviction that was final at the time Padilla was decided, including Defendant's conviction. View "State v. Garcia" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree rape and two counts of sexual contact with a child under age sixteen. Defendant was sentenced to fifty years incarceration for each of the first-degree rape convictions and fifteen years for each of the sexual contact convictions, with the sentences to run concurrently. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the indictment was duplicitous, and therefore, his right to jury unanimity was violated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to strictly comply with the "either or rule" by either requiring the State to specifically elect the acts it would rely on at trial or by giving a unanimity instruction because the jury was ultimately informed of the unanimity requirement; (2) sufficient evidence supported both of Defendant's sexual contact convictions, but the evidence presented at trial was only sufficient to support one of Defendant's first-degree rape convictions; and (3) the sentences imposed by the trial court did not violate Defendant's Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. View "State v. Brende" on Justia Law

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Mother and Father had Child out of wedlock. Following their separation, Mother retained primary physical custody of Child. Father later filed a motion for change of custody. The trial court determined that it was in Child's best interests that Father have primary physical custody of Child. Mother appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) based on its "balanced and thorough analysis" of the applicable factors provided in Fuerstenberg v. Fuerstenberg, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that it was in the best interests of Child for Father to have primary physical custody; and (2) the parties' individual motions for appellate attorney fees were denied. View "Roth v. Haag" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a property owner, sought to expand the buildings on his property and, accordingly, asked the City to rezone a portion of his property zoned within the Flood Hazard Zoning District. The City denied the request along with Plaintiff's building permits because the proposed expansion extended to a portion of Plaintiff's property zoned within the Flood Hazard Zoning District. After unsuccessfully appealing to the Zoning Board of Adjustment, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the circuit court, which included a writ of certiorari, a request for declaratory judgment, a writ of mandamus, a civil rights claim, and a state constitutional claim. While the suit was pending, the City partially granted Plaintiff's rezone request. The circuit court subsequently denied Plaintiff's writ of certiorari and granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the remainder of Plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's writ of certiorari and granting summary judgment in favor of the City on Plaintiff's remaining claims. View "Parris v. City of Rapid City" on Justia Law

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JAS Enterprises, Inc. (JAS) entered into a purchase agreement with BBS Enterprises, Inc. (BBS), which sold vehicles, equipment, and inventory used in a sheet metal installation business. The agreement also contained a covenant not to compete. The agreement was signed by the Statons as personal guarantors of the agreement. When BBS failed to make timely monthly payments, JAS filed suit against BBS and the Statons, alleging breach of contract. BBS and the Statons counterclaimed, arguing that JAS and James Swaby, JAS's principal shareholder, violated the covenant not to compete. A jury concluded that BBS and the Statons breached their contract and that JAS and Swaby breached the covenant not to compete. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) erred when it denied Swaby's motion to dismiss him personally; (2) erred in admitting certain testimony; (3) erred in admitting parol evidence in interpreting the contract; and (4) erred by not requiring the jury to choose the date when the damage occurred to enable the trial court to properly calculate prejudgment interest. Remanded. View "JAS Enters., Inc. v. BBS Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

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The mother of three girls (Mother) signed a petition to voluntarily terminate her parental rights, attesting in an affidavit that she believed it to be in the best interests of her children for her children to remain with their father and to be adopted by his wife. After a termination hearing, the circuit court found Mother had voluntarily consented to the termination of her parental rights and ordered permanent termination. The court then entered judgment declaring the children to be the adopted children of their stepmother. Mother later moved to vacate the judgment terminating her parental rights, alleging fraud upon the court because she was "secretly paid" monetary consideration and given "secret promises" of continued visitation with her children. The court denied Mother's motion to vacate, ruling that Mother failed to establish exceptional circumstances warranting relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in balancing undisclosed side agreements and unsettled arrangements for continued parent contact with the children's need for stability and finality. View "In re Termination of Parental Rights of Ibanez" on Justia Law

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Defendant applied for homeowner's insurance with Insurer, and his application was approved. Several years later, after discovering a misrepresentation in Defendant's application, Insurer rescinded the homeowner's insurance policy issued to Defendant. Insurer then initiated this action against Defendant, alleging that it lawfully rescinded the insurance contract with Defendant. Insurer also sought recovery of all monies paid to Defendant under the insurance contract. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Insurer, determining, as a matter of law, that Defendant made a misrepresentation on his homeowner's insurance application and that the misrepresentation was material. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because no material question of fact existed regarding whether Defendant made a material misrepresentation on his application for homeowner's insurance, the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment for Insurer. View "De Smet Farm Mut. Ins. Co. of S.D. v. Busskohl" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit against Black Hills Federal Credit Union and CUNA Mutual Insurance Society for changing their credit disability insurance policy. The complaint alleged that Defendants wrongfully switched the credit disability insurance policies of 4,461 borrowers. Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, but the trial court denied the motion, finding that Plaintiffs did not meet the adequacy requirement or the predominance and superiority requirements of the class certification statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in its application of the class certification statutes to the facts in this case. Remanded for certification of the class. View "Thurman v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff was injured while walking on a sidewalk abutting a Granite Sports, a sporting goods store in Hill City. The sidewalk also abutted a state/federal highway. Plaintiff and her husband sued Granite Sports and the City for negligence. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that neither owed a duty to Plaintiffs to keep the sidewalk reasonably safe. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the summary judgment granted in favor of the City, holding that the City had sufficient control of the sidewalk to charge it with the affirmative duty of keeping its sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for public travel; and (2) affirmed the summary judgment granted in favor of Granite Sports, holding that the store did not have the general duty to keep the sidewalk reasonably safe in this case, and it thus did not have the lesser included duty to warn. Remanded. View "Patitucci v. City of Hill City" on Justia Law

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M.E.H. alleged she was kidnapped and raped by Defendant in 2000. The charges against Defendant were dismissed when DNA testing failed to implicate him. In 2008, the case was reopened, and the evidence obtained in 2000 was retested using a new method of DNA testing, which revealed the presence of Defendant's DNA. Defendant was again indicted, and a part II information was filed charging Defendant as a habitual offender. The jury found Defendant guilty of rape in the second and third degree and related charges. In a separate trial, the jury found Defendant was a habitual offender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of an incident involving another alleged victim as other acts evidence; (2) did not violate Defendant's right to confrontation by admitting testimony regarding the results of the DNA testing performed in 2008 and 2011, even though some steps of the testing were performed by nontestifying analysts; but (3) because the State's filing of an amended part II information effectively dismissed the original part II information, the State's dismissal of the amended part II information left the trial court without jurisdiction over the habitual offender proceedings. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Medicine Eagle" on Justia Law