Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The personal representative of an estate sold real property that had been specifically devised to several heirs. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous appeal that the personal representative lacked the authority to sell the property and remanded the case to allow the buyers of the real property to intervene to protect their interests. After remand, the buyers filed suit against the estate. The heirs who objected to the sale intervened. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the buyers, finding that the buyers were good faith purchasers for value of specifically devised land and thus were protected by S.D. Codified Laws 29A-3-714 as a matter of law. The intervening heirs appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed but on narrower grounds, holding that based on lack of notice of the heirs' interest in the land or the law at issue, the buyers were good faith purchasers for value, and as such, were protected by the statute. View "Muhlbauer v. Estate of Olson" on Justia Law

The South Dakota Governor requested an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court regarding eligibility requirements for individuals seeking appointment to the South Dakota Supreme Court. The Governor asked (1) what actions or intent are sufficient to satisfy the requirement of S.D. Const. art. V, 2 and 6 that justices of the Supreme Court be voting residents within the district from which they are appointed, and (2) at what point in time must these actions be undertaken or intentions be formed? The Supreme Court accepted the request and answered (1) a person selected by the Governor to fill a vacant seat on the Supreme Court becomes a justice by qualifying for office by taking an oath or affirmation, (2) prior to taking that oath, that person must fulfill the eligibility requirement to hold that office including establishing voting residency in the district from which he or she is appointed pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 12-1-4, and (3) by doing so, that person becomes a justice after taking the oath and complies with the constitutional directives of being a voting resident of the district from which he or she was selected. View "In re Interpretation of S.D. Const. art. V, 2 & 6" on Justia Law

Pizza Hut hired Norman Williams, who was at the time on parole for a felony conviction involving a gang-related incident of mutual combat resulting in serious injury. While working at the restaurant, Williams allegedly attacked David Iverson. Iverson filed suit against Williams and Pizza Hut, asserting (1) vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior, (2) negligent hiring, (3) breach of duty to control an employee, and (4) negligent supervision. The circuit court granted summary judgment in Pizza Hut's favor on all four theories of liability. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was proper where (1) Pizza Hut's agency relationship was immaterial to Williams's tort, (2) because at the time Williams was hired he was only to have incidental contact with the public, Pizza Hut did not have a duty to inquire further into Williams's background, (3) because Iverson did not satisfy the foreseeability prong, he failed to show that Pizza Hut had a duty to control Williams, and (4) given the facts and circumstances, it was not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty on Pizza Hut to prevent Iverson from meeting with Williams at the restaurant. View "Iverson v. NPC Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Timothy Farmer, a patrol officer for the Rapid City Police Department, was investigated for excessive use of force relating to the apprehension of the alleged perpetrators of an assault. The Department later fired Farmer after finding, in addition to the most recent incident, Farmer had been the subject of several complaints for excessive force. The Department of Labor upheld the Police Department's decision. The circuit court affirmed, finding ample evidence to support the discharge. On appeal, Farmer contended that he never acted beyond the Department's use of force continuum policy. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Department of Labor and circuit court, holding that sufficient cause existed to discharge Farmer. View "Farmer v. City of Rapid City" on Justia Law

Appellees Floyd Demaray and James Hagemann were sued for repeated tortious activity in discharging of pollutants into lakes and streams of a nearby property. Appellees, who owned separate but identical insurance policies with De Smet Farm Mutual Insurance, notified De Smet of the lawsuit. De Smet declined defense of the suit, asserting it owed no duty to defend under the insurance contract. Appellees obtained their own defense counsel and defended the matter through trial, where a jury ruled in their favor. Appellees then sued De Smet, alleging that the company breached its duty to defend them in the previous lawsuit and seeking indemnification for all costs and fees incurred as a result. The trial court granted Appellees' motion for summary judgment, holding that De Smet owed Appellees a duty to defend because the alleged claim, if true, fell within policy coverage. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the policy language was unambiguous and the complaint asserted no claim that would arguably invoke coverage. Remanded with directions to grant summary judgment for De Smet. View "Demaray v. De Smet Farm Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

When Dennis Lindskov purchased Les Lindskov's interest in an automotive company, Dennis and Les signed a dissolution agreement that contained a non-disparagement clause. Les opened a competing business within months of the sale of his interest in the company. Dennis initiated a breach of contract and fraud and deceit action, alleging that the non-disparagement clause contained a covenant not to compete. The trial court granted Les's motions for summary judgment on both causes of action and dismissed Dennis's complaint. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the trial court properly granted Les's motions for summary judgment where (1) because the clause did not create a covenant not to compete, Les did not breach the dissolution agreement by opening a competing business, and (2) because Les did not have a fiduciary duty to disclose his intent to compete, he did not commit fraud or deceit as a matter of law. View "Lindskov v. Lindskov" on Justia Law

After the City of the Pierre and the International Union of Operating Engineers were unable to reach an agreement for employment contracts, the City imposed the terms and conditions of one of its previously proposed contracts that had been rejected by the Union. The Union filed for conciliation and fact-finding with the state Department of Labor, arguing the City could not impose the previously rejected contract until after the Department's conciliation and fact-finding process was complete. The trial court held in favor of the City, holding that the conciliation and fact-finding process was permissive, not mandatory, and therefore the City could unilaterally impose a contract any time after impasse was declared. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City could not impose a previously rejected contract until the Department's conciliation and fact-finding was complete. Remanded. View "International Union v. City of Pierre" on Justia Law

J.L. was fourteen when he engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with his twelve-year-old girlfriend. A juvenile petition was filed against J.L., and the circuit court adjudicated J.L. as a delinquent under S.D. Codified Laws 22-22-1(1), a statute under which the girlfriend was legally incapable of giving consent and under which J.L. would have been convicted of rape in the first degree had J.L. been an adult. On appeal, J.L. argued that the application of the statute to the facts of this case created an absurd result, one not reasonably intended by the legislature. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that application of the statute to the facts did not suggest an unintended absurdity. View "In re J.L. " on Justia Law

After a fire damaged Oscar Batiz's residential rental property, Batiz filed a claim with his carrier, Fire Insurance Exchange. Exchange initially tendered to Batiz $33,182 representing the actual cash value of the damaged property, later raising that amount to $8,415 after both parties chose an impartial appraiser and an umpire determined the cost to repair the property was $43,921. Batiz did not cash the payment and brought a declaratory action against Exchange. Both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted Exchange's motion for summary judgment, dismissing Batiz's action without prejudice. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) the circuit court did not err in determining that a declaratory judgment against Exchange was unwarranted because the insurance policy unambiguously provided what rights and obligations the parties had; and (2) the circuit court was correct in ruling that Batiz's assertion that the vast difference between his appraiser's and the umpire's valuations presented a justiciable issue requiring the court to determine the amount of loss was premature as Batiz had not yet repaired or replaced the damaged property. Remanded. View "Batiz v. Fire Ins. Exchange" on Justia Law

Arrowhead Ridge initiated a forcible entry and detainer action when its tenant, Cold Stone Creamery, defaulted on its lease. The trial court granted Arrowhead partial summary judgment, and the issues of mitigation of damages, interest, and attorneys' fees proceeded to trial. The trial court concluded that (1) Arrowhead failed to mitigate its damages due solely to an exclusivity provision in a lease with another tenant, and (2) Arrowhead could not recover its attorneys' fees under either the terms of the lease or state law. The court then denied the parties' motions for a new trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the undisputed evidence established that Arrowhead made substantial efforts to lease the premises to another tenant, the trial court abused its discretion by denying Arrowhead's motion for a new trial; (2) the record established that Arrowhead mitigated its damages by the exercise of reasonable diligence as a matter of law; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Arrowhead's motion for a new trial on the basis that it could recover the attorneys' fees it incurred due to Cold Stone's default. Remanded. View "Arrowhead Ridge I, L.L.C. v. Cold Stone Creamery, Inc." on Justia Law