Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant William Jensen was charged with fourth offense driving under the influence. He filed a motion to strike one of his three prior driving under the influence convictions, arguing that because the magistrate court relied on a statement of rights form to establish the voluntariness of his guilty plea during that prior hearing, that prior conviction was invalid for sentence enhancement purposes. The trial court denied Jensen's motion to strike, concluding that the statement of rights form was an adequate record of voluntariness. Jensen appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Jensen did not demonstrate prejudice, his challenge to his prior driving under the influence conviction was not proper for the Court's consideration; and (2) Jensen did not demonstrate that the magistrate court's failure to personally canvass him to establish the voluntariness of his plea violated his due process rights. View "State v. Jensen" on Justia Law

Richard Orr and Sheldon Cook had a partnership agreement to conduct a cow-calf operation. The parties sold the cows and calves in the spring of 2007. Cook received $230,935 from the sale. Orr sued Cook, disputing the reimbursement amount Cook owed him from the sale and for the cost of feeding and caring for the cows during the winter of 2007. The trial court awarded Orr $41,614. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court was not clearly erroneous in determining the value of the calves; (2) the trial court was not clearly erroneous in determining the amount of reimbursement Cook owed Orr for feed and veterinarian costs; and (3) the trial court did err in refusing to award Orr prejudgment interest because it was requested in a manner allowed by statute. View "Orr v. Cook" on Justia Law

Carlin Jewett was employed as a welder by Real Tuff where Jewett often worked on his knees. In 2006, Jewett suffered a right knee injury. Jewett received arthroscopic surgery, during which the surgeon found pre-existing bilateral osteoarthritis in Jewett's knee. Jewett subsequently filed a petition with the state Department of Labor, seeking workers' compensation for a right knee replacement. Two years later, Jewett suffered a second work-related injury to his left knee. Jewett added a workers' compensation claim for diagnostic treatment of his left knee. The Department and the circuit court ruled that Jewell failed to sustain his burden of proof on the alternate theories that (1) work-related injuries to both knees were a major contributing cause of the need for medical treatment, and (2) the cumulative effect of Jewett's work-related activities was a major contributing cause of the osteoarthritis. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the Department and circuit court did not err in finding (1) Jewett's first injury was not a major contributing cause of Jewett's need for a right knee replacement, and (2) Jewett did not prove that working on his knees was a major contributing cause of his osteoarthritis. View "Jewett v. Real Tuff, Inc." on Justia Law

A limited partnership, POB Associates, was formed for the purpose of owning and operating a physicians office building. The partnership had two general partners. The allocation of POB Associates' profits and losses was governed by Article I, Section 1.06(b) of the partnership agreement, and for approximately 25 years the general partners annually allocated 98% of the limited partnership's profits and losses to the limited partners in accordance with the number of units held by each. In 2008, the general partners adopted a new allocation formula based on a new interpretation of Section 1.06(b), under which 46% of POB Associates' profits and losses were allocated to the limited partners and the remaining 54% was allocated to the general partners. Several limited partners sued the general partners, alleging breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty and requesting a declaratory judgment regarding the allocation under the agreement. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the general partners. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment, finding the partnership agreement capable of more than one meaning under the disputed facts of the case. Remanded. View "Benson Living Trust v. Physicians Office Bldg. Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Ivan Good Plume was found guilty of aggravated assault and of being a habitual offender and was sentenced to eighteen years in prison. On appeal, defendant asserted (1) that the sentencing judge, in referring to a pattern of drunken violence by Good Plume as "going native," evinced his personal bias against defendant and used race as a sentencing factor, thus violating defendant's federal and state due process rights; and (2) the judge abused his discretion in admitting into evidence a letter defendant wrote without considering the requirements of S.D. R. Evid. 404(b) before admitting it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) defendant did not meet his burden of making a specific and substantial showing that a racial or personal bias was used as an aggravating factor in his sentence, and (2) the letter was admitted not to prove defendant engaged in other wrongs, crimes, or acts but as res gestae evidence necessary to prove intent. View "State v. Good Plume" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roger Rodriguez filed an action for sexual abuse as a child against Brother Matthew Miles and John Donadio and the Congregation of the Priests of the Sacred Heart for alleged abuse that occurred in the 1970's while plaintiff was a student at St. Joseph's Indian School. The defendants asserted that, based on plaintiff's deposition testimony, the statute of limitations for plaintiff's action barred plaintiff's claims because plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the childhood sexual abuse caused him injury more than three years before his lawsuit was filed. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that it was undisputed that plaintiff knew of the alleged abuse more than three years before he filed suit and that plaintiff was aware of enough facts to put him on inquiry notice more than three years before he filed suit. View "Rodriguez v. Miles" on Justia Law

Jeremy Lloyd was the general manager at a CiCi's Pizza in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, which was owned by Dakota Land Pizza, and was temporarily managing two CiCi's Pizzas in Omaha, Nebraska, which were owned by Byrne Brands. While traveling between Omaha and Sioux Falls on a trip that was not assigned as part of Lloyd's employment duties, Lloyd was involved in a rollover accident. Lloyd filed a workers' compensation claim against defendants Dakota Land and Byrne Brands. The Department of Labor granted defendants' motions for summary judgment, determining that no genuine issue of material fact demonstrated that Lloyd's injuries arose out of or in the course of his employment. The circuit court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Lloyd's claim did not satisfy the "arising out of" requirement for a workers' compensation claim because it failed to demonstrate that a causal connection existed between the injury and the employment. View "Lloyd v. Byrne Brands" on Justia Law

In an abuse and neglect proceeding, petitioner father's parental rights were terminated in the trial court. The court of appeals dismissed the petitioner's appeal because the original notice of appeal did not contain petitioner's signature required by S.D. Codified Laws 15-26A-4. The petitioner petitioned the Supreme Court to reinstate his appeal but prior to mailing the petition the time for filing a notice of appeal had expired. The Supreme Court denied the petition for reinstatement. The Court concluded that (1) the signing requirement of the statute is jurisdictional and jurisdictional requirements cannot be waived; (2) filing a notice of appeal without petitioner's signature deprived the Court of jurisdiction to consider the appeal of a judgment terminating parental rights; and (3) because the time for filing an appeal expired before petitioner cured the defect, any notice of appeal filed after the prescribed period failed to confer jurisdiction upon the Court. View "In re B.H., J.R. & M.H." on Justia Law

Allen Kissner asked Robert Goulding to take Kissner's life with a gun. Goulding agreed and fatally shot Kissner. A jury found Goulding guilty of first degree murder. Goulding appealed, arguing (1) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that as a matter of law it was not suicide if a person other than the decedent performed the overt act resulting in the decedent's death; (2) the court erred in refusing defense instructions that would have supported an alternative assisted suicide conviction; and (3) the court erred in prohibiting Goulding from referring to the assisted suicide statute. After an analysis of the relevant statutes, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because a "killing by the accused" is not an element of assisted suicide, and because there is no dispute that Goulding committed the overt act that directly caused Kissner's death, Goulding could not have committed assisted suicide. View "State v. Goulding" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Spiska Engineering, Inc. (Spiska) sued Defendant-Appellee SPM Thermo-Shield, Inc. (Thermo-Shield) for breach of contract. Following a number of proceedings and appeals relating to the arbitration of the dispute, an arbitration award was confirmed, and Spiska obtained a money judgment against Thermo-Shield. A receiver was appointed to satisfy the judgment by liquidating Thermo-Shield's assets. Appellant Joseph Raver was Thermo-Shield's president, CEO and sole shareholder. Mr. Raver was not a party to the arbitration proceedings. The receiver mailed Mr. Raver a motion and notice of its intent to sell Thermo-Shield's assets. Mr. Raver appeared at a hearing at the circuit court, and objected to the sale. The court denied Mr. Raver's objection, and approved the sale. Though injunctive relief was not an issue at the hearing, the receiver included language in his proposed findings and conclusions that permanently enjoined Mr. Raver from competing with Thermo-Shield. The court adopted the receiver's findings in its final order. Mr. Raver appealed the award of injunctive relief, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Raver to enjoin him. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin Mr. Raver from competing with Thermo-Shield. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.