Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellee Steven Johnson wanted to purchase a tract of commercial real estate from Defendant-Appellant Harrell Sellers and his wife Sandra Green. The purchase agreement, dated May 2009, was prepared by Mr. Johnson's attorney and incorrectly indicated that Mr. Sellers was a single person. Mr. Sellers was married at the time, but in the process of obtaining a divorce from Ms. Green. Ms. Green moved out in October 2008, and divorce proceedings started in January 2009. Sometime after signing the purchase agreement, Mr. Sellers told his attorney about the mistake in the agreement. Mr. Sellers' counsel advised him that Ms. Green would need to give her permission to sell the property. In June 2009, Ms. Green would not authorize the sale. The parties tried to work out agreements as to the closing and problems with the title, but could not resolve their problems. Mr. Sellers tried to rescind the original purchase agreement, arguing that issues with his divorce made closing on the property impossible. Mr. Johnson sued for specific performance. The trial court ruled that Mr. Sellers waived his rights pertaining to certain terms of the original purchase agreement. The Supreme Court concluded that the impediments to closing were resolved within a reasonable time, and because of this, the court could award specific performance of the contract. The Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court.

Plaintiffs Terry and Susan Brown purchased land adjacent to Defendant James Hanson. The neighbors signed a well-and-road easement agreement, which was recorded with the County Register of Deeds. Believing that the Browns had violated the terms of the agreement, Mr. Hanson filed a letter "rescinding" the agreement with the Register of Deeds. The Browns sued Mr. Hanson, and the trial court ruled that a rescission was not the appropriate remedy for a breach of the easement. Mr. Hanson appealed that decision, and the appellate and Supreme Courts affirmed it. The case was remanded back to the trial court for other issues, one of which was that the Browns alleged Mr. Hanson slandered their title by filing his "rescission" letter with the Register of Deeds. Furthermore, that letter created a cloud on the Browns' title, which the Browns claimed interfered with their contract to sell the property to a third party. The trial court entered a judgment in the Browns' favor. Mr. Hanson again appealed. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in finding Mr. Hanson slandered the Browns' title and tortiously interfered with their sales contract. The Court remanded the case for the redetermination of attorney's fees.

The South Dakota Department of Transportation (DOT) obtained title to land once owned by Defendants Philip Clark, P&J Enterprises, LLC and Hansen Manufacturing Corporation by eminent domain. The jury determined the amount of compensation to award for the taking. The trial court subsequently awarded prejudgment interest and attorneyâs fees to Defendants. The DOT challenged the award of attorneyâs fees. The Supreme Court found that the plain language of the applicable state law allows for an award of prejudgment interest and attorneyâs fees in connection with eminent domain takings. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial courtâs decision.

Petitioner James Lawrence appealed the circuit courtâs denial of his petition for habeas corpus, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and sentence for âtheft by deception.â In 1996, Petitioner approached the victim four times over the course of several months, offering to perform home repairs that he said would be reimbursed under a federal government program. By the end, Petitioner had received over $5,000 for his âwork.â Petitioner furnished invoices he claimed would be reimbursed and an âofficialâ called the victim to arrange to inspect the work Petitioner had done. When the inspector never showed, the victim called the local branch of the government agency to follow up, and learned that the alleged reimbursement had ended several years earlier. In 2003, a jury found Petitioner guilty of theft by deception and sentenced him to twenty-five yearsâ imprisonment at the state penitentiary. The appellate court affirmed his conviction. In 2006, Petitioner sought the writ of habeas corpus, alleging among other things, that his constitutional rights had been violated because he was convicted on insufficient evidence. The circuit court denied his motion, and Petitioner brought his appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court concluded that there was ample evidence from which the jury could draw its conclusion. The Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decisions to dismiss Petitionerâs appeals.

Plaintiff Gregory Carmon filed suit against Defendant Brian Rose, alleging conspiracy to defraud. Plaintiffâs suit claimed that Defendant and several others defrauded him in an oil and gas investment scheme. The summons and complaint were served by substitute service to Defendantâs wife who lived in Kentucky. When no responsive pleadings were filed, Plaintiff moved for a default judgment, which was granted. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to set aside the judgment, claiming the substitute service was invalid because he had not lived in the Kentucky home since separating from his wife in 2008. The trial court denied Defendantâs motion, and Defendant appealed. The evidence presented to the trial court showed that the Defendant continued to use the Kentucky address to conduct business after separating from his wife. As late as 2010, a vehicle registered to Defendant was photographed outside the Kentucky home. The Supreme Court concluded that the weight of the evidence supported the trial courtâs conclusion that substitute service was valid, and affirmed the lower courtâs decision.

Appellees Nine, Inc. and GDT, Inc. own and operate a private bar and/or restaurant businesses in Brookings. These businesses are authorized to sell alcoholic beverages under operating agreements with Brookings. Appellees sought a declaration that a Brookings ordinance and resolution establishing the fee for additional full-service restaurant on-sale liquor operating agreements/licenses violated state law because the fee was based on city population rather than the market value of existing operating agreements/licenses. Brookings is a "local option community" in that there is only one liquor "license" and that license is held by the city. Local option cities then enter into "operating agreements" with private businesses to sell alcoholic beverages. Because there are technically no licenses or license sales to determine current fair market value, a question arose whether Brooking's operating agreements should be considered the same as licenses for the purpose of determining the fee under SDCL 35-4-117. Brookings took the position that because there wee no "license sales upon which current market value could have been established under the statute, the city was authorized to set the new license fee at the minimum amount based on population as provided for in SDCL 35-4-116. Appellees brought suit; the circuit court ruled that the operating licenses were the same as licenses for the purposes of determining the fee under the new statutes. The court declared the Brookings ordinance and resolution invalid because they established the new license fee at an amount far less than current fair market value under SDCL 35-4-117. On review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court correctly determined the Brookings ordinance and resolution were invalid and affirmed the lower court's decision.