Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A law enforcement officer stopped a vehicle driven by Shane Erwin for making an illegal left turn. After engaging in routine traffic stop questioning, the officer became suspicious and walked his drug-sensing dog around Defendant's vehicle. Drugs and drug paraphernalia were later found in the vehicle. Shane and his father, Richard Erwin, who was traveling in the vehicle, were both arrested. The Erwins moved to suppress evidence, alleging an illegal stop. The trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the officer had probable cause to stop the Erwins because he witnessed a violation of S.D. Codified Laws 32-26-18, which requires that a left turning vehicle turn into the left most lawfully available lane. Remanded. View "State v. Erwin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual contact with a child under the age of sixteen. Defendant appealed, arguing that his arraignment was inadequate and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant had sufficient notice of the charge against him, pleaded not guilty, exercised his rights, and had an adequate opportunity to defend himself at trial, there was no error in the arraignment; and (2) Defendant waived his argument that the trial court erred in failing to enter a specific finding that the minor victim was a competent witness, and therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

A deputy sheriff stopped a pickup truck because he did not see the vehicle's temporary license permit on the rear window. Defendant, the driver, was subsequently arrested for DUI. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop. The circuit court granted the motion, concluding that the deputy unconstitutionally extended the scope of the stop by initiating contact with the driver when the deputy could have first confirmed that the temporary license permit was valid. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it ruled that the initial stop of Defendant's pickup was based on reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle was without a license; (2) when an officer stops a vehicle based on objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, and the officer's suspicion is dispelled, the officer may nonetheless approach the driver and explain the mistake; and (3) it was error for the circuit court to suppress the evidence gathered as a result of the stop and to order dismissal of the case. View "State v. Amick" on Justia Law

An intoxicated driver (Driver) struck and injured several children. Driver later pleaded guilty to two counts of vehicular battery. Driver's insurer (Insurer) brought a declaratory action seeking a ruling that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the driver in any negligence suit brought on the children's behalf. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Insurer, ruling that coverage had expired twelve hours prior to the accident. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that by failing to accept the offer from Insurer to renew her insurance policy, Driver's coverage expired the day before the accident under the express and unambiguous terms of the insurance contract. View "Alpha Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ihle" on Justia Law

At the start of each beekeeping season, Elllingson's Inc. placed its honey bees on the real property of others. After Ellingson's determined it would not longer own bees, it leased to other beekeepers the right to place bees on the property of some of the landowners with whom Ellingson's had been doing business. In 2011, Jim Ammann, a competing beekeeper, sought permission to place his bees on the property of landowners who had previously given Ellingson's permission to place bees. Several landowners subsequently revoked the permission they had given Ellingson's and granted Ammann permission to place his bees on their property. David Ellingson, a principal in Ellingson's, sued Ammann for interference with a business relationship and other causes of action. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Ammann. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that David had no business interference claim he could assert in his individual capacity, and thus, summary judgment in favor of Ammann was proper. View "Ellingson v. Ammann" on Justia Law

Appellees John Apland and others (collectively, Apland) and the Butte County Director of Equalization (Director) were involved in a dispute over the method Director used to calculate the value of Apland's rangeland property for tax purposes. In Apland I, the Supreme Court held that Director failed to comply with the Constitutional requirements of equality and uniformity and remanded with direction to Director to re-determine the property values after giving appropriate consideration and value to appurtenant and nontransferable water rights. On remand, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Apland, concluding that Director failed to comply with the directives in Apland I. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Director properly executed the directives of Apland I but that the record did not allow the Court to determine whether Director's method of valuation of Apland's property resulted in an equal and uniform assessment. View "Apland v. Bd. of Equalization for Butte County" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault. Defendant appealed, alleging multiple errors in his trial. The Supreme Court (1) remanded for further proceedings on a potential Batson violation for the trial court's grant of a preemptory strike of a Native American juror, holding that Defendant established a prima facie case for purposeful discrimination in the preemptory strike, and because the circuit court failed to determine if Defendant proved that the State was motivated by purposeful discrimination, a limited remand was required to allow the circuit court to engage in the missing analysis; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "State v. Scott" on Justia Law

Upon Marcus Degen's purchase of a home, Marcus purchased a homeowner's insurance policy with Hanson Farm Mutual Insurance Company of South Dakota (HFMIC). Marcus, Tina Sellers, and Tina's two daughters moved into the house. One evening, while Marcus was leveling dirt on the property with a skid loader, Marcus hit and killed one of the girls, Adrianna. Tina pursued a wrongful death action against Marcus a year later. HFMIC filed a declaratory judgment action asking the trial court to determine whether it had an obligation to indemnify or defend Marcus in the underlying wrongful death action. The trial court ruled in favor of HFMIC, determining that Adrianna was in Marcus's care and was therefore excluded from coverage under a household exclusion contained in the policy. Both Tina, as the personal representative of her daughter's estate, and Marcus appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court correctly concluded that the phrase "in your care" was unambiguous and in concluding that Adrianna was in Marcus's care; and (2) because she was in Marcus's care, Adrianna was excluded from coverage under the household exclusion contained in the policy. View "Hanson Farm Mut. Ins. Co. of S.D. v. Degen" on Justia Law

Claimant was employed full-time by School District (District). The District later notified Claimant it was replacing her full-time position with a part-time position, which would consist of seventy-five percent of the time of Claimant's full-time position and a twenty-five percent reduction in pay. Claimant rejected the offer of the part-time position and filed a claim for unemployment benefits. The Department of Labor and Regulation, Unemployment Insurance Division concluded that Claimant was eligible to receive unemployment benefits, and an ALJ affirmed. The Secretary of the Department of Labor reversed, finding that Claimant was not eligible to receive unemployment benefits. The circuit reversed, concluding that the part-time position was not "suitable" employment and that Claimant had good cause to reject the offer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Claimant was eligible for unemployment benefits because the twenty-five percent pay reduction made the part-time position unsuitable and gave Claimant good cause to reject the new position. View "Easton v. Hanson Sch. Dist. 30-1 " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree manslaughter by means of a dangerous weapon, vehicular homicide, vehicular battery, and DUI. Defendant was acquitted of two charges of first-degree manslaughter while engaged in the commission of a felony. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the language "while engaged in the commission of a felony" was prejudicial when referring to the charge of DUI; and (2) the trial court improperly overruled her objections to the admissibility of testimony regarding the kinetic energy of Defendant's vehicle. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) because the jury did not convict Defendant on the counts containing the language "while engaged in the commission of a felony," Defendant's argument that she was prejudiced was moot; but (2) the trial court erred when it concluded that the disputed testimony was relevant, and the error was not harmless. View "State v. Kvasnicka " on Justia Law