Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Homeowners obtained a default judgment against an LLC. Although the LLC's manager (Manager) was listed as an individual defendant, the default was only against the LLC. A partial satisfaction of the judgment was later entered. Afterwards, the trial court issued an order stating that any other claims against Manager were dismissed with prejudice. Later, LLC unsuccessfully challenged the amount of the partial satisfaction of judgment. Thereafter, Manager, individually and on behalf of the LLC, filed a notice of appeal appealing four separate orders made in the case. Homeowners moved to dismiss, arguing that the appeal was untimely, Manager was not an attorney and could not represent the LLC, and Manager was not an aggrieved party. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the appeal of three of the orders was untimely; (2) a non-licensed attorney is not permitted to appear pro se to represent an LLC; and (3) because all of the claims against Manager were dismissed, he was not an aggrieved party and could not appeal the remaining order, the partial satisfaction of judgment order. View "Smith v. Rustic Home Builders, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to first-degree injury to property and possession of a controlled substance. Appellant was sentenced to twenty-one years in the penitentiary for both convictions, to be served consecutively. Appellant's sentenced commenced on June 18, 2007. According to the Department of Corrections (DOC), Appellant's initial parole date was June 21, 2027. The DOC calculated the initial parole date pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 24-15A-32. Appellant appealed the DOC's determination. The Board of Pardons and Paroles and the circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board acted without authority in determining that Appellant was a Class 2 felon when calculating his initial parole date. Remanded to the Board with directions to calculate Appellant's initial parole date in conformity with this opinion. View "Rowley v. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles" on Justia Law

In 1967, Raymond and Margaret Becker's eight child inherited an undivided one-eighth interest in patented fee land located within the boundaries of the Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Reservation. None of the Beckers were Indians. In 2006, one of the Becker children sold her interest to Patrick and Carletta Aberle. Patrick was a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, and Carletta was a non-Indian. Due to certain conveyances, Patrick and Carletta each owned an undivided one-sixteenth interest in the property. The Becker children later commenced this action seeking a sale of the entire property. The Aberles counterclaimed for partition. Patrick also contended that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute because he was a member of the Tribe, which had jurisdiction. The circuit court ordered a sale of the entire property, concluding that state jurisdiction did not infringe upon tribal sovereignty. In considering the state-tribal jurisdiction issue, the Supreme Court noted that a determination of the disputed land's alienability was necessary. The Court then remanded the matter to the circuit court to reconsider the jurisdiction question after further development of a factual record and consideration of land alienation cases. View "McGuire v. Aberle" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of first-degree rape of a minor and twelve counts of possessing, manufacturing, or distributing child pornography. Defendant was indicted of the charges after the deputy state's attorney issued subpoenas to Midcontinent Communications requesting the personal information of the subscriber associated with the IP address where officers found child pornography. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the trial court failed to address the pertinent factors and make specific findings regarding its exclusion of the general public from the courtroom when the child victim testified about sexual abuse; and (2) Defendant had no privacy interest in the information obtained by subpoenas issued by the State to Midcontinent, and therefore, Defendant had no standing to challenge the subpoenas. View "State v. Rolfe" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for driving with a revoked license. The indictment stemmed from a traffic stop that a law enforcement officer initiated after he noticed that Defendant's headlights appeared to be at their high-beam setting. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence and statements obtained during the stop of his vehicle, arguing that the stop should have ended after the officer confirmed Defendant did not fail to dim his headlights. The magistrate court denied the motion and later found Defendant guilty. The circuit court affirmed Defendant's conviction, including the magistrate court's denial of Defendant's suppression motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when the officer requested Defendant's driver's license, the officer had not yet completed his investigation of the failure to dim offense, and therefore, the officer's request was within the scope of the investigation attendant to the traffic stop; and (2) accordingly, there was no violation of Defendant's federal or state constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. View "State v. Bonacker" on Justia Law

Daughter was born with cerebral palsy and developmental disabilities. Daughter's Father and Mother later divorced. After Daughter turned eighteen, a California court appointed Mother as Daughter's guardian and conservator. Mother subsequently moved to South Dakota with her new husband and Daughter. Thereafter, Father sought to end Mother's role as guardian and conservator. After a hearing, a South Dakota circuit court terminated Mother's appointment as guardian and conservator for Daughter, finding that Mother failed adequately to address Daughter's obesity and transition to more independent living. Mother appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in (1) preventing Mother from questioning attorneys appointed to represent Daughter about certain statements attorneys made in an investigative report, as the report was not entered into evidence at the hearing; and (2) removing Mother as Daughter's guardian and conservator, as Mother did not make significant progress toward the goal of moving Daughter into an independent residential living situation and failed promptly and aggressively to manage the issue of Daughter's weight. View "In re Guardianship of Stevenson" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was serving a life sentence in the South Dakota Penitentiary when he and another inmate assaulted a correctional officer, pled guilty to first-degree murder of the officer. Defendant waived his right to a jury determination of the appropriate sentence. After a pre-sentence hearing, the circuit court sentenced Defendant to death. Defendant appealed his sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in all respects with one exception, holding (1) in selecting a sentence, the circuit court violated Defendant's right to be free from self-incrimination by improperly considering statements made by Defendant to a psychiatrist during a competency evaluation; and (2) the use of this statement was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded to the circuit court to conduct a sentencing without this error. View "State v. Berget" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree rape. Defendant appealed a number of issues involving hearsay and the denial of a requested jury instruction, a Batson challenge, and an objection regarding the State's use of the word "rape" during trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's challenges to testimony admitted at trial were either not preserved for appeal or were without merit; (2) the instructions that were given to the jury accurately stated the law and were not prejudicial to Defendant; (3) the trial court correctly denied Defendant's Batson challenge to the State's peremptory strike of a juror; and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's objection to the use of the word "rape" during trial. View "State v. Roach" on Justia Law

Ila and Gary Fedderson owned a business called Whisky Flow Dining and Minor Alley. Whisky Flow was destroyed by fire, after which Ila and Gary submitted a sworn proof of loss statement to the business's insurer, Columbia Insurance Group. Gary, however, made misrepresentations and committed fraud in submitting the statement. Columbia declined to pay Ila benefits, relying on a condition that voided the policy for fraud or misrepresentation by any insured. Ila filed suit, claiming that she was an innocent insured who was entitled to her share of the claim that related to her fifty percent interest in the business. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Columbia. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly granted Columbia's motion for summary judgment, as Gary's misrepresentation and fraud voided the policy. View "Fedderson v. Columbia Ins. Group" on Justia Law

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved plans and specifications for the Brant Lake Sanitary District's wastewater treatment facility in 2012. The Brant Lake facility plans proposed to join and expand the Chester Sanitary District's existing wastewater disposal system. The plans included the construction of an additional treatment lagoon to tie into Chester's existing two-cell lagoon system. The plans also included the construction of additional piping to transport wastewater to the treatment lagoons. Plaintiffs' home and business were near the proposed lagoon. Plaintiffs filed an application for a writ of mandamus requiring DENR to comply with applicable state statutes, administrative rules, and DENR internal guidelines in approving the plans and specifications for the Brant Lake facility. The trial court denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden to show that DENR disregarded a clear duty to act under the applicable statutes, administrative rules, or manuals, and accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' application for writ of mandamus. View "Krsnak v. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res." on Justia Law