Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Walter Henderson brought a quiet title action to claim ownership of an undivided thirty percent interest in a mineral estate. Following a court trial, which confirmed Walter's ownership of the mineral interest in fee, Walter's half-sister, Susan Henderson, individually and as representative of her deceased mother, Dora Henderson, appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that Walter's cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations under S.D. Codified Laws 15-2-13(1) and 15-3-2. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly quieted title in Walter's favor and concluded that Walter was the owner of the thirty percent mineral interest described in an agreement between Walter and his father. View "Estate of Henderson v. Estate of Henderson" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty but mentally ill to ten counts of grand theft. Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her guilty but mentally ill pleas prior to sentencing. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw her pleas of guilty but mentally ill; (2) Defendant's due process rights were not violated when she was denied the opportunity to review and comment on the entire presentence investigation report prior to sentencing; (3) Defendant's claim that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel was not ripe for review on direct appeal; and (4) Defendant's sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. View "State v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

Lamar Advertising submitted applications to Rapid City for sign building permits, which would allow Lamar to convert six traditional billboards to digital signs. The City denied Lamar's applications, finding that a conditional use permit was required to alter an existing off-premises sign. Lamar petitioned the circuit court for a writ of certiorari, arguing (1) the City, in at least 100 prior instances, allowed Lamar to alter existing signs without first obtaining a conditional use permit, and therefore, the City should be estopped from now requiring a conditional use permit; and (2) the City's denial was beyond its jurisdiction as an effort to improperly regulate digital billboards in contravention of existing ordinances. The circuit court denied Lamar's petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City acted in an irregular pursuit of its authority when it denied Lamar's six applications for sign building permits. View "Lamar Adver. of S.D., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment" on Justia Law

Mother and Father had a child out of wedlock. The parents had agreed that Mother would retain physical custody of the child and Father would exercise visitation for one week every other month. This arrangement continued until Father petitioned for a change of custody. The circuit court awarded joint legal custody to both parents and primary physical custody to Father. Mother appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding (1) Mother's mental health condition, when untreated, made her unable to care for the child; (2) Mother's relationships negatively impacted the child; (3) Father had developed a bond with the child and could meet the child's needs; and (4) Father's wife's relationship with the child was not inappropriate, harmful, or otherwise negative. Lastly, the court did not impose a higher burden on Mother to prove a substantial change in circumstances before she could receive custody. View "Benson v. Loffelmacher" on Justia Law

Bradley DeBoer sued Tara DeBoer for divorce. During the parties' marriage, the Texas Department of State Health Services issued an amended birth certificate naming Bradley as the father of Taiton, the child Tara had from a prior relationship. Tara counterclaimed for custody and support of Taiton. The circuit court granted Tara custody of Taiton but denied her request for child support. At issue on appeal was whether the circuit court erred in concluding Bradley was not Taiton's presumed father under Texas law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 1260.207(a)(4), a rebuttable presumption of paternity arose because Bradley voluntarily asserted he was Taiton's biological father and the assertion was in a record filed with the bureau of vital statistics; (2) under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 160.607(b) the presumption of paternity was not rebutted; and (3) although Bradley was not Taiton's biological father, Bradley was Taiton's parent for purposes of child support. Remanded. View "DeBoer v. DeBoer" on Justia Law

Terry Leonhardt and his wife, Cindy, alleged that they entered into an oral lease with Terry's father, Delbert Leonhardt, which was to extend for the lives of Delbert and his wife, Ellen. They claimed the oral lease contained a right of first refusal that Terry could exercise after the death of both Delbert and Ellen. Delbert later entered into a written lease with his grandson, Matthew Oswald. The written lease encompassed some of the farmland Terry and Cindy alleged was part of their oral lease with Delbert. Terry and Cindy initiated a declaratory judgment action against Delbert, seeking a declaration that the oral lease and right of first refusal were valid. Matthew intervened in the lawsuit. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Delbert and Matthew on the ground that the lease was invalid under the statute of frauds. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court erred in failing to provide them with notice that it would consider granting summary judgment on a legal theory different from the legal theory advances by Delbert and Matthew in their summary judgment pleadings and brief, and Terry and Cindy were prejudiced by the error. View "Leonhardt v. Leonhardt" on Justia Law

James Kesling executed a holographic will. After James died, the will was admitted into probate and James's three daughters were appointed as co-personal representatives of James's estate. Both the Estate and James's wife, Sandra, petitioned the circuit court to construe the will. The circuit court granted the Estate's motion for summary judgment. Sandra appealed, arguing that the will was ambiguous, and thus, the court erred by not considering extrinsic evidence as to James's intent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) James's intent was clearly expressed within the four corners of his holographic will and extrinsic evidence was not needed; and (2) the unambiguous language of the will demonstrated James's intent to give Sandra a life estate in his property with his three daughters as remaindermen. View "In re Estate of Kesling" on Justia Law

Nicole and Michael Hagedorn were married for fifteen years and had two daughters. Nicole later filed for divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery. The trial court granted Nicole a divorce on those grounds and awarded her alimony of $5,000 per month and attorney fees. Michael appealed the awards of alimony and attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding to Nicole alimony in the amount of $5,000 per month for life; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding $14,419 in attorney fees to Nicole. View "Hagedorn v. Hagedorn" on Justia Law

Insurer denied coverage for two unassembled wind turbines that were destroyed in a fire on Ranch's property. Insurer claimed that a policy exclusion for "fences, windmills, windchargers, or their towers" permitted it to deny coverage for the loss. Ranch sued Insurer, asserting Insurer committed a breach of contract and acted in bad faith in denying coverage for the unassembled wind turbines. The circuit court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment, finding the policy exclusion applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly applied the law in determining Ranch's unassembled wind turbines were precluded from coverage under Insurer's policy exclusion, as the language of the exclusion was unambiguous and the plain and ordinary meanings of "windmill" and "windcharger" encompassed the unassembled wind turbines. View "Ass Kickin Ranch, LLC v. N. Star Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The district court granted temporary custody of three Native American children to the department of social services. Citing the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe (Tribe) contested the custody order by challenging the oldest child's temporary placement and questioning the lack of adherence to relative placement preferences under the ICWA. The court advised that ICWA placement preferences were not yet applicable. The Tribe filed an application for a writ of mandamus or prohibition from the Supreme Court to compel a new temporary custody hearing. The Supreme Court dismissed the Tribe's application for an extraordinary writ, holding that the trial court was not obligated to follow ICWA at temporary or emergency custody proceedings under state law, and therefore, the trial court appropriately rejected the Tribe's invocation of ICWA and requests for a new temporary custody hearing conducted in full accord with ICWA. View "Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Judicial Court (Davis)" on Justia Law