Justia South Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Before he died, the Decedent transferred two quarter sections of Indian trust land located in Tripp County, South Dakota, to his son. The Decedent’s estate (the Estate) filed this action arguing that the Decedent lacked the requisite mental capacity or was unduly influenced by his son when he transferred the land. Specifically, the Estate requested that the court compel the Decedent’s son to make application to the Secretary of the Interior for the transfer of the Indian trust property to the Estate. The circuit court denied the Estate’s request and dismissed the action, determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the parcels held in trust by the United States. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. View "Ducheneaux v. Ducheneaux" on Justia Law

Sister and Brother were co-trustees of a family Trust established by the siblings' parents. Before their mother died, she entered into a contract for deed with Brother for the sale of 480 acres of trust farmland. After the mother died, the siblings stipulated for court supervision of the Trust. Within the Trust action, Sister sued Brother and his wife for undue influence on his contract for deed with their mother. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Brother, concluding that Sister’s claim of undue influence was barred by the statute of limitations and that any oral agreement associated with the contract for deed was barred by the statute of frauds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Sister did not timely bring her claim for undue influence, the circuit court correctly ruled that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) because Sister sought to enforce her asserted interest in the sale of real estate, the circuit court correctly ruled that any oral agreement regarding the real estate was barred by the statute of frauds. View "In re Matheny Family Trust" on Justia Law

Before his death in 2011, Donald Hyde executed a will and then a revocable trust that he funded with real estate and a brokerage account containing stock. Under the trust, the stock was to be distributed to charities upon Hyde’s death. However, in a post-trust codicil, Hyde bequeathed the stock to his siblings. Before his death, Hyde also deeded trust real estate to siblings and loaned his sister money that he obtained from the trust brokerage account. After the circuit court supervising the trust made its findings and determinations, and charities and Hyde’s sister appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in determining (1) the post-trust codicil did not modify the trust; (2) the trust should not be reformed to distribute the stock to the siblings; (3) the loan to the sister should be repaid to Hyde’s estate rather than his trust; (4) the deeds conveying property to Hyde’s siblings were validly delivered before Hyde’s death; and (5) the charities failed to meet their burden of proving that some of Hyde’s dispositions were the result of undue influence. View "In re Donald Hyde Trust" on Justia Law

Steven C. Lester died on August 17, 2011. Pamela Lester, the personal representative of Steven’s estate, published a Notice to Creditors advising them to file claims within four months of the notice. On a later date, Pamela mailed a notice directly to Michelle Lamphere, which provided a later deadline by which Lamphere was required to file her claim. Lamphere met that deadline, but Pamela denied the claim. Lamphere subsequently filed a petition to allow the claim. Pamela moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it was barred by the statute of limitations provided for creditors’ claims. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Lamphere’s claim was time-barred because it was not filed within four months after the publication of the Notice to Creditors. Lamphere appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by granting the motion to dismiss because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether she was an unknown, known, or reasonably ascertainable creditor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it resolved a disputed question of material fact regarding Lamphere’s status as a creditor and granted judgment to Steven’s estate. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Lester" on Justia Law

Ella Richard died leaving a will naming her son, Kelly Ricard, as personal representative of the estate and the sole devisee. The circuit court entered an order for complete settlement declaring the will valid. Thereafter, Renee Laas, another of Ella’s children, filed a petition to set aside informal probate and determine intestacy, alleging undue influence. The circuit court denied the petition, determining that the order for complete settlement was final and appealable and that Laas failed to appeal the order. Laas appealed the denial of her petition, arguing that the will was never formally probated and that S.D. Codified Laws 29A-3-108 and 29-3-401 allow an interested person to file a petition for formal administration of a will any time within three years of the decedent’s death, even after a complete settlement of the estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the estate in this case was completely settled and closed in a formal probate proceeding, that Laas had notice of this proceeding, and therefore, the circuit court did not err when it denied Lass’s petition to set aside informal probate and declare intestacy. View "In re Estate of Ricard" on Justia Law

After Earl Long died, Earl’s daughter, Brenda Chafin, challenged the validity of Earl’s estate plan, which included certain gifts and amendments to his trust. The circuit court concluded that Earl’s estate plan was valid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it determined that Earl had the requisite testamentary capacity to carry out his estate plan; (2) the circuit court was correct in determining that Earl’s estate plan was not the product of undue influence; and (3) the circuit court did not err by not requiring the distributions to be equalized under a review of Earl’s entire estate plan. View "In re Estate of Long" on Justia Law

Dora Gaaskjolen was an eighty-seven year-old widow who suffered from a traumatic head injury and other physical ailments. Dora’s grandson, Shane, an attorney, filed a petition for appointment of temporary conservator, and the circuit court ordered Dacotah Bank to be Dora’s temporary conservator. Shane subsequently moved for Dacotah to be Dora’s permanent conservator, but Dora moved to set aside the appointment of Dacotah as temporary conservator and, instead, nominated her daughter Audrey to be her conservator. Ultimately, the circuit court granted Shane’s motion for Dacotah to be Dora’s permanent conservator and denied Dora’s motion, finding that it was in the best interests of Dora that Dacotah be appointed as her conservator. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court’s finding and conservator appointment had support in the record. View "In re Conservatorship of Gaaskjolen" on Justia Law

Decedent's ex-wife, Ann, filed a claim against Decedent's estate for compensation for nursing and convalescent services she provided to Decedent before his death. Before Decedent died, he forgave a loan he made to Ann. The trustee of Decedent's trust denied Ann's claim, asserting that the loan forgiveness constituted payment for Ann's services. Ann subsequently filed a petition for allowance of claim, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment and seeking payment from Decedent's trust. The trial court ordered that the trust pay Ann $183,538 for services rendered, concluding that Ann was entitled to compensation. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the loan forgiveness was not compensation for the services Ann provided to Decedent and that Ann was entitled to compensation for the services she provided to Decedent; but (2) concluded that the trial court erred in calculating the amount of Ann's award. Remanded with instructions to recalculate the award. View "In re Nelson Living Trust" on Justia Law

After Wife moved into a nursing home, Husband disinherited Wife in his will. Wife's attorney-in-fact, her son, disclaimed any inheritance Wife may have been entitled to receive from Husband's estate. One year later, while Wife was receiving Medicaid assistance for her nursing home care, Husband predeceased Wife. Wife's guardian ad litem petitioned for an elective share of Husband's estate and moved to set aside the disclaimer. The circuit court denied the petition, concluding that Wife had validly disclaimed her right to an elective share and that Wife received her fair share of Husband's estate when Husband used their joint resources to pay for her care. The Department of Social Services, which administers the Medicaid program, intervened and moved to reconsider. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for Wife to obtain her elective share, holding (1) Wife was entitled to an elective share; and (2) because no prejudice to interested parties was demonstrated, the circuit court erred by not granting the guardian ad litem's motion to revoke the disclaimer where the guardian was acting in Wife's best interests. View "In re Estate of Shipman" on Justia Law

Curley Haisch and his wife Rose owned Mulehead Ranch. Joe Duling was the Haisches' financial advisor as well as a realtor and broker. When Curley was ninety years old, he decided to sell the ranch and signed a listing agreement with Joe. Approximately one year later, Joe suggested that Curley and Rose form a charitable remainder trust (Trust) into which the ranch and chattels could be gifted. Curley and Rose executed the Trust, to which the Ranch was transferred. The Trustee then sold the Ranch to Joe and Lynne Duling. Later, it was discovered that the Trust contained multiple defects. The Trustee brought suit against the Dulings, their businesses, and the Mulehead Ranch on behalf of the Trust and the Haisches. The complaint alleged negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duties. A jury found in favor of the Trust awarded Plaintiffs $1,568,200, including punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for a new trial on damages, holding (1) the circuit court erred in failing to give a proper instruction on the statutes of limitation applicable to Plaintiffs' claims for future tax consequences related to the defects in the Trust; and (2) the court did not err in the remainder of its judgment. View "Bailey v. Duling" on Justia Law